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The current strategy to computer networking is to increase the accessibility that legitimate 
users have to their respective systems and to distribute functionality. This creates a more 
efficient working environment, users may work from home, organisations can make better 
use of their computing power. Unfortunately, a side effect of opening up computer systems 
and placing them on potentially global networks is that they face increased threats from 
uncontrolled access points, and from eavesdroppers listening to the data communicated 
between systems. Along with these increased threats the traditional ones such as 
disgruntled employees, malicious software, and accidental damage must still be countered. 
A comprehensive integrated security system ( CISS ) has been developed to provide 
security within the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) and Open Distributed Processing 
(ODP) environments. The research described in this thesis investigates alternative methods 
for its implementation and its optimisation through partial implementation within hardware 
and software and the investigation of mechanisms to improve its security. 
A new deployment strategy for CISS is described where functionality is divided amongst 
computing platforms of increasing capability within a security domain. Definitions are given 
of a: local security unit, that provides terminal security; local security servers that serve the 
local security units and domain management centres that provide security service co- 
ordination within a domain. 
New hardware that provides RSA and DES functionality capable of being connected to Sun 
microsystems is detailed. The board can be used as a basic building block of CISS, 
providing fast cryptographic facilities, or in isolation for discrete cryptographic services. 
Software written for UNIX in C/C++ is described, which provides optimised security 
mechanisms on computer systems that do not have SBus connectivity. 
A new identification/authentication mechanism is investigated that can be added to existing 
systems with the potential for extension into a real time supervision scenario. The 
mechanism uses keystroke analysis through the application of neural networks and genetic 
algorithms and has produced very encouraging results. 
Finally, a new conceptual model for intrusion detection capable of dealing with real time 
and historical evaluation is discussed, which further enhances the CISS concept. 
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1. Introduction 
This clw/rlc'r gives a brief i/Nrnchrclicur to Ihc' need 
. 
/or SL'crn"ily within 
open clisir"ihrrlcd c'rrº'iIV/? / rer1IS". II a/so describes the aims and 
nhjeclires of the research aiid gives a brief inlroclrcclion to each 
chn/)Icr u ilhinr Ihis" Ilhcsis". 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 TntroductiOn 
Civilisations have been built upon a single foundation - knowledge. The exploitation of 
natural resources, the management of workforces, the governing of economies, the creation 
of weapons, all require knowledge; knowledge of a process, knowledge of a method, 
knowledge of a thin. Within the twentieth century the possession of knowledge bequeaths 
more power than ever before and with its new found value it has acquired a new name - 
data. Data is this century's most valuable commodity; it has no material substance, residing 
in an ethereal realm of charge within the memory of computers. Computers, themselves a 
major influence on the shape of our society, must protect the resource that moulds our 
society. The increased connectivity. which computers have attained within the past two 
decades and the wider availability of computing power have placed a potential weapon 
within reach of many members of society, and as technology improves this weapon is likely 
to be extended to an ever increasing proportion of society. 
As we enter the final years or tile twentieth century the changes that have taken place within 
our society, especially within the past three decades, were efTected by the increasing 
exposure of the public to information technology. Data storage, manipulation and delivery 
have all become faster and easier for the user as technology has improved and demand has 
increased. More people are beginning to use the power that information technology can 
provide and equipment manufacturers have attempted to blur the technology that service the 
user, by providing easy interfaces through which it is possible for anybody to very quickly 
attain a basic level of competence and remove the illusion that computers were meant just 
for the `techies. ' 
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It is the ultimate goal of modern information interconnection strategies to provide global 
connectivity of people and computers. This goal may have appeared unobtainable a decade 
or so ago, but recent activity within the information technology community makes it appear 
that it may not just be possible, but now very probable. 
The latest charge within the boundaries of information technology comes under the banner 
of the "information super highway, " the term made famous by vice-president Al Gore of the 
USA [1 ], [2 ]. It is the "sound-byte" by which the programme to lead the United States 
data communication infrastructure into the next century is known. The infrastructure will 
comprise of an optical fibre network extending to the home of every citizen within the USA, 
so providing much increased capacity and greater accessibility for all. As with so many 
innovations from America it is now being adopted within the European Community. 
As networks and the consequential connection of computers with their stored data becomes 
increasingly common through the introduction of standards such as the International 
Standards Organisation Open System Interconnection (ISO-OSI) reference model [3 ], the 
security of that data becomes ever more important. Current techniques in security have 
proved themselves to be ineffective when confronted by credible hackers [4 ], [5 ], [6 ]. As 
more and more people gain access to networks and the computers connected to them, as 
current policy within the EC and USA indicates they will, then there is likely to be more 
people tempted to pursue illegal activities. Many may wish to instigate malicious damage 
while others may only inadvertently cause damage. Whatever the reason, the action is 
illegal and security upon the computer systems must be capable of dealing with these 
attempts. 
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To combat the increased security risks that placing sensitive information upon open 
computer networks with ever increasing numbers of users introduces, new methods for 
security must be found. The model upon which this research is based is called the 
Comprehensive Integrated Security System[7], CISS. The ISO have been setting standards 
for open interconnection of computer systems over the last two decades and the CISS 
model attempts to provide the required security to meet the ISO recommendations [8], [9]. 
CISS is an adaptable security system capable of being added to existing computer systems 
to bring their current level of security up to an acceptable level dictated by the specific 
organisation. 
Increasingly it is becoming easier for individuals to pick up the necessary skills to hack or 
cause malicious damage within computer systems. As development tools for business 
packages have appeared to help business, so to have development tools for virus writers. 
Which makes it quicker and easier to produce viruses that can subsequently be released to 
cause damage to a system's data. Recently an application `SATAN' [10] has become 
available through the internet, ostensible for the use of security administrators, that can be 
used to detect weaknesses ( such as access control and illegal assumption of privileges ) in 
the set up of UNIX systems. As more of these applications are made available, there will be 
a proliferation of people with the necessary skills to effectively conduct attacks upon the 
computer systems, that are becoming ever more important to everyday life. 
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1.2 Aims ind Objectives of the Research 
The main aims of this research project were to further the CISS model by the investigation 
of suitable security mechanisms and the production of modules that would aid in the 
development of a CISS prototype. The specific objectives are: 
1. the identification of weaknesses within the CISS model and the refinement of said model; 
2. the optimisation of a CISS software prototype through implementation of functionality 
within hardware; 
3. development of a new management strategy for CISS within a local area network and 
specification of terminal security; 
4. research into, and the production of new hardware for the development of a prototype 
CISS implementation; 
5. the production of equivalent functionality that the objective 4 hardware provides in 
software for greater flexibility of CISS; 
6. research and development into new mechanisms and concepts that will aid in the security 
of a local security unit. 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
This thesis describes the research conducted in the pursuit of the above aims and objectives. 
Chapter 2 begins with a general description of cryptography and the modern strategies for 
its use that form the basis of all security upon modern computer systems. Without 
cryptography, security would not be feasible across a distributed environment as secure 
communication would not be practical. The theory and basis for modern security policies 
are described along with various security mechanisms which when co-ordinated within a 
coherent policy provide strong security. 
Chapter 3 briefly describes the principles that lie behind the CISS security model. The need 
for security within an OSI environment is discussed along with how CISS can provide this 
in a practical manner. CISS is the basic security model that is developed within the 
proceeding chapters. It provides security through the correct ordering of security 
mechanisms and the use of secure protocols. 
Chapter 4 describes a management policy for the implementation of CISS upon a local area 
network (LAN). LANs provide a good division between the relatively (physically) secured 
communication and a more hostile WAN where a communication medium can potentially be 
tampered with. Organisations usually view their area of responsibility extending as far as 
their own LAN. This chapter uses the mechanisms and concepts described in the previous 
two chapters to provide an overall coherent policy that is flexible enough for configuration 
in a heterogeneous environment, supporting diverse security policies. The management 
6 
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uses a hierarchical structure formed from local security units (LSU), local security servers 
(LSS), and domain management centres (DMC). 
Chapter 5 describes the hardware built for a CISS prototype that has been implemented 
upon a Sun workstation. The board is the first of its kind for Sun workstations, providing 
facilities for symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic algorithms whose use was described 
in chapter two. The development of the prototype board was accomplished in three stages. 
The use of this board will speed up a CISS implementation as described within chapter four 
and can be used in the provision of security mechanisms described in chapter two. 
Chapter 6 describes the necessary software drivers supplied for use with the prototype 
board and a description of the software written to provide the necessary cryptographic 
algorithms, that can be used on systems without access to the hardware implementations. 
The software and hardware are hilly compatible and ready for use within a prototype CISS. 
The software supplied as part ofa mathematical module for CISS is also described. 
Chapter 7 describes the investigation of a new technique for access control and user 
identification mechanisms that can be adapted for use by many computer systems. Its 
adaptability makes it very suitable for application within CISS, specifically the local security 
unit as described in chapter four. The new method analyses the keystroke characteristics of 
an individual from samples of static text strings, so that when presented with further 
keystroke samples they can be classified correctly for user authentication. The keystroke 
recognition has been accomplished through the use of neural networks and genetic 
algorithms for pattern recognition and data sorting respectively. 
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Chapter 8 expands the functionality of the monitoring agent within CISS. Most of the 
security mechanisms used by CISS to provide protection to the computer system on which 
it is implemented can be thought of as barriers. For example, user authentication blocks an 
individual's attempts to access a system. The monitoring agent is expanded to include 
system activity monitoring through appropriate auditing techniques and user profiling. 
Finally, chapter 9 dives the main conclusions that can be gathered from the research. The 
main achievements are reviewed together with its limitations, and suggestions for further 
development of the CISS model and management architecture. 
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Chapter Two 
2. Introduction to Cryptography 
This clºuhler / c't. in. s ºrilh an c'xpluººcºlion c? f leº"ºººs Mal are commonly used 
H'ilhin lho. liclcl n/"c"11lºI(r, L'rcº/rh),, then describes the Iwo grcrrr/r. s of 
cri/rlnt, 'rulrlric SV. %ºrrrr., ". lln" fiº'c rºrn. sl /rnlrrrlur (111(1 heel º"eý. ý/)eclc'd .s slem. s 
are summarised. 77ºc º"c'grºirc. 'ºrºcºrls crf (º cº º/rlný, ýrcr/chic . ýý sleet are 
discussed Wilh º"c'. \/Jrcl !n iºrrl, /cºueººlcºlioºº uººcl cr/)/)licalinºº ºi'ilhin CISS 
and Iwo cº)'/)loSy. slons are chosen 
. 
for inº/)lCºuc'ºrluliOºº ºrilhiu (7 S. 
Finally, cº brief iºNrcrclrrcliurr I" Ihc' ºr. cc' (? f Cº)/r/ogra/rlric techniques 
ºrilhin non-cc, ººfidenliul . (anritt' ººrc'cluºººiSºuS is given. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Cryptology is the science of secure communication in spoken, written, or increasingly, 
electronic form. The word Cryptoloýy derives its meaning from the Greek words `kryptos' 
meaning `hidden' and `loos' meaning `word'. Cryptography is commonly associated with 
the `classic' written communiques of war [I I ]. More recently it is being used in less 
dramatic but more lucrative scenarios, such as banking, pay-television or mobile 
communications. Effective security within distributed systems is only possible through the 
use of cryptography. If it were necessary to secure distributed systems through tamper 
proof technology then it would be too expensive for most organisations to afford. 
For a long time cryptographic techniques were solely used to ensure confidentiality of data, 
but with more importance being placed upon the electronic documents stored within 
computer memory, cryptographic techniques are being applied within proof mechanisms, to 
provide identification, authentication and integrity, As information technology becomes 
even more a part of everyday lif'c the need for the implementation of strong cryptographic 
techniques within cilective security procedures grows. 
2.2 Terms Used in Crvii(maratihnv 
A ciyplogrn/)her is a person who finds ways of ensuring the security of data whereas a 
cryptanalysl tries to obtain the meaning of data manipulated by the cryptographer. A 
cIJpIo. cyslem is a way of ensuring data can be stored and transmitted confidentially. Data in 
an unsecured form is known as ! Mail, /exi and the process of concealment is encryption; 
encrypted data is known as ci/p/wriev and the process of revelation is decryption. Most 
10 
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cryptosysterns require knowledge by the user of a kej' which is vital to the correct 
encryption/decryption of the data. The raw effectiveness of how difficult a cryptosystern is 
to break by a cryptanalyst is determined by calculating the time it would take for every 
possible key to be used in decrypting a ciphertext. This foram of attack is known as brute 
force. If a cryptanalyst is constrained to use a brute force attack the cryptographer has 
done his job well. For example, if a cryptosystem has a key length of 56 bits there are over 
7x 1016 possible keys, each decryption and analysis of the result for a given ciphertext might 
take a microsecond, therefore, to test all keys would take around 2000 years. 
2.3 Block and Stream Crvntasvslcnis 
There are two ways in which cryptosystems can be used in communication, as block 
ci}p! o. %y. wems or as slrecani rid'/, 1O. vv. v1em. c. A block ciyptosystem takes as its input a block 
of plaintext which it replaces with a block of encrypted data. Block cryptosysterns are 
defined by the finite size ol'the plaintexts which they can encrypt and their use of buffers to 
store data. Stream cryptosystems work on streams of data such as voice or video data 
where encryption must be done on the tly, ' generally encrypting= decrypting a bit at a time. 
It is possible to convert a block cryptosystem into a stream cryptosystern, but, it is not 
possible to convert a stream cryptosystem into a block cryptosystem due to the time 
dependency of a stream cipher. 
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2.3.1 Block Cryptosystem Modes of use 
Block cryptosystems are generally used in one of four ways [12 ]: electronic 
codebook(ECB); cipher block chaininý(CBC); cipher feedback(CFB); and output feedback 
(OFB). 
2.3.1.1 Electronic Codebook 
nt-hil ttt-hil 
i) -- ---ºI: nýryluinn --- -º 
C- -----ºIlcciýpt ou ºp 
n ýý n 
EK 1)K 
Key 
Source 
Figure 2-1 Electronic Codebook 
The Electronic Codehook (ECI) nmocle of operation produces one-to-one mapping of the 
in-bit blocks, where in is the size of a block that the cryptosystern can process. Any errors 
occurring in an m-bit block during storage/transmission is confined to that block. When the 
plaintext is not a multiple of ni bits in length it is necessary to include padding before 
encryption, which leads to an expansion of the ciphertext. This padding necessitates 
framing information to be sent in the ciphertext. 
When a cryptosystem is used in ECB mode any message that has a regular pattern 
throughout its length, such as a header that appears in the first line of every page, may 
exhibit patterns in its ciphertext. A cryptanalyst could then potentially use these patterns to 
attack the ciphertext, the Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation avoids this problem. 
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2.3.1.2 Cipher Block Chaining 
r-- in Bit Memory 
r--, 
T, la-11 
n 
Kev 
Anti 
IV Source 
ý-- m I; il ýIcmoiti" 
C. 
t 
ECII T 
ý1- 
º(t ) ºPn 
Figure 2-2 Cipher Block Chaining 
Figure 2-2 shows how to use a block symmetric cryptosystem in CBC mode. All but the 
first in-bit block of plaintext is exclusive ORed with the previous m-bit block of cipher text. 
Since there is no previous block of cipher text for the first block of plaintext an Initial 
Vector (IV) is chosen and held within the m-bit nmcnmory. The initial vector is a random m- 
bit number and must be communicated along with the decryption key ( DK ) to all parties 
wishing to decrypt the ciphertext. Decryption of a ciphertext encrypted using CBC is 
accomplished through decryption of the ciphertext and XORing the result with the previous 
ciphertext. 
Because all following blocks of ciphertext are dependent upon previous blocks of 
ciphertext, any error occurring in the ciphertext during communication will cause all 
following blocks to be decrypted incorrectly. 
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2.3.1.3 Cipher Fccdhuck and Output Feedback 
4 Shifi Shift L Bits 
m Bit Shift Register ý- 
-m Bit Shift Register 
L Bits 
CCIt 1 CC[i 
Key Encryption; Enrnption Key 
Left L Bits Left L Bits 
c 
P -i +--- -i -º{ +ý º L Ilits n 
Figure 2-3 Cipher Feedback 
Cipher feedback can be used as a stream cipher. Before encipherment L (the number of bits 
to be fed back) and an initial vector of m bits must be chosen. Like CBC any error 
occurring in the cipher text during transmission will cause all following packets to be 
decrypted incorrectly. 
4 tihi li 
m Itit Shift Register 4 
1. ('1( 
Key I. ncnpli. ro 
V 
LcliI. Hi 
n 
ni lilt Shill Register 
I? iiii)I mr 
Key 
Lett L Flits 
L Bits 
v -i 
C 
, 
Figure 2-4 Output Feedback 
The fourth mode of operation involves using, the symmetric block cryptosystem as a 
pseudo-random number generator. This mode is useful for video or audio communication 
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where small errors in the data are acceptable and like ECB any error occurring in the stream 
of cipher text is not perpetuated throughout the following decryption, as all blocks of m bits 
in OFB are independent. 
2.4 Symmetric and Asymmetric Cryptosystems 
In 1949 Claude Shannon released a crucial paper in modern cryptography, "Communication 
theory of secrecy systems, " [13]. In it he placed all cryptosystems in two groups; those 
cryptosystems whose strength depend upon the inadequacy of computational ability at any 
given time - cone mlationcilly secure systems, or those that no matter how much computing 
power is available cannot be broken - unconditionally secure systems. All modern 
cryptosystems are computationally secure, the `one-time pad' cryptosystem [14], is the only 
known unconditionally secure system 
Most modern cryptosystems can be further divided into one of two groups, symmetric or 
nsymmelric. A symmetric cryptosystem requires only one key. This key is used in the 
encryption and decryption calculations giving no differentiation between the encrypter and 
the decrypter. In asymmetric cryptosystems the encryption and decryption calculations use 
separate but related keys, thus differentiating between the encrypter and decrypter. 
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2.4.1 Symmetric Cryptosystcros 
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Figure 2-1 Symmetric Cryptosystem 
If a party A wishes to communicate with a second party B, confidentially, using a symmetric 
cryptosystem, then both A and B must know the key that is in use. Once the key is known 
to both parties confidential duplex communication can be performed. The most immediate 
problem with the use of a symmetric cIyptosystem is how to communicate the key to be 
used confidentially between the two parties. This leads to the necessity of having a `secure 
channel' along which keys can be communicated secretly. The necessity of having a secure 
channel gives this system its second name, a secret key 
The necessary existence of a secure channel begs the question, why not send the data across 
it? The secure channel and its provision led to research into a second class of cryptosystem 
which does not require the channel - asymmetric cryptosystems, see section 2.4.2. 
The next three sections detail the symmetric cryptosystems considered for use within CISS. 
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2.4.1.1 DES 
In 1974 the US NBS(National Bureau of Standards) sent out a call for cryptosystems to be 
used as a Data Encryption Standard (DES) and a cryptosystem submitted by IBM was 
accepted [15]. DES is itself based upon a cryptosystem developed by IBM prior to 1974, 
their Lucifer cipher [16]. The Lucifer cipher had a key length of 128 bits, however, DES 
has a key length of only 56 bits. In 1977 a Senate select committee ascertained that the 
NSA (National Security Agency) was instrumental in the reduction of the DES key length 
(previously denied by IBM and NBS). The NSA has also classified the design principles 
that IBM used for part of the cryptosystem. 
Shannon[13] provided suggestions to guide the design of new cryptosystems, primarily the 
principles of d ffiision and confusion. Diffusion removes the statistical nature of the 
plaintext from the ciphertext. Confusion reduces the ability to draw statistical information 
between the ciphertext and the plaintext. DES attains diffusion through transposition and 
confusion is attained through substitution. When transposition and substitution are used in 
combination the new cryptosystem is referred to as a product cryptosystem. 
In its native mode of operation (ECB) the DES cryptosystem takes a 64-bit input and gives 
a 64-bit output that is dependent upon a 64 bit key, of which, only 56 bits are used and the 
remaining eight make up an odd parity check. DES can be used in any of the modes 
described in section 2.3.1. DES is a product cipher that also incorporates bit-by-bit modulo 
2 addition. The DES algorithm is shown below in Figure 2-2. 
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Figure 2-2 DES Algorithm 
DES requires an input block of 64 bits, which undergoes an inilinl permu Talion, IP. The 
input block is then split into two blocks of 32 bits, the lell 32 bits (L) and the right 32 bits 
(Rn) 
. 
Blocks L and R,, undergo 16 complex key dependent computations, known as the 16 
rounds of DES, before going through an inverse of the initial permutation 11'-1. 
DES's designers deserve a lot of credit, even with all the suspicion aimed at the 
cryptosystem (originating from the fact that it is government approved) nobody has found a 
back door in the DES design, and nobody has been able to devise a strategy much better 
than a brute force attack to obtain the secret key. 
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The main source of concern about DES is its relatively small key. The DES key is 56 bits 
long giving 256 possible keys, because of the speed and cost of DES hardware the 
production of a machine that breaks normal DES through brute force would cost $1 Omillion 
dollars[17 ]. However, DES can be significantly improved through techniques such as 
double or triple DES which gives an etiective key length of 112 bits making it substantially 
more expensive to crack. 
It is common knowledge that there are certain keys that if used reduce the security of DES, 
there are however only 4 weak keys and 60 semi-weak keys[ 14]. The weak keys of DES 
produce identical encryption and decryption algorithms, i. e. a ciphertext produced using a 
weak key can be deciphered by encrypting it again. The semi-weak keys are a group of key 
pairs that encrypt a plaintext into the same ciphertext, i. e. one key in a key pair can decrypt 
a ciphertext generated using the other. It should he noted that there are only 64 
compromising keys out of 2"' possible keys. 
The DES cryptosystem is probably the most widely used cipher at present, protecting the 
confidentiality of transactions involving trillions of dollars each year, as recommended by 
the American Bankers Association[ IS]. The technical details of the DES algorithm were 
released in 1977, some 18 years later it is still a very secure cryptosystem, despite the 
numerous attempts to break it [I() ]. 
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2.4.1.2 Escrow Technology 
In the 1990s the United States NSA developed a new block cryptosystern and set 
cryptographic policy that will have far reaching consequences to cryptography. The Clipper 
chip, as the cryptographic chip designed by the NSA has become known, employs the secret 
`Skipjack' algorithm[20 ]. The government has proposed the use of this chip in 
communication devices used to deal with the government. 
The Clipper chip takes a 64-bit input block and transforms it into a 64 bit output block, the 
transformation being dependent upon an S0-bit key. The Skipjack algorithm was designed 
by NSA cryptographers, and unlike many other modern cryhtosystems, NSA have not 
allowed the algorithm to be made public, citing that the design techniques employed in the 
Skipjack algorithm are representative of algorithms used to protect classified data. 
However, NSA and chosen experts from the field of cryptography [21 ], have evaluated the 
cryptosystem and reported that it provides a high level of security. One consequence of the 
secrecy of the Skihjack algorithm is that only certain companies are allowed to produce 
Clipper chips, thus setting up a nmonopoly. 
Annoying as it may be to the cryptographic community that the Skipjack algorithm is kept 
secret, it is not the main Claw that many find with the Clipper chip. Every Clipper chip that 
is produced will have its own device unique 80-bit key [22 ]. This 80-bit key is divided into 
two 40-bit keys and stored separately with two escrow agents, giving law enforcement 
agencies the capability of listening in on any communications using the Clipper chip. To 
obtain the device's unique keys law enforcement agencies must first get a court order. The 
use of Clipper chips are at this moment voluntary but because of the amount of business the 
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US government generates they could mandate Clipper when dealing with them, effectively 
making it a standard. The government has proved its intentions of using the Clipper chip by 
ordering 50 000 Clipper equipped devices. 
As with all cryptographic technology within the USA its exportation is subject to the 
Defence Trade Regulations [23 ], [24 ] and as a consequence it is at the moment illegal to 
export Clipper chips. 
2.41.3 International I)ntn Errcr1ption, t l;; nr"ithin (IDEA) 
This cryptosystem is similar to DES in that it is a symmetric block cryptosystem. IDEA 
[25 ] takes a 64-bit block and outputs a 64-bit data block, the result depends upon the 128- 
bit key used. Unlike DES which uses substitution and transposition, IDEA uses a mixture 
of three algebraic groups whose operations are mixed: 
1. exclusive ORs; 
2. addition modulo 26(ignoring any overflow); 
3. multiplication modulo 2'°+I(ignorin`g overflow). 
These groups were chosen so that when implemented in hardware or software they would 
be very fast. Implementations of' the IDEA algorithin tend to run faster than DES in 
hardware and software [26 ]. For example, on a 33-Milz 386, IDEA encrypts at a speed of 
88OKbits/s, while an equivalent DES program attained encryption speeds of 584Kbits/s. 
CRYPTECH (a security manufacturing company from Belgiunn) produce cryptographic 
chips including a DES chip that runs at lOMbits/s. Although DES uses functions that are 
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optimised in hardware, IDEA was specifically optimised for implementation on current 
technology so it is capable of running at 88OKbits/s in software and at 177Mbits/s in 
hardware, which is considerably faster than DES. 
The IDEA algorithm can be used in any of the modes that DES can be operated in, such as 
CBC, ECB CFB and OFB. The algorithm has been patented [27] by Ascom-Tech in 
Europe and has a patent pending in America. 
Because of the newness of IDEA there have been few accounts of attacks against it and no 
accounts of successful ones. It has been proved that it is resistant to differential 
cryptanalysis[28], which is one of the more successful cyptanalytic attacks devised. 
Differential cryptanalysis exploits differential characteristics in ciphertext from known 
differences in the plaintexts to probabilistically determine possible keys. 
The relative newness of IDEA has meant it has found limited application, although it can be 
found within security applications such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [29]. 
2.4.2 Asymmetric Cryptosystems 
In 1976 a paper crucial to modern cryptography was published by Diffie and Hellman, 
entitled "New Directions In Cryptography, " [30] in which they suggested a way to set up 
secure systems that require no communication of a secret key. Though Diffie and Hellman 
went some way to showing that such a scheme was possible they did not present a workable 
solution, that was finally solved inl 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman as discussed in 
Section 2.4.3. 
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Figure 2-3 Asymmetric Cryptosystem 
Asymmetric cryptosystems require two keys: a private key and a public one. The public key 
may be made available to anyone without reducing the security of the cryptosystem. These 
cryptographic systems are also known as public key, cr)hlo. \ycIejns. For a public key 
cryptosystem to he acceptable, computation of the private key from the public one should 
take enough time that an attempt would take loner than the useful life time of the 
information encrypted. 
If party A wishes to send party Ba message confidentially using a public key cryptosystem, 
party A would obtain party B's public key either from a database or through a request to B, 
and use the public key to encrypt the Maintext. Only party B should have the related private 
key and therefore only party B should be able to decrypt the ciphertext. To obtain duplex 
confidential communication between A and B each party must know two keys, their own 
private key and the other party's public key. 
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The public-key cryptosystems considered for use within CISS are detailed in the following 
sections. 
2.4.3 RSA 
In 1978 Rivest, Shamir and Adleman published "A Method For Obtaining Digital Signatures 
And Public-Key Cryptography, " [. 3111 in which they presented the first proposal for a one- 
way trapdoor function. This is now known as RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman). 
The seven steps of tile RSA algorithm are: 
1. generate two large prime numbers ({), q); 
2. compute the modulus (ii) =p*q; 
i. compute ca(n) = (p- I )*(q-1): 
4. select an odd intcg.; cr e that is relatively prime to O(n); 
5. COIl1ppute CI as the IIIUItil)IICltive inverse of C, modulo 0(n); 
6. make the Public key known, P= (e, n); 
7. keep the Private key, S= (d, n). 
The first part of the RSA algorithm requires the generation of two large prime numbers p 
and q, which can be accomplished by using Fermat's Little Theorem[32 ] to repeatedly test 
random numbers for compositness. If a random number passes the test several times to 
different bases, it is very probably prime. 
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The two large primes p and q are then multiplied together to give the modulus it that is then 
used in all future RSA calculations using this key. Euler's totient ý(ºº) [32] is then 
calculated, using the prime factors of the modulus n, resulting in the totient being equal to 
(p-1)(q-1). Using Euclid's algorithm, see Chapter 6, a random integer e is selected so that 
it is co-prime with O(n). Euclid's extended algoritlinm, see Chapter 6, is used to determine d, 
the modulo inverse of e modulo O(n). The key set (e, ii) is published while (d, ii) is kept 
secret. 
Confidential communication is performed using the public-key of the recipient. 
C= Al` (mod ii) 
The recipient decrypts the ciphertext C using his private key. 
i=C''(mod n) 
At the moment the only strategy ror breaking the RSA cryptosystem is to be able to 
factorise the known modulus into the two prime factors that were used in the creation of the 
key. The security of the RSA cryptosystem therefore depends upon the difficulty in 
factoring large integers for its security. The best and quickest methods for accomplishing 
long integer factorisation still work in exponential time when presented with integers larger 
than 500 bits in length. For example, a 664-bit number takes 1023 [33 ] steps to factorise, 
so if a theoretical computer does a million steps per second, then using, a million such 
computers it will take four thousand years to factorise. 
RSA has been adopted by the cryptographic community as the unofficial public-key 
crpytosystem standard [14], its official endorsements include the ISO specification for 
25 
(7urpier Two: Inlroduciion In Ciyptography 
digital signatures[34 ] along with the French Banking Community[35 ]. RSA is also found 
within PGP, various programs that implement Privacy Enhanced Mail[36 ] (PEM), and 
other security products. 
2.4.4 ElGamal 
ElGamal is a public key ciyptosystem [37 ] that utilises the key distribution scheme 
developed by Diflie and Hellman ['18 ]. The Diflie and Hellman key distribution scheme 
depends upon the function, 
Y= O'` mod /) 
For example: 
A and B wish to share a secret K. ",. A has a private key . tin and B has a private key Sb. 
Two constants are known by both parties a and p. 
A computes, 1', % = oc, " mod p 
B computes, º'I4 = cz""h mod p 
Calculating So or b from knowing a., /), ý': ý and )y, is a discrete logarithm problem and as is 
the factorisation of long integers it is a computationally difficult problem to solve, requiring 
exponential time for solutions. 
), A is communicated to B. 
yi; is communicated to A. 
Both A and B can now calculate K, \,,, 
KAB; = oc";, s`' mod /, 
_)ýA mod /) 
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=Ybsa mod p 
yA and yB can be kept in a database along with a and p. 
KAB can be used as a key for a secure communication session. 
The ElGamal cryptosystem works in the following manner. If party A wishes to send a 
confidential message M to party B. A first obtains B's public key y and the constants a and 
p. Party A then calculates a secret K which is relatively prime to p-1. A then generates and 
sends to Ba ciphertext with two distinct parts, Cl and C2. 
C1= ak mod p 
C2=ykMMiod1) 
B can reproduce the plaintext M through using his private key Sb. 
M= C2/C I" niod p 
To attain the same level of security as RSA achieves it is necessary to use a public key file 
and ciphertext twice the size of that used in RSA, the reason being that the algorithm itself 
requires twice the information. The ElGamal public key cryptosystem is as yet un-patented. 
However, it is possible that use of ElGamal would violate Dife-Hellman key exchange 
patents in the USA and Canada. 
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The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have adopted a variant of 
ElGamal in its Digital Signature Standard[ 39 I (DSA) demonstrating the cryptographic 
community's faith that has been placed in the security of this algorithm. 
2.5 Choosing a Cryhtosvstem 
Selection of the best cryptosystern for a security system is a matter of compromise between 
several characteristics, some of which are detailed below. 
2.5.1 Security 
The security of a cryptosystem cannot be calculated accurately in any mathematical form 
and therefore security derived ti-om cryptosystems is dependent upon belief. Belief that a 
cryptographic algorithm is secure grows with the continued appearance of failed attempts to 
break it. Therefore, cryptosystems that stand the test of time can be regarded as having 
proven security, as well as can be accomplished without mathematical proofs. 
2.5.2 Cost 
A primary concern for most potential users of a cryptosystem is how much the technology 
will cost them and the cost of a ciyptosystem is influenced by two things: 
1. patent; 
2. and form of implementation. 
Most cryptographers that develop a cryptosystem do so because they are interested in the 
lucrative patent laws and subsequent royalties a successful cryptosystem will bring them. 
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Use of a cryptosystem in a country where it has been patented requires payment of royalties 
to those people holding the patent, though payment is negotiable and is sometimes 
dispensed with. An active patent makes the cost of a security system using the 
cryptographic technique more expensive. 
It is a general case that implementations of cryptosystems in software are cheaper than 
purchasing a hardware implementation. Development of a cryptosystem in hardware 
requires greater effort on behalf of the manufacturer who subsequently charges more for his 
product. For a hardware implementation of a cryptographic algorithm it must first be 
analysed and optimised for hardware, designs must be drawn up, masks for chip 
manufacture made and finally chip must be manufactured. The entire process requires an 
initial input of capital usually upwards of six figures. However, a single person or team of 
programmers can produce coding optimised for current computer systems at a cost far 
below that necessary for hardware development. 
One of the hidden costs of any system is that of maintenance and upgradeability. Because 
hardware is specifically designed to take the load oil' the computing platform it was 
designed for, any improvements in the technology of the computing platform will not be felt 
in functions where cryptographic hardware is used. Therefore, a security communication 
system utilising hardware for cryptographic processes must purchase new hardware if it 
wishes to stay abreast of improvements in technology and retain competitiveness with rivals. 
However, in cryptosystems implemented within software this is not the case. It has become 
common practice for software developers to offer revised versions of software to be 
provided at a greatly reduced price when technology has improved. Even if new versions of 
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the software were not provided, improvements in the speed of computers for instance 
would improve the performance of software cryptosystems. 
2.5.3 Speed 
Speed of a cryptosystem depends upon the algorithm it employs and the technology used in 
its construction. As a rule symmetric algorithms tend to be simpler than asymmetric ones to 
implement in digital electronics, using operations based around byte word sizes, bit-shifting 
and logical operations that are continually optimised. Asymmetric cryptosystems, such as 
those described in section 2.4.2, require long integer modular exponential calculations 
which are notoriously slow in digital electronics due to the large number of operations 
required. A modular exponentiation using repeated squaring [40] (as described in chapter 
six ) requires approximately °(ß') steps, where ß is the bit length of the integers used 
within the calculation. Due to the increase in speed of technology and specialist 
algorithms[41] for factorisation a secure public-key length should be greater than 400 bits, 
giving approximately 64 million steps. Symmetric algorithms, such as those described in 
section 2.4.1, require a constant number of steps significantly less than that required in the 
long integer calculations of asymmetric systems. The smaller number of steps in symmetric 
cryptosystems makes them faster than the asymmetric cryptosystems. 
2.5.4 Published and Unpublished Algorithms 
When a cryptosystem has been designed its creators must decide whether or not to release 
details of the cryptosystem's algorithm. If a cryptosystem derives its security from the 
secrecy of its algorithm then details of the algorithm must be kept confidential. However, 
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this is difficult as confidentiality must be maintained by the developers, the engineers that 
design the implementations (hardware/software), and the manufacturers. Once the device is 
sold (whether as hardware or software) it must keep its design secret against attempts of 
reverse engineering. Therefore, a cryptosystem that derives its security from secrecy of its 
algorithm has many points at which it may be attacked. However, if the security of a 
cryptosystem is not dependent upon its algorithm's secrecy all these potential weaknesses 
have been eliminated. 
A cryptosystem that can have details of its algorithm released to the public allows potential 
users/buyers to: 
1. analyse the algorithm and test its security; 
2. check that 'trapdoors' are not present allowing, third parties access to confidential data. 
The longer a cryptosystem survives such public scrutiny the greater the belief in its security 
and therefore the more confident potential buyers are to use and buy such a cryptosystem. 
The augmentation of public confidence by publishing algorithms has made it more common 
for cryptographers to release details of their cryptosystems to the public. 
2.5.5 Asymmetric or Symmetric cryptosystems 
Symmetric cryptosystems require the use of secure channels to communicate session keys 
between parties. However, asymmetric systems do not require one, thus eliminating a 
potential weak point for a cryptanalyst to exploit. Therefore, using symmetric 
cryptosystems in a distributed communications environment involves greater care over key 
management, and a subsequent increase in the size and complexity of key exchange 
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protocols. Because asymmetric ciyptosystems use long integer arithmetic the necessary 
hardware designs are more complex and subsequently producing more expensive hardware 
devices. Symmetric systems require simpler designs making them cheaper. 
2.6 A Crviitosvstem for CISS 
Increasingly, security policies have been relying upon the use of both an asymmetric and a 
symmetric cryptosystem. The symmetric cryptosystem is used for the bulk of data 
encryption for communication, such as files or messages. The asymmetric algorithm is used 
in key distribution and proof mechanism which are described in sections 2.7 and 2.8. 
Symmetric Cry ptosystem DES IDEA Ski Jack 
Key Length (bits) 56 128 80 
Block Length (bits) 64 64 64 
Year of Ori, -, 
in 1974 1992 1990 
Algorithrn Published Published Un-Published 
Hardware Encryption Speeds I OMbits/sec I77Mbits/sec 15Mbits/sec 
Software Encryption Speeds on 386 SS4Kbits/sec SSOKbits/sec NA 
Security Kneen Weak 
koks. size of key 
S111.111. 
Suspect keys 
found. Analysis 
Iu nixed 
Escrow agencies 
hold device keys. 
Analysis limited 
'Dalle 2-1 Symmetric Cryplosyslcros 
32 
Chapter Two: Introduction to Ciypfography 
Asymmetric Crv ptosvstem RSA ElGamal 
Public key e, n a. P. y 
Cipher text c cl, c2 
Year of Origin 1978 1985 
Algorithm Published Published 
Hardware (CRYPTECH) 32Kbits/s <32Kbits/s 
Software 386 6Kbits/s <6Kbits/s 
Security Dependent on long integer 
factorisation 
Dependent upon discrete 
logarithms 
Table 2-2 Asymmetric C yptosystems 
Based upon sections 2.4 and 2.5 DES and RSA best fit the needs for CISS. 
1. Both DES and RSA have been around for sufficient time that the belief in their security is 
almost universal. 
2. The cost of implementing DES in hardware is relatively low, in part due to the age of the 
algorithm and its large continuin demand. 
3. Although there is a patent on the RSA algorithm, it is only valid in the USA and 
therefore development of a security system using RSA outside of the USA will not 
require the payment or royalties. 
4. The current research into DES is revealing new methods of using it that give it greater 
security [42 ], [4 3] and reduce the insecurity present in such a small key. 
5. RSA requires less memory for storage of public keys and cipher texts than ElGamal. 
The other popular cryptosystems were discouufted because: 
1. ElGamal requires larger public keyfiles for the same relative security as RSA. Also, to 
send a plaintext securely ElGamal expands the ciphertext to twice its original size 
whereas no expansion is necessary in RSA. Decryption in ElGarnal requires an extra 
division step than RSA; 
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2. IDEA is too new. Analysis of the algorithm is nowhere near as extensive as that of 
DES. When the new algorithm has been thoroughly analysed it is very promising as a 
replacement for DES. It is patented[27] in Europe and therefore may be expensive to 
use commercially; 
3. escrow technology is not a viable option, not only can it not be purchased outside of the 
United States but letting the government hold keys to every Clipper chip may not be 
accepted by companies purchasing CISS. 
2.7 Security Mechanisms Involving Cryptography 
In communication there are several main security services other than confidentiality that 
cryptography helps to provide within an overall security policy: 
1. authentication; 
2. integrity, 
3. and non-repudiation. 
2.7.1 Hashing Algorithms 
A hashing algorithm produces a finite length bit string of set size from a potentially infinite 
one. 
h= H(M), where M may be of any length but h is of length n dependent upon the 
hashing algorithm. 
A good hashing algorithm has three characteristics: it is hard to calculate M given h; it is 
easy to calculate h given M and it is difficult to calculate another message that gives the 
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same value h as H(/v! ). One think that should be noted about hashing algorithms is that they 
suffer from multiple mappings. Since the input message may be infinite, and the output is 
only beneficial if it is of a relatively small length, more than one input will achieve any 
specific result. Therefore, the finite length output should be within a range great enough 
that generation of any specific result from the hashing algorithm takes more effort than the 
benefits of obtaining it. 
Hashing functions are generally used within the provision of authentication and data 
integrity, they are particularly useful when used in conjunction with public-key cryptography 
to supply digital signatures, see section 2.7.2. Examples of one way hash functions are 
MD5[44 ] and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)[45 ]. 
A hashing algorithm that is key dependent is known as a message authentication code 
(MAC) and can be constructed through using DES or any other block cryptosystem in CFB 
mode. The exact method is specified in ANSI X9.9[46 ]. This is useful for providing fast 
authentication nmechanisnis. For authentication to take place both the sender and receiver 
must be in possession of the secret key used by a MAC. 
Integrity of a message can be determined by use of a manipulation detection code (MDC), 
which is a hashing algorithm used to provide integrity. It can be used independently of 
authentication and confidentiality, where data sensitive to manipulation but not necessarily 
secret is being communicated. 
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2.7.2 Digital Signatures 
Digital signatures[47 ] are used in the provision of authentication. A digital signature is an 
item of data that can be attached to a digital message to provide an indication of who the 
message creator was. It is analogous to a normal signature on a paper document and is 
meant to be used in the same way. 
Most of the public-key cryptosystems were developed in the pursuit of digital signature 
algorithms. For example, RSA and ElGamal were first proposed as algorithms for digital 
signatures. There is no confidentiality required, nor is there a secret key shared between the 
two parties as is necessary in the case of a MAC. A typical sequence involving digital 
signatures can be seen below. 
0 Party A generates public key pair AP and AS, and publishes AP; 
" Party A generates a document (doc) that it wishes to prove to B has been generated by 
A through use of a signature. 
" A-*B : Aid, doc, signature = E, ý, (H(Aid, doc)); 
Aid is an identifier identiryiný A as the sender so that B can obtain the correct 
public key for decryption of the signature. HO is a hashing algorithm used to 
reduce doc to a bit length suitable for quick public key encryption. 
"B obtains the correct public key AP and decrypts the signature. If DAI, (signature) is the 
same as the result of B's own H(Aid, doc) calculation then it can be assumed that A has 
signed it and did indeed generate it. 
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A necessary assumption in the use of digital signatures is that A's private key is only known 
to A. If anyone else knew it then they could sign documents pretending to be A. Due to 
the dependency of the hash value upon every bit of information contained within Aid and 
doc instead of being used as a signature it is also possible to use it as an indication of 
integrity. 
2.7.3 Non-Repudiation 
A non-repudiation service is one which removes the ability from an entity of denying that 
they have committed an act that they have done. A non-repudiation service relies upon the 
generation of evidence, which is used to provide proof of certain facts. 
There are two important non-repudiation services that have been defined in the ISO-OSI 
Basic Reference Model Part 2: Security Architecture; proof of origin, and proof of 
delivery. Proof of origin can be attained through the use of digital signatures, proof of 
delivery requires the use of a delivery service 
Proof of origin is generated by the originator of a niessa-e. The proof of origin may be a 
signature that can be stored or an entire message encrypted using an asymmetric private 
key. The proof is usually stored by the recipient of the message in case the originator 
denies generation of the message. Proof of delivery is generated by a delivery authority and 
sent to the originator of the message as proof that the originator's message has been placed 
in the message store of the recipient, thus preventing the delivery service from denying 
delivery. 
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There are four phases of non-repudiation [48 ] 
" Evidence generation: 
Evidence is generated by an evidence generator or the initiator of a process that 
requires proof. An Evidence generator is a party trusted to provide accurate 
information, they may also provide services of evidence recording or verification. 
0 Evidence transfer, storage and retrieval: 
Evidence is transferred between evidence generators and evidence users, or to and 
from storage at the request of evidence users. 
" Evidence Verification: 
An evidence user requests ti-onm an evidence verifier ( this is usually an evidence 
generator) that the evidence provided is good enough in case of a dispute. 
0 Dispute resolution or arbitration: 
An arbitrator collects evidence from all parties involved in a dispute and resolves it. 
2.8 Key Management and Distribution 
When cryptographic techniques are used it is important not to weaken the overall 
cryptographic scheme by placing the secret/private keys in danger from attacks. To prevent 
the unwanted acquisition of keys by third parties an effective and secure key management 
policy is necessary. This policy will determine three things: 
1. generation of keys; 
2. storage and access of keys; 
3. communication of keys. 
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Key generation should be conducted secretly and randomly within the valid range of keys 
for a specific cryptosystem. Any potential weaknesses that are known about the generation 
process of keys should be tested for and eliminated. 
The communication of keys within a public key cryptosystem is simple. Only the public 
keys of a key pair should ever be communicated between computer systems and because the 
private key is indeterminate with knowledge of the public one it remains safe. However, in 
the event a symmetric key system is being used it is necessary for two parties to know what 
the secret key in use is. This produces a co-ordination problem, as it is inadvisable to 
communicate a secret key in any clear form. Therefore, it is now generally accepted that a 
proper policy for confidential communication requires the use of both a public-key 
cryptosystem and a secret key system. The secret key is communicated between the two 
parties by encrypting it with the private key of one and the public key of the other. 
An example of a protocol for the communication of a secret key using a public key 
cryptosystem with authentication is shown overleaf 
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" Party A generates public key pair AP and AS, and publishes AP; 
" Party B generates public key pair BP and BS, and publishes BP; 
9 Party A generates ciphertext CT from plaintext PT using symmetric key SK, 
CT= ESK(PT); 
9 A-4B: Aid, CT; 
Aid is an identifier identifying A as the sender so that B can obtain the correct 
public key for decryption of the ciphertext CT. 
9 A->B : key = EBp(EAS(SK)); 
9B calculates SK = Dp(Dßs(key)); 
"B calculates PT = DsK(CT). 
A problem associated with the distribution of public keys is in trusting that the public key 
obtained does in fact belong to the party that it is supposed to. This problem can be solved 
through the use of a Trusted Third Party (TTP). A TTP is an independent organisation that 
has no interest in one communicating party over another. TTPs are generally expected to 
be provided by the government or by a large telecommunications provider such as British 
Telecom (BT). 
TTPs can become involved in any of three ways within a communication protocol [49]: 
1. off-line: these TTPs are certification authorities or key generation authorities 
which may not be involved in every instance of communication. The TTP 
generates evidence that can be used by the communicating parties to check 
authenticity etc; 
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2. on-line: these TTPs may be delivery authorities that act as intermediaries for 
communication, capable of providing proof of origin and proof of receipt and 
may assist the two parties in verifying certificates etc; 
3. in-line: in this case the TTP acts as a monitor and intermediary performing 
exchanges of information etc. 
The authentication and integrity of cryptographic keys between two communicating parties 
using an off-line TTP is dependent upon the use of ceriircales". A certificate is an item of 
data that can prove a certain fact due to the trustworthiness of the TTP that generated it. 
Each TTP will have its own asymmetric cryptosystem key pair, a private key that does not 
leave the physical locality of the TTP and which may be used to sign certificates to prove 
their validity, and a public key that is available to all users of the TTP to check signatures. 
An example of the fields found within a TTP certificate is shown overleaf. 
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" ID number: 
this is the TTP certificate number. 
" Certificate Signature Algorithm: 
this field is used to indicate which signature scheme was used by the TTP to sign the 
certificate. 
" Issuer's Name: 
this field holds the unique/distinguished name of the TTP. 
" Period of Validity: 
this field contains the date on which the certificate expires. 
" Unique name: 
this field contains the unique/distinguished name of the entity for which the certificate 
is used to identify. 
" Entity Public Key: 
this field contains the public-key to be used in any communication that requires its 
use. 
" TTP signature: 
this is the signature placed upon the certificate by the TTP using the signature scheme 
indicated in 'Certificate Signature Field. ' The signature is an assurance that the 
certificate has not been tampered with and is generated using the TTP private key. 
The three main services that a TTP may supply are the following. 
1. Generation and distribution of session keys. 
If confidential communications are necessary between two parties using a symmetric 
cryptosystem then they may opt to have the certification authority generate a random 
secret key. In this case the TTP would generate the session key and then 
communicate the keys confidentially using the public-keys of the two parties to 
encrypt the secret key. 
2. Generation and distribution of ccrtiticates. 
The initial information used in the generation of a certificate must be gathered with 
great care, and should therefore be done through conventional means such as the use 
of written requests or personal meetings. The distribution of certificates is 
accomplished through the storage of the certificates in an openly accessible database 
maintained by the TTP, generally indexed through'a party's unique name. 
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3. Revocation of certificates. 
After a specified elapsed time a certificate must be withdrawn and re-issued, or if 
there has been some abuse of the system certain certificates might be re-issued, or 
simply removed. 
TTPs can be used in non-repudiation acting as evidence generators/stores/arbitrators. Non- 
repudiation and certification are security services that come Linder the title of notary 
services, these are services that require an independent witness to a process for the 
attainment of secin-ity. 
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the uses for which cryptographic techniques can be used within 
computer security. Although cryptography is a large part in any security system it is not the 
only part. A discussion of the further necessary attributes are discussed in the next chapter, 
where CISS is introduced. 
The cryptosystems chosen for implementation within CISS are RSA and DES, chosen for 
the reasons given in section 2.6. These cryptosystenis can provide the necessary 
functionality for authentication, integrity, proofs and confidentiality. The techniques 
described in sections 2.7 and 2.8 will be used in the provision of effective security within 
CISS. 
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Chapter Three 
3. Comprehensive Integrated Security System 
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3.1 Introduction 
The CISS architecture [7], [50 ] was developed to protect computer systems within an open 
distributed environment against threats of a potentially malicious nature. The exact threats 
are detailed below in section 3.2. An open distributed environment is one in which 
geographically dispersed terminals, users, applications and other computing resources 
process and communicate information between them. These types of systems are becoming 
much more common as users begin the migration out of central offices and into the home, 
and as organisations begin to make the best use of resources through greater accessibility to 
its users. 
The majority of existing computer networks were not designed with the necessary security 
features in which to provide protection of computing resources within a distributed 
environment. CISS was conceived to provide the additional security features that are 
missing from many of today's networks. Its exact configuration is dependent upon the 
security policy within the organisation which it is being implemented. 
3.2 Threats, Services and Mechanisms 
The security implemented within an organisation is dependent upon its security policy. A 
security policy is created from analysis of: 
" which threats should be protected against; 
" the services that the security system should provide to counter the potential threats; 
" and the degree of protection to allocate to system resources. 
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3.2.1 Threats 
Threats to a computer system are realised in one of two forms of attack, passive and active. 
A passive attack attempts to glean useful information from eavesdropping or monitoring 
transmissions. An active attack involves some form of modification, creation, prevention or 
interrogation of data and services. 
Threats and subsequent attacks present a greater security risk within a distributed 
environment where information is transmitted over large distances and in greater volume. 
For example, the threat of an intruder within a closed system would be lessened by the need 
for the intruder to gain physical access to an entry point to the system. Whereas, in an open 
system access is potentially available from terminals in geographically dispersed locations 
that may not be physically secured. 
The threats that must be considered are as follows. 
" Masquerade. 
A masquerade occurs when one entity pretends to be another, this form of attack 
usually involves other forms of active attacks. For example, authentication sequences 
can be recorded and replayed. Recording would be a passive attack while replay is an 
active attack. Masquerade is a threat present from legal or illegal: user; software; 
hardware. 
" Illegal Associations. 
An illegal association is one in which there has been a violation of the authentication 
and authorisation policies in place for the system. This may involve legalrllegal 
users/software. An attack may result in the creation of an account for an individual 
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that is not allowed such an account under the current policies, thus setting up the 
potential for illegal associations between said user/software and system resources. 
" Non-Authorised Access. 
Non-authorised access is one in which an entity violates the access control 
mechanisms of a security system. This threat may involve a legal/'illegal 
user/software. This threat is clearly demonstrated when a hacker obtains illegal 
access to a system and has therefore violated access control. Total access control can 
be obtained through modification of control files or by masquerading as a privileged 
user. 
Denial of Service. 
This is where a legal user/software is denied legitimate access to system 
resources/services. An attack may be caused by illegal/legal users/software 
engineering a way to tie up system resources, an example would be the 
monopolisation of processing time. Accidental damage or deterioration of equipment 
can also lead to denial of service. 
" Repudiation. 
This occurs when an entity denies an action such as originating, delivering, receiving, 
or transmission of a message when they have actually performed said action. 
" Leakage of Information. 
This takes the form of interception of data leading to a loss of confidentiality, or 
identification of data which results in loss of anonymity. Leakage of information can 
be caused by illegal/legal users/software/hardware. 
47 
('liaplcr iin'e: i'(1111prehemyiyc' %! ilegrakC'd Security System 
" Traffic Analysis. 
Although there may be no leakage of information, a passive attack involving analysis 
of traffic flow is a security threat. Analysis of traffic can produce statistics on size, 
source, destination, frequency of communications between parties. This information 
could then be used in guessing the nature of the communication. The threat of this 
attack is present from illegal/legal users/software/hardware. 
" Invalid Messaffe Sequencing. 
This form of attack is active and involves the capture of transmitted data for the 
purpose of eliciting an illegal effect from the system through re-ordering or replay. 
The threat of this attack is present from illegal/legal users/software/hardware. 
" Data Modification. 
This is an active attack that either through intentional or un-intentional action causes a 
modification in information being transmitted or stored. It results in a loss of 
integrity. The threat of this attack is present from illegal/legal 
users/software/hardware. 
" Deduction of Information. 
Although access to certain database segments may be restricted information from 
those segments may be garnered through the interrogation of the information 
unprotected in a database. This form of attack is referred to as deduction by 
inference. The threat of this attack is present from illegal/legal users. 
" Illegal Modification of Programs. 
Is the introduction of some form of software that modifies the operation of legitimate 
software. The threat of this attack is present from illegal/legal 
users/software/hardware. 
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3.2.2 Security Services 
To combat the threats described in section 3.2.1 a security system makes available services 
that can be used to provide the necessary security. The table below lists the security 
services that are used to counter the threats listed in section 3.2.1. 
Threat Service 
Masqueraders " Authentication 
Illegal Associations " Access Control 
Non-Authorised Access " 
" 
Access Cont rot 
Authentication 
Denial of Service " Qu: ality of Service 
Repudiation " Non-repudiation 
Leakage of Information " Message Coil lidcntiality 
Traffic Analysis " Trallic Flow Confidentiality 
Invalid Message sequencing " Connection Into grity 
Data Modification " Data Integrity 
Illegal Modification of Programs " Access Control 
Table 3-1 Security Services 
What follows is a description of the security services used to counter the threats in the table 
above. 
" Authentication: 
is used to identify a user/software/hardware to other entities. This can be 
accomplished through digital signatures, MACs, secret identifiers. 
" Access Control: 
determines whether an entity has legal access to system resources. This is 
accomplished through the use of an crccesv cowrni matrix. If an entity attempts to 
access a system resource, the access matrix is consulted by the security system. If the 
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point of intersection in the matrix indicates right of access then the entity is allowed to 
continue. 
" Connection Integrity: 
is used to prevent such attacks as replay. This is generally accomplished through the 
use of time-stamps, or sequencing numbers. Tine-stamps indicate a specific time, 
such as the time a message is sent. If the recipient receives a message outside of a 
time period described by the security policy as being valid it is considered an attack. 
Sequence numbers are used to order packets that may arrive in different orders due to 
connectionless communication. 
" Data Integrity: 
prevents the modification of data going undetected. The usual method for 
accomplishing this is through the use of integrity checkers such as hash algorithms, 
MDCs, etc. 
" Message Confidentiality: 
is to prevent loss of confidentiality. It is usually accomplished through the use of 
cryptography. 
" Non-Repudiation: 
helps to prevent the denial of various truths. This is generally accomplished through 
the generation of proofs, and the use ofTTPs to provide notary services. 
" Quality of Service: 
is the active monitoring of the state that a connection/association is in. If a denial of 
service, or loss of service is detected then efforts to establish service is attempted. 
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9 Traffic Flow Confidentiality 
prevents the analysis of traffic. Traffic flow confidentiality involves the use of traffic 
padding or routing control. Traffic padding is used to either pad out individual 
messages or to insert messages with data that have no other function than to confuse 
any analysis of the traffic. Routing control can provide prevention of traffic analysis 
through organising a messages route so that only those segments of a network that 
are physically secured are used and so cannot be eavesdropped upon. 
3.2.3 Mechanisms 
The security services themselves are implemented through the correct ordering and 
application of security mechanisms. The mechanisms employed within CISS are given in 
Table 3-2. Table 3-3 gives some examples of which security mechanisms constitute a 
security service. 
En Enci herment 
DS Digital Signature 
AC Access Control 
DI Data Integrity 
AE Authentication Exchange 
TP Traffic Padding 
RC Routing Control 
Nt Notarisation 
Table 3-2 Security Mechanisms 
X indicates a mechanism is present and C) indicates its aheenr, P 
Service En DS AC DI AE TP RC Nt 
Peer Entity Authentication X X 0 0 X 0 0 0 
Data origin Authentication X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Access Control Service 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 
Data Confidentiality x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Non-repudiation Origin 0 X 0 X 0 0 0 X 
Non-repudiation delivery 0 X 0 X 0 0 0 X 
Table 3-3 Sample Service Structure 
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The majority of the security mechanisms in Table 3 -2 are described in Chapter 2. 
3.3 Conceptual Model of CISS 
The way that CISS supplies an organisation with the necessary security services and 
mechanisms can be described through the conceptual model of CISS which can be seen in 
Figure 3-1 below. 
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Ruine 3-1 CISS Conceptual Model 
The various segments of the conceptual model are discussed below. 
3.3.1 Mathematical Module 
The »naihc'»>uiicul mc, chile is a set of basic mathematical functions that can be used to 
provide the cryptographic functions used in the majority of security mechanisms described 
in section 3.2.3. The provision of basic mathematical functions allows CISS to implement 
new cryptographic algorithms as and when they become available. 
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For example, all public key cryptosystems are based upon the same techniques, those of 
modular exponentiation. Therefore, the provision of standard low level functions for 
modular exponentiation allows CISS to implement either of the public-key cryptosystems 
described in Chapter 2, and potentially all others based upon the same techniques. The 
cryptosystem actually used within a security service will be dependent upon the individual 
organisation's security policy which governs the configuration of CISS. However, the fact 
that either cryptosystem can be provided makes the mathematical module approach very 
flexible. 
3.3.2 Mechanisms and Services 
The security services and mechanisms are those described in section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
CISS provides flexibility of' implementation through the selection of security services that 
are used within secure con1munication/processes. The individual selection of security 
services used by various entities within a system is necessary because of the differing 
amounts of security an organisation's security policy will require for individual system 
resources. For example. a user/process may use weak but efficient security mechanisms 
within the security services used within electronically sent memos, while electronic funds 
transfers between departments within an organisation may require slower stronger 
mechanisms. The exact strength of a service is determined via the security policy and the 
technological limitations that are placed upon the user/process. The configuration of the 
services and mechanisms that are used by entities are located in security profiles stored 
within the knowledge base of CISS - the security management information base. 
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3.3.3 Agents 
Because a security system is a very complex and potentially large software construction 
problem CISS has been divided into ten functional elements known as agents. The agents 
are responsible for the co-ordination, supply and control of security services to 
users/processes. The agents' functionality is described in section 3.5. 
3.3.4 Security Protocols 
The security protocols are sequences of events that two or more parties follow to 
accomplish a task. It determines a safe and secure way in which the two parties may 
accomplish their task. All parties involved in a protocol must be aware of the correct order 
of events to follow. CISS provides protocols for the interaction of users/software and the 
agents that make up its functional portion. Protocols govern such things as key exchanges, 
contract signing, peer to peer authentication, etc. Protocols for secure communication can 
be found in Schneien[ 14] and Multic[S 1 ], the agent protocols are specified in Muftic[7]. 
3.3.5 Security Management Information Base 
The security management information base (SMIB) is the CISS knowledge store. It 
contains information on the configuration of CISS through the selection of mechanisms, 
services, protocols and the subsequent limitations upon the variables in their use as specified 
by a security policy. The SMIB contains information on authorised users, authentication 
data, user entity capabilities and privileges. See section 3.4 for details of the SMIB. 
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3.3.6 Security Management 
The most abstract part of the CISS conceptual model is the segment necessary for correct 
management of CISS. The ISO security architecture [8] divides management functions into 
four parts. 
1. System ft Security Mailage/Hell!: 
deals with event handling, such as the keeping of audit trails and system recovery. 
2. Security . Service A-lctilt rgei, ic'izI: 
selects and invokes the security mechanisms to provide security services. 
3.. Secicrily A'Icchcc, cisi,, s A'lmu't eineu/: 
manages the cryptographic keys and the necessary parameters for correct invocation 
of the cryptographic mechanisms. 
4. Seciii"ily of OS/ Man agcinenl: 
provides the necessary management exchange of information through security 
management protocols. 
The management functions are provided by CISS through the SMIB and the various agents 
and can only be configured by the security administrator of CISS. 
3.4 Security Management Information Base 
The SMIB is central to the functioning of CISS. The SMIB contains six basic conceptual 
segments which are given below. 
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" The identification segment: 
contains the identity of an entity, for example the user's login name. Indexed by the 
user's name is an item of authentication information such as a password for basic 
authentication. 
" The extended security segment: 
stores the security profiles of users/resources. These profiles store the mechanisms 
and services that are to be used to counter security threats. The profiles for individual 
objects are necessary for comprehensive implementation of a security policy. 
" The secure associations segment: 
maintains information on current active associations. Monitoring of the associations 
is important for the detection of denial of service and other potential security 
violations. 
" The extended access control segment: 
holds information oll the pri\"ile es of users. It contains the access rights of the user, 
and groups the user may belong to. Privileges describe the users ability to conduct 
actions such as creation, modification, and deletion of system resources. The 
authentication mechanisms that are necessary for access to system resources may also 
be stored here. 
" The security lag: 
is where events of significant interest to security that occur on a computer system are 
recorded for further analysis. The analysis of the security log is usually conducted by 
the security administrator. 
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" The confidential segment: 
private segment used to store sensitive data for active entities, such as temporary 
secret/private keys. 
Because of the sensitivity of the information present within the SMIB it is an option of the 
security administrators to allow its entries to be selectively encrypted. However, this form 
of protection leads to an increased amount of processing and consequently greater delay 
when accessing the information stored within the SMIB. 
The use of security profiles by the SMIB provides a flexible solution to creating different 
levels of security according to policy or user's personal preferences. For example, the user 
security profiles that are stored within the SMIB may contain the preferred encryption 
algorithm for confidentiality, or the preferred digital signature mechanism, or even the size 
of public key used (a smaller key would mean quicker encryption/decryption speeds and less 
waiting time for the user). The configuration of CISS (controlled through the parameters 
stored within the SMIB) according to the local security policy maintains limits on personal 
preferences. For instance, a user would be denied a public-key pair if they attempted to 
violate the minimum or maximum public-key length set by the active security policy which is 
stored as a parameter within the SMlß. 
The modularity of CISS allows greater flexibility in the implementation of security 
requirements, with the possibility for quick modifications to its implementation through 
adjustments to the entries within the SMIB. This modularity is extended to the services and 
mechanisms that can be sequenced according to the preferred options of the security 
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administrator and local security policy through alteration of the respective entries within the 
SMIB. 
Security services are formed through the correct ordering of security mechanisms. The 
order of security mechanisms within security services is held within the SMIB's security 
profiles. The security protocols are used to order the mechanisms and services so that no 
security holes appear through the way they are used, as opposed to the individual 
mechanism's or service's innate level of security. An example of the way mechanisms and 
services are sequenced in CISS is described below. 
The mathematical module provides numerous mathematical functions 
including: 
exponential calculation (EXP); 
modulus calculation (MOD)-. 
bit shift operation (BSH); 
bit substitution operation (BSUB); 
exclusiveor operation (XOR). 
A (Mechanism) is comprised of (Math module functionl), (Math Module 
function2), etc. 
RSA is a digital signature mechanism 
HASH is an integrity mechanism. 
DES is an encipherment mcchanism. 
RSA is comprised of sequenced EXP and MOD. 
HASH is comprised of sequenced EXP, MOD and XOR. 
DES is comprised of sequenced BSH, BSUB and XORs. 
A service is provided through the use of selected mechanisms. 
A (Service) is comprised of (Mechanism 1), (Mechanism 2), etc. 
P00 is the notary service proof of origin 
CON is a confidentiality service. 
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PolO is comprised of scqucnccd HASH and RSA mcchanisms. 
CON is comprised of the DES mechanism. 
A protocol would then use the services in a sequenced step of actions to 
accomplish a specific task such as: 
confidential communication with proof of origin (CON-COM-Poll); 
CON-COM-Pott is comprised of sequenced CON and Po(O scnvices. 
3.5 The Ten A! _, ents of 
CISS 
The ten CISS agents are: 
1. user agent (UA); 
2. security administration agent (SAA); 
3. security services agent (SSA); 
4. security mechanisms agent (SMA); 
S. security management information base agent (SNIIBA); 
6. operational environment agent (OPENA); 
7. association agent (AA); 
8. inter-domain communications agent (IDCA); 
9. monitoring agent (MA); 
10. recovery agent (RA). 
The interaction of these agents can be seen in Figure 3-2 overleaf. 
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Figure 3-2 Ten Agent Interaction 
As can be seen there are three access points to CISS, the UA, the SAA, and the OPENA. 
3.5.1 User Agent 
This is the interface of CISS through which the users can access its security mechanisms 
and services directly via a request. Dependent upon the security policy some security 
services will be provided irrespective of the user's wishes (see the OPENA description 
below). The user interface is primarily responsible for: 
" providing user access to the SSA; 
" formatting the user requests into valid calls for service from the SSA, and the 
presentation of data from the SSA to the user; 
" maintaining a temporary log of user requests, helping against data inference, 
" prompting the user for more information at the SSA's request. 
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" assisting users in their own security management requirements, such as file encryption for 
storage. 
3.5.2 Security Administration Agent 
This is the second interface to CISS and is solely used by the security administrator. The 
division of functionality between the UA and the SAA has come about due to the necessity 
of making the UA a multi-user agent producing complex code, the separation produces 
simpler code for the SAA. The main functions of the SAA are: 
" interfacing between the security administrator and CISS; 
" configuring SMIB segments, which implement the security policy; 
" accessing the SSA on behalf of the security administrator; 
" co-ordinating and co-operating with the MA and the RA. 
3.5.3 Operational Environment Agent 
This is the final interface through which CISS communicates with the outside world. Its 
main function is interfacing the operating system (OS), applications, to the SSA for the 
provision of security services. The OPENA is made up in part by the application 
programming interface (API). The interface allows applications to access CISS services 
giving CISS greater flexibility for implementation within existing systems. The OPENA 
interacts with the AA and IDCA for communication with entities external to the local 
security domain. 
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3.5.4 Security Services Agent 
The SSA is the central agent through which all services are requested. The SSA has 
contact with all other agents and should therefore be fully optimised as it has the potential 
to be a processing bottleneck. The SSA selects the security mechanisms that a requested 
security service is made up from, and with assistance from the security mechanism agent, 
implements the service. The SSA must restrict the use of security services by user entities 
to those that they are entitled to use, either through their privilege or the capability of the 
system they are using. 
3.5.5 Security Mechanisms Agent 
The SMA interfaces the security mechanisms to the SSA for the provision of security 
services. Therefore, it accepts control and data commands from the SSA. The SMIBA 
provides information on the parameters that a mechanism can accept; for example, 
depending on the security policy in place an RSA key length of 512 may be too small or 
may be excessively safe. 
3.5.6 Security Management Information Base Agent 
The SMIBA is responsible for interfacing the SMIB to the other agents within CISS. It is 
the only agent with direct access to the SMIB. All the security parameters held within the 
SMIB that the SSA requires must be obtained through requests to the SMIBA. As this is 
the only agent that interacts with the SMIB and the SMIB will be under heavy use this is a 
potential bottleneck for CISS activity. 
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3.5.7 Association Agent 
The AA is responsible for the associations between agents within the local security domain. 
It must make sure that associations are initiated with the correct security and that security is 
maintained throughout the association. At termination of the association the AA must make 
sure that the agents complete a proper termination by examining a state table kept within 
the SMIB secure associations segment. The agent is also responsible for detecting denial of 
service subject to quality of service conditions. 
3.5.8 Inter Domain Communication Agent 
The IDCA is responsible for communication with entities external to the local security 
domain. Therefore, it must negotiate the required parameters for a secure connection with 
an external entity. Such negotiations may involve the type of cryptographic algorithm to be 
used, the hashing algorithm, size of key. The IDCA interacts with the AA and the OPENA 
for the provision of secure inter domain communications. 
3.5.9 Monitoring Agent 
The monitoring agent monitors the activity of CISS, primarily the actions of the SSA, and 
logs the events within the SMIB. The historical events that are stored within the SMIB are 
only accessible by the security administrator for the preparation of auditing logs. The 
monitoring agents role is enlarged to encompass entity profiling in Chapter 8 where a 
monitoring model is presented. 
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3.5.10 Recovery Agent 
The recovery agent is responsible for the recovery of CISS when faults either at component 
level or procedural occur, caused either maliciously or accidentally. The RA must detect 
when faults occur and place CISS into a secure state. The error is noted by the MA for the 
attention of the security administrator. This is especially useful for procedural errors which 
can be used to weaken CISS's security through repeated use, potentially leading to denial of 
service to legitimate users. The biýýest potential problem that the RA will have to deal with 
is a fault occurring within the SNIIB. In this situation the RA would have to halt CISS, 
producing a complete denial of service and notify the security administrator. 
3.6 Security Management Centres 
The suggested management structure for a CISS security system involves the use of 
SecuurityManugeient ('entre. ( SMCs ) [7]. The SMC controls the security for all objects 
within its security domain, which is defined as the entities subject to a single security policy 
and a single authority. The SMC's influence extends only as far as the organisation's local 
area network as this is usually a good division point between the outside world and the 
relatively secure environment upon the organisation's LAN. 
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The SMC as with all entities within the conventional CISS setup, has access to the ten 
agents that make up CISS and an SMIB in which to store operational information for the 
management of CISS. The services and mechanisms that are provided to the SMC through 
the CISS agents are used to provide management functions to the domain and all other 
CISS secured entities within it. Each SMC implements the security policy of the security 
domain providing hosted clients with their security needs. 
The main security functions that the SMC provides to users and the security administrators 
include the following. 
" Logging and Auditing Security Relevant Events. 
Audit information is analysed here for potential privilege abuse and intrusion 
detection. 
0 Inter-domain Communications. 
When a user wishes to perform some function manipulating an entity within a 
different security domain the Sh1Cs of each domain must negotiate what services 
are required for secure communication over the public unsecured network. 
" Generation, Storage and Distribution of Cryptographic Keys. 
To maintain confidentiality within the domain it is necessary to generate keys to a 
set policy and then use secure protocols for their storage and distribution. 
9 Domain Notary Service. 
The SMC must act as a lriistec! Third lady (TTP) for the users hosted upon it. 
This means that it must provide the functions, registration, notarisation, 
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certification services and public key verification along with public-key distribution 
for all users. 
" Trusted entry point. 
Firewalls [52 ], are used for access control to local area networks through the 
Internet. This method of access control should be implemented in CISS via the 
SMC which will act as a single point of entry and exit to the security domain, 
allowing the implementation for efficient security logging and access control. 
" Domain Communications. 
If a user wishes to perform a remote operation upon a machine that is within the 
same security domain, the SMC must make sure that all security requirements are 
net according to the policy laid out within the domain. 
0 Access Control. 
Through the use of the SMC's SMIB the access rights and privileges of individuals 
may be determined so that unauthorised manipulation of domain entities can be 
secured against. 
0 Authentication. 
Every person that wishes to use CISS functionality must first be authenticated by 
the SMC through information stored within the SMC's SMlB. 
One of the problems of having a single point of control, like an SMC, is that it produces a 
potential bottle neck that can adversely atlect system performance. One way of alleviating 
this problem is through distributing the central processing elements functionality. 
Alternatively, a very powerful central machine can be used to meet the demand for services 
but the reduced performance return of using a large central machine makes the latter 
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solution less attractive in large networks, the former solution is presented in the next 
chapter. 
67 
Chapter Four: 3-L Architecture 
Chapter 4 
4.3-L Architecture 
77wc' chapter hc'gi//s by cd '. vcrihing the lo/)n/oiº ' c? f a new managemc'nl 
scheme for ('/SS. 7/ic' ('155 cwc'//lc u/ui s'c'n'icc'. v that the . SMC 
, ýrcýý; cle'. c crl c' crý; ch'cl cllul, Lº., l Ihe' I/irc'L' /c'ý c'ýe of lhc' , /e'ýiý . cche'aýe'. 
The 
three lc'vc'/s" (I* the urchilc'clllre are /hell c%scrihed, ulnug with the way 
in which the . SA-1(' services are hroric%c. Finally, the common 
services lhcl/ the three level provi e are s7//1 marised 
68 
Chapter Fair: 3-L Architecture 
4.1 Introduction 
A security domain generally extends as far as an organisation's local area network (LAN), 
which provides a suitable boundary at which responsibility for security is clearly divided 
between that of the organisation and that which is not. Under ideal circumstances the 
computer systems for which the single authority is responsible would be homogenous ( i. e. 
common computing platforms, and processing capabilities ) and the connections between 
these systems would be totally secure. However, the reality is that in most cases a security 
domain will be made up of vastly ditl'eriný machines with ditieriný capabilities and physical 
conditions, potentially spread across a large geographical area where the security of a 
communication line cannot be assured. Therefore, the security requirements of a domain 
should not start at its boundary with the outside world, but should begin at the user 
terminal. 
Because of the difiering capabilities of machines within a single organisation the current 
model for CISS is inadequate as it demands far too much processing power from potentially 
very limited machines. Within this chapter a new architecture still abiding by the CISS 
concept is suýýested, The work is theoretical but some of the requirements that it suggests 
for a workable system are investigated in later chapters. The modularity of the new 
architecture and the flexibility it provides is better suited for a real world application, 
allowing the security to be determined on a machine by machine basis 
The necessity for security at the user terminal is being demonstrated through other research 
currently undertaken within the Network Research Group at the University of Plymouth 
into the acquisition of user passwords across a local area network [53 ]. The method being 
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investigated requires a PC, an Ethernet card and a custom program that enables the PC to 
run in `promiscuous node, ' where the PC looks at all packets upon the Ethernet. The 
custom program then filters the information looking for passwords that are in plaintext; for 
instance when a mail client accesses a mail server the user must lo(, in and enter a password 
to read their mail, but with many readers the password is sent in plaintext. An attacker 
using a promiscuous PC on a LAN can store the captured passwords and login names to 
obtain full access to the user's account. 
4.2 Three Level Architecture 
There are two problems with the conventional deployment of the CISS agents. 
1. In a heterogeneous network there may be machines that are incapable of providing the 
necessary processing power that is required by the ten agents of CISS. 
2. The use of a central SMC to provide all management functions for a domain creates a 
bottle neck. 
The objective of the three level architecture ( 3-L architecture ) is to provide management 
of security services within the boundaries of a security domain in a distributed environment 
by replacing the central Sh1C and altering the deployment of the CISS agents. 
The 3-L architecture is comprised of a domain management centre ( DMC ), multiple local 
security servers ( LSSs) and a local security unit ( LSU ) upon each user terminal. Multiple 
LSUs would be hosted upon a single LSS, the number of LSSs within an organisation 
would be dependent upon its size and its internal policy for computer asset organisation. 
However, it is envisaged that a single DMC will enforce domain wide policy while each 
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logical division within an organisation such as accounting, personnel, sales, procurement, 
will have an LSS for enforcement of divisional security policy. Upon each data terminal 
that users may access the organisation's computer system an LSU will be present. The 
three levels interact within the boundaries of the security domain to meet the requirements 
of the organisations security policy for activities within the security domain and without. 
t L. 
*" DMC 
4LSS LSS 
LSU LSU LSU LSU 
User ser User ser 
Security Domain 
Figure 4-1 Three Level Architecture 
Each higher level within the 3-L architecture is aware of the capabilities of the immediate 
lower level units that are connected to it, information concerning the hosted security 
modules would be kept within the SMIBs of the LSSs and DMCs and would require an 
extension to the security profiles for software and hardware components discussed within 
Chapter 3. This knowledge allows the upper levels to determine whether services requested 
by lower level units meet with the required security laid down by the domain security policy 
and therefore whether the operation can go ahead, or if the operation requires more security 
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than is available the operation is prevented by the higher level entity and the reason is 
logged with the requesting unit. 
Each of the level entities that make uh the three level architecture are built from the agents 
that are available within CISS. The CISS agent list for each level is given in the table 
below. 
X-Present, O-Absent 
DMC LSS LSU 
UA 0 0 X 
SAA X X 0 
SSA X X X 
SMA X X X 
SMIBA X X 0 
OPENA X X X 
AA X X 0 
DCA X 0 0 
NIA X X/O X/O 
RA X X/O O 
ADDITIONAL 0 0 X 
Table 4-1 Agents Used within 3-L 
Some of the SMC's duties are common amongst the three levels and some are specific to a 
certain level, the table below sums uh the division of labour for the 3-L architecture. 
X-Provided, O-Not Provided 
Security Service DMC LSS LSU 
Logging and Auditing Security Relevant Events x X X 
Generation, Storage and Distribution of Crypt ogra phic Keys x X X 
Domain Notary Service 0 X 0 
Inter-Domain Communications x 0 0 
Trusted Entry Point x 0 0 
Domain Communications 0 X 0 
Access Control x x 0 
Authentication 0 X X 
Table 4-2 3-L Division Of Labour 
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The 3-L architecture relies heavily upon the use of public-key and secret-key cryptosystems; 
every user, LSU, LSS and DMC has their own public cryptographic key pair used for 
authentication. The use of the LSU, LSS and DMC key pairs are for security service 
management only, while the user's public-key pair is used to attain personal liability, 
accountability, etc. 
4.3 Domain Management Centre 
The domain management centre is the highest authority within the three layer architecture 
and is comprised of most agents within the basic CISS model. For all intents and purposes 
it acts as an SMC to entities requesting associations with entities on the opposite side of a 
security boundary. The DMC is the only level entity within a security domain that has the 
direct use of the IDCA. As with the SMC the DMC is analogous to a packet switching 
centre in data networks. It is therefore possible to control traffic flow between a CISS 
secured domain and its external environment. 
Within the DMC's S 1113 eich LSS has its own security profile in which its inter domain 
communication properties are listed i. e. the mechanisms and services to be used during 
contact with entities outside the local security domain. Also within the extended access 
control segment an access list is maintained that may hold attributes that refer the DMC to 
the LSS of interest for instructions or a detailed list of external entities that may form an 
association with an LSS/LSU. In this way the DMC replaces the role of the SMC in its 
analogous role of an Internet firewall. 
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For example, a business wishes to place its accounting machines upon a LAN so that its 
accountants may access them ti-oni remote sites across the domain. However, the 
administration is worried that the placement of the machines upon the LAN will put them at 
risk from attackers external to the security domain. Therefore, a parameter is entered into 
the machines profile held within the extended access control segment of the DMCs SMIB 
indicating no external associations are allowed with the accounting machines. As the DMC 
is a required route to the machines within the security domain for external connections the 
accounting machines attain greater access control. 
The DMC is responsible for the implementation of the security policy within a domain. To 
accomplish this the DMC is capable of modifying the SAA or rather the SMIB entries that 
determine the security mechanisms used by the various services and protocols of the LSSs, 
the divisional security policies will vary between the boundaries set by the domain wide 
security policy. For maximum security, confi uration of the 3-L architecture should only be 
possible from the DNIC console. Therefore, the machine that requires the most stringent 
access control and authentication requirements within a domain is the DMC. Of the 
functions the DMC provides, the hardest to gain access to and the greatest privileges to use 
will be the one evoked for configuration of SN11B segments within the 3-L architecture. 
4.3.1 Inter Domain Communications 
One of the primacy jobs the DMC has is the managing of interdornain communications. 
Within a security domain the 3-L DMCs are implemented by organisations to look out for 
their own interests through the implementation of their security policy. Therefore, DMCs 
by necessity have a policy of distrust to all entities outside of their domain. This policy of 
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distrust makes communication difficult between two DMCs when there must be a 
negotiation of protocols between them. For trust to exist between two DMCs an arbitrator 
is necessary to distribute cryptographic keys and confirm identities. DMC to DMC 
communication can be facilitated through the use of a TTP public key certification 
service[54 ] which alleviates the problems of authenticity and integrity of public-keys used 
by an unknown DMC. TTPs may also provide evidence storage facilities (as described in 
Chapter 1) for audit trails and notary services, the exact proofs/records a TTP keeps is 
dependent upon how active a role the TTP takes in the facilitation of secure 
communications between the two parties. For some of the notary services to be provided 
the TTPs must be in-line or on-line, potentially producing bottlenecks for system activity 
during requests from multiple TTf' users. Theretbre, the 3-L architecture will generally use 
TTPs only in an oil-line capacity, generating the necessary certificates for key distribution 
etc. 
Every M1C has its own public key pair, with the private key never being transmitted across 
any communication medium. The public keys of the DMCs will be registered with a TTP 
along with the DMC's unique name and any other information that the TTP deems 
necessary for public-key certification, this information will then be signed by the TTP and 
the certificate stored or communicated to the DMC. 
An example of certification can be seen in Figure 4-2, below. 
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Figure 4-2 DMC to DMC via TTP 
1. Request certificate from TTP. 
2. TTP sends DMC1's requested certificate. 
3. Request certificate from TTP. 
4. TTP sends DMC2's requested certificate 
5. DMC 1 requests service of DMC2 passing its certified public key. 
6. DMC2 responds to DMC l passing its own certified public key. 
Two DMCs may not subscribe to the same TTP, making it impossible for either DMC to 
trust the public key certificate of the other. To overcome this problem the X500[54] series 
of recommendations suggest a hierarchical structure for TTPs providing certification 
services. The X500 series recommendations are a set of standards for a distributed 
directory. Because public key certificates are almost impossible to forge at present, it is 
safe to store certificates in an open distributed database such as the X500 directory. The 
X509[54] recommends that certification authorities certify each others public keys in a 
hierarchical fashion. The following diagram shows a suggested certification authority 
structure. Using the notation of the X509 standard: 
X«Y» which is a certificate, X certifies the public key of Y. 
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Figure 4-3 X509 CA Hierarchy 
For example, using Figure 4-3 the two DMCs can obtain each others public key certificate 
through a chain of certificates. 
DMC I obtains Y«T», Y«X», X«DMC2» 
DMC2 obtains X«Y», Y«T», Y«DMC 1» 
A DMC registering with a TTP for the first time must be given the TTPs public key 
securely so that no-one can substitute a false key. This can be accomplished through 
delivery of the key within a written letter, securely transported disk or smart card. Once a 
DMC can trust the TTP's public-key, obtaining further updated keys can be done via the 
TTP database as a self-signed certificate or from a higher level TTP within the X509 
hierarchy. 
Level entity peer to peer authentication may be accomplished through the use of an X509 
authentication scheme, as detailed above. Using the LSSs to certify the LSUs public-key 
and the DMC to certify the LSSs public key. The DMC being the highest level within the 
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3-L architecture cannot obtain a true certificate ( one provided by a higher TTP certification 
authority ) and therefore lower levels must trust the DN1C. 
4.3.1.1 Securiti' Serricec hi certificates 
The SSid is a special form of certificate that one entity provides to another within the 3-L 
architecture. If an entity has siiccesstülly petitioned another entity for a service, it will be 
presented with an SSid, the requesting entity must then present the certificate to the service 
provider whenever they require continued use of that service. A standard SSid certificate 
can be seen below. 
" SSid header: 
this is used to signify that what follows is an SSid certificate. 
" Security Set-vice ID Number: 
this is the DM1C service number. 
" SSid Type: 
indicates the type of SSid, i. e. access, session etc. 
" Requesting Entity ID: 
this field holds the domain unique/distinguished name of'the requesting entity. 
" Period of Validity: 
this field contains the period of'time ihr which the certificate is valid. 
" Server Signature: 
this field contains the server signature of'the information above. 
The next three sections are added by the requesting entity when presenting the certificate 
back to the server for further use of the service. 
" SSid continuance header: 
this is used to siýnity that what follows is the attachment. 
" Time-Stanmp: 
current time of use. 
" Requesting Signature: 
this is the signature placed upon the certificate by the requesting entity signing all 
sections including the provided server SSid section. 
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Dependent upon the security policy implemented within the domain it may only be 
necessary for these certificates to be used occasionally rather than continuously within a 
secure process. The presentation of the SSid back to the service provider provides proof 
that the requesting entity is the sane entity that successfully petitioned the server in the first 
place. This is similar to the ticket used in Kerberos [55 
The use of this type of certificate is particularly useful as it gives authenticity and integrity 
without the overhead for encrypt rig the information completely. In many cases 
management information within security systems do not require confidentiality but only 
authenticity and integrity. However, if security policy requires confidentiality then it can be 
accomplished by encrypting the appropriate sections within the certificate. 
Another think that should be noted is the ability to stack SSids, in that the association of an 
LSU within one domain will result in a multi-layer SSid. Figure 4-4 shows an example of 
stacked SSids. 
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Figure 4-4 Multi-layer SSid 
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The SSids are useful for auditing purposes and security supervision functions, once 
recorded they provide a comprehensive map of user activity. 
4.3.1.2 Protocol for a 1)iUC to 1)4 1C Connection Using a TTP or Certification 
Authority 
E, x() is an encryption process using the 
key X and applied to the data within the brackets. 
HO is a hashing process applied to the data within the brackets. 
DMC I asymmetric keys SI -private, I' l -public. 
DMC2 asymmetric keys : S2-private, 112-public. 
lid - header containing necessary information, such as time stamp etc 
1. DMC I -> TTP : (lid, REQ, "1 i, 1, si, ) where sib = E%I(H(hd, REQ('I R'I*)) 
2. TTP -* Dti1C I: (CERTl)\i2"2) 
3. DNICI checks TTII signature on the certificate and the validity of the certificate, if both 
are correct it will cache the certificate. 
4. DMCI -> DMMC2 : (lid, RCQ, "N, sib, ) where sib = E, 1(H(hd, REQ(. )N)) 
5. DMC2 examines the request and attempts to obtain DMC 1's public key 
DMC2 -* TTP : (lid. REQ(.,.. 1o. sib), where sig = ES2(H(hd, REQc"ERr)) 
6. TTP - DMC2 : (CERT\", ) 
7. DMC2 checks the TTf' signature on the certificate and then the validity of the 
certificate, it then checks the validity of the DMC I REQ("O<. Within REQCON there will 
be a minimum set of requested security services, if DMC2 can agree upon a common set 
of security services it sends an SSid with a generated secret key Ss, else DMC2 will 
send back its minimum set of security services for renegotiation. 
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IF comnmon-set = TRUE TlIEN 
DMC2 generates a symmetric key S, 
DMC2 -+ DMCI : (lid, RESPcN, SSidrON, E,., (S,, ), sig), 
where sib, = E(H(hd, RESP,. ON, SSid("()N E1, i(Ss))) 
where RESP, "()N contains the negotiable variables 
ELSE 
DMC2 -* DMC I: (lid, RESP(. ()N, sip) 
where sig = Esl(H(hd, RESP, "N)) 
RESP, "N contains DM1C2's minimum security requirements 
ENI)IF 
8. In the case of renc-otiation, DMC I will again submit a REQ( )N if it can meet DMC2's 
minimum requirements. 
DMCI presents the SSid inter-domail) associat1OIl 
SSiCI("(, 
N ) whenever it requires a service 
from DMC2. If confidentiality is not required for DM1C to DMC communication then the 
Eýti process can be ignored. The security services required by the DMC's security policy 
may require notary services, in which case they might have to be provided by a TTP which 
would then be used in an on-line or in-line function. The above protocol does provide proof 
of origin in that the signatures that the DM1Cs produce can be used at a later time as 
evidence for a DN1C's part in the communication. 
Access to inter-domain communications is dependent upon a user's right to those 
communications. The user's rights are determined via their entry within their LSS's SMIB, 
which is determined by the organisation's security policy and security manager. It may be 
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the case that certain users xvill not be allowed access to inter-domain communications 
because it is not necessary as part of their job description and they would therefore be tying, 
up resources allocated to other users that do require the service. In the same fashion as 
many organisations organise phone privileges allowing or denying, local calls, national calls 
and international calls dependent upon need. 
The co-ordination and synchronisation of management keys within the security domain is 
the responsibility of the D\1C. The D"\, IC ensures synchronisation by regular distribution of 
LSS public-key certificates to all LSSs or their respective entries within an X500 directory 
if one is being; used. The certificates are distributed in off-peak hours so that system 
performance is not adversely atThcted. The D\1C may demand the generation of new keys 
from its hosted LSSs according to the security policy of the domain. The time for which 
keys may be valid will be set at convenient intervals dependent upon specific security 
policies and noted within the distributed certilicates. The interval for generation and 
distribution could fror example be N\cckly, allowing the distribution cif the certificate list to 
be accomplished on Sunday nights, %%hich in all likelihood is the quietest night in most 
organisations. 
4.4 Local Security Server 
The local security server provides the framework for secure communications across the 
LAN and has a part in all of the LSU's activities. The LSS can be thought of as a file server 
and any references to files will be examined by the LSS. It enforces the protocols to be 
used as indicated by the DMMC and subsequently entered into the LSS's SMIB. The LSS 
treats the DMC as a TTP and it is envisaged that the DMC should be a physically secured 
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machine to which access and the obtainingg of system privileges is restricted to minimal 
personnel. The DIM should be solely controlled by the security section of the organisation. 
The LSS provides secure ser'ices such as secure tile transfer, notary services, etc, to the 
LSUs that it hosts. For secure communication outside of the security domain the LSU 
contacts the LSS which then contacts the DMC on the LSU's behalf. 
4.4.1.1 Protocol /or 1SS tu LS. S' rnrnniiinirutiwn 
E. O is an encryption process using the key X and applied to the data within the brackets. 
Ho is a hashing process applied to the data within the brackets. 
LSS I asymmetric keys :SI -private, (' 1-public. 
LSS2 asymmetric keys : S2-private, P2-public. 
lid - header containing necessary intot oration, such as time Stamp etc 
1. LSS I receives request ii om a hosted LSU. 
2. LSS I >LSS2 : (hd, REQ, ". \, E1(S, ), si(, ), where sig = E, i(I-I(hd, REQC"cºN, E1'2(S5))) 
Ss is the symmetric key set up br connection between LSS I and the LSU. 
3. LSS2 checks the digital signature using the distributed LSS public key list, see section 
4.7.2, examines the REQ, N against intbrmation within its SMIB. 
0 1F access granted TIIEN 
LSS2 -- LSS I: E(hd, SSid( )N) 
ELSE 
LSS2 -> LSS I: (hd, net) 
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where net may be a renegotiation of connection variables or an SSidDEN 
refusal of connection. 
END1F 
4.4.1.2 Protocol for LX. ti to 1)3IC Coºnfirlcrºtiul Communication 
1. LSS receives a request Ihr a connection to the DMC. 
2. LSS -> DMC : (lid, REQc>, ES2(Ss), sig), 
where sib = E(11(hd, REQ,., )N, Es2(S, )) 
;. The DMMC checks the signature using the entries within its SMIB, and checks the 
variables chosen Withiin the request, it and then checks the access rights of the request. 
" II access rantecl 'I'II E\ 
DMMc -> LSS I: 
ELSE 
DMMC -> iss i 
m here neg may be a renegotiation of connection variables or an SSidDEN 
refusal ofconnection. 
ENI)1F 
4.4.2 Domain Notary Services 
The LSS will provide the notary services within it domain, specifically those of non- 
repudiation with proof of delivery and proof of origin. These are of particular importance 
within a working environment as decisions must be made on information that is 
communicated between the various employees of an organisation. A message received 
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containing ells-information can lead to the use of false information to make business 
decisions. For example, a devious employee could provide a co-worker with false 
information that may lead to a bad business decision resulting in financial loss. In an 
environment with proof of origin the information can be traced back to the originator and 
the necessary disciplinary actions taken. 
Also, the ISO-OSI Basic Reference Model-Part 2: Security Architecture [8], defines two 
forms of a non-repudiation security service; non-repudiation with proof of origin and non- 
repudiation with proor or delivery. Therefore, for compliance with OSI it is necessary that 
these two services be provided by the DMC and LSSs within the 3-L architecture. Figure 
4-5 below shows the provision of non-repudiation mechanisms within a local security 
domain. 
Droof Of 
SU: ýr1 fission 'AASaýý; A Proof NASVýpA 
Of Delivery 
A 
s::;: üi:::: ` Puoot Of C)ripin :.:..., .;.. 
Originator >° Rec pient lStI Proof Of Rer_. Pipt LSU 
hN", 
Figure 4-5 Non-repudiation Routes 
Proof of origin (Poll) is provided throughout the system by digital signatures. Where 
proof may be needed at a later (late the document is stored with its attached signature. 
(lid, ni, siy) where sib = Es(li(hd, ni)) 
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where hd is a header that must contain the following fields as a minimum; time stamp, 
originators id, and hashing, mechanism used. So is the Originators private key, and m is the 
message. 
Proof of delivery ( PofD ) is generated by the delivering LSS once the LSU has 
acknowledged receipt of the message. 
PofD = ESD(H(hd, in)) 
hd is the message header, m is the message sent and SD is the LSS's private key. 
Other suggested non repudiation services that should be included are those of receipt and 
submission: 
Proof of receipt (PofR) is generated by the recipient's LSU 
PofR = EsR(H(hd, m)) 
hd is the message header, m is the message sent, and SR is the receipt 
Proof of Submission ( PofS )is generated by the senders LSS 
PofS = Ess(H(hd, m)), 
hd is the message header, in is the message, and Ss is the LSS's private key 
Non-repudiation services can be requested by users whenever a transfer of data takes place, 
the proofs are kept by the user in case of need against false claims. Proof of origin is always 
implemented within the 3-L architecture as the authentication of entities within a distributed 
environment is one of its main tasks. 
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User A wishes to send -a memo to user B but it is a memo that B must receive for A to keep 
their job. Therefore, A invokes its LSU with a request for the non-repudiation service of 
receipt, proof of receipt implies proof of delivery and submission. User A may retain his 
proof of receipt for use if B denies (Yetting the memo. 
4.5 Local Security limit 
The local security unit is situated upon the user terminal, it is concerned primarily with the 
confidentiality ot'data and the authentication of users. Before we discuss the local security 
unit the use of' dumb terminals in networking needs to be addressed. Due to their lack of 
processing power and therelore their inability to maintain confidential communications 
between themselves and their host, they provide a small security risk. In the case of dumb 
terminals it must be assumed that the physical links between the terminal and the host is 
secured, either through cryptodevices [56 ] at either end of the connection, or physical 
impediments, for example concrete encasement o[ the line. 
Cryptodevice 
Dumb Terminal 
Unsecured 
Connection 
`Cryptödevice - 
, 
'. ý ý' 
Secure Unit 
eipure 4-6 Secure Dumb Terminal 
In the event of dumb terminals beinte used within the 3L architecture the LSU will reside on 
the host and the security methods for confidentiality mentioned above must be relied upon 
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to provide the confidentiality of data communicated between the terminal and the host, the 
use of cryptodevices for confidentiality could also be used to obtain a data integrity service. 
The alternative to the use of cryptodevices is to limit the services that dumb terminals can 
access, denying them any access to sensitive information. This would be accomplished 
through restrictions indicated via the security profile for the LSU within the LSS SMIB. 
However, with the downward spiral of the cost of processing power, and the movement 
towards distributed processing it can be assumed that most recently procured user terminals 
upon LANs will not be dumb terminals, with the most common approach being, the use of 
PCs. How much processing, power these terminals have is extremely variable and 
dependent upon such things as the computer purchase policy of the company, or the 
position of the user within the COMIX1nyy. Therefore, the 3-L architecture loads these 
machines the (east by limiting the necessary processing for security that must be 
accomplished upon them. 
Within the 3-L architecture there are many LSUs within a domain, this division of 
processing power is a more ellicient way of' m eetin the needs of* users than through the use 
of a large central processing clement. Most of the cryptographic processing will be present 
on the LSUs, it is theretbre important that the LSU provides fast cryptographic 
functionality. The ci)yptographic functions settled upon in Chapter 2 were DES and RSA it 
is these processes that must be provided within a fast implementation. Of the two media, 
software and hardware, implementation in dedicated hardware generally runs faster. 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, hardware has a limited useful life time and 
replacement costs are much higher than for software. For every function implemented in 
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hardware a software function should also be provided. The software version may run 
considerable slower than the hardware but the fact that it is available in software, capable of 
being run on potentially any machine, is a good selling point and also necessary for 
complete compatibility. 
4.5.1 User Authentication Within the LSl1 
The LSU is the access point of users to the system and it is therefore laical that it be at this 
point that user authentication take place. 
User authentication is usually conducted at 
several sites within an organisation's physical location. Even if there is no set policy for 
authentication it may still take place implicitly through the suspicion of people that work 
within the Organisation towards strangers walking into offices etc. The points usually 
associated with the presence ol'authentication tech nicques are also those areas of traditional 
access control: 
" entry to a building,; 
" entry to a room; 
" access to a terminal. 
Authentication at the first two boundaries are primarily concerned with the physical security 
of equipment, securing against theft or damage. The third site at which authentication takes 
place is concerned with the authentication of an individual attempting to use a service. 
At the beginning of a user's session the OPENA of the LSU will be called by the systems 
login process via the CISS API. When this happens the LSU first establishes a secure 
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connection with its LSS, where the user identification data is stored. It then attempts to 
obtain an SSid authentication certificate, this certificate can later be used by the LSU if 
further identification is necessary, however, the certificate will be invalidated upon 
suspicious user activity. 
4.5.1.1 Local. S'ccurittr 1ºi%i, rniation Base 
The LSIB is a temporary , storage 
cache for information relevant to the specific user upon 
the data terminal such as the inf rmation that is required by the SSA of the LSU, once the 
user has lo 0 ed oil the 
LSIB is cleared. The clearing of the LSIB should be done 
thoroughly as any residual itillo nation such as cryptographic bit sequences representing 
keys may be retrieved by an attacker through scaininin the storage media. Erasure of 
sensitive inlbrination stored by computer requires over-writing of the memory area it 
occupied. The National Computer Security Centre considers three over writes to be 
adequate for the job of'deletin sensitive information. 
4.5.1.2 11rotocol, for C'oni ficleiitiul Communication Between LSU and LVS 
At the start of any communication between the LSU and LSS it is necessary to negotiate a 
session key that can be used lbr the encryption or all sensitive data passing between the two 
levels, ensuring the confidentiality of all data passed between the levels. 
E. O is an encryption process using the key X and applied to the data within the brackets. 
Ho is a hashing process applied to the data within the brackets. 
LSU asymmetric keys :SI -private, PI -public. 
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LSS asymmetric keys : S2-private, P2-public. 
hd - header containing necessary information, such as time stamp etc 
1. LSU generates symmetric session key S. 
2. LSU -> LSS : (lid, REQ("N, Ei, 2(S, ), sig), 
where sib = E(H(hd, REQ, "()x, E1»(S, ))) 
3. LSS checks the signature sib by using the protocol described in Chapter 2. 
" IF sib=TRUE THEN 
LSS -> LSU : Ess(hd, SSid("N) 
ELSE 
LSS > LSI. ) : (hd, SSidi, i.: x) 
Termination of* Protocol 
[\t) IF 
The specified symmetric key can now be used to encrypt all communication between the 
LSU and LSS, or it can be used to encrypt only especially sensitive information. Once 
again this is policy dependent. However, it is advisable to not overuse encryption since 
even when symmetric cr, 'ptosystems implemented in hardware run in the range of tens of 
Mbits per second, any unnecessary activity needlessly slows down the system. 
It can be assumed that the LSU who received the SSid, "N for a requested connection using 
the secret key E is the only entity with knowledge of that key, therefore providing implicit 
authentication via the use of the C key. 
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4.5.1.3 Protocol. fOr User il zithentication 
The suggested protocol for user authentication at an LSU is where implicit authentication of 
an LSU is not used. 
E, %O is an encryption process using the key X and applied to the data within the brackets. 
HO is a hashing process applied to the data within the brackets. 
LSU asymmetric keys :SI -private, PI -public. 
LSS asymmetric keys : S2-private, P2-public. 
hd - header containing necessary information, such as time stamp etc. 
I. User starts up the user agent. 
2. LSU challený, es the user according to the authentication mechanism specified in the 
LSIB. 
3. LSU sets up cool dential session with LSS as described above. 
4. LSU -> LSS : (lid, G(INI-), sib, ) here sib.; = E(I-I(hd, G(INF))). 
5. LSS checks the signature, obtains INF and then compares the information INF with that 
Contained within its S\MIII. In the event that it is unable to find the information within 
its SNIIB, it may interro`ate other L. SSs in the assumption that the user attempting to 
login is in tact a I1o11-local user. 
" it »r = SMMIR-INF THEN 
LSS -> LSU : (lid, SSi(l. \i"-i. 1i) 
ELSE 
LSS > LSU : Old, SSi(1I)J N) 
, tet'ntination of' protocol 
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ENo1F 
6. LSU informs user of successful login 
The use of smart cards in the authentication process can help increase the relative security 
of the user authentication mechanism. A smart card can be used by the system to store a 
user's private key. Whenever the user attempts to access the system they must present the 
card with its encoded information and processing capability. Of course there would also be 
other authentication mechanisms but here too the smart card can be of use by storing the 
relative information required by these mechanisms 1or identification. The only thing that 
limits the use of smart cards at this time is the limited processing power that they can 
provide. However, increased hrocessii1 power is only a matter of time and eventually all 
the information that is necessary to identity an individual could be stored upon a single card 
and more importantly be processed. Therefore, no vital information will ever need to be 
communicated oil' the smart card and any necessary cryptography that needs to take place 
can take place on the card. 
Once a user has been authenticated the user's security information Such as his asymmetric 
key pair and security preferences that are stored within the LSS's SMIB can be down 
loaded into the LSIB. The users asymmetric key pair is used to provide personal 
accountability. 
4.6 Common Services 
These services are provided through the co-ordination of all three layers of the 3-L 
architecture. 
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4.6.1 Access Control 
Access control is determined by information contained within the SN11B segment - extended 
access control. There is a segment entry for every user, LSU, LSS and DMC contained 
within the collective SMIBs of the domain. The DMC maintains access information upon 
inter-domain communications while the LSS maintains access information upon LSUs, files 
and passive devices. 
An access control segment will maintain at least Ibur attributes per entity. 
1. Distinguished Name. 
The label assigned to the entity by which it can identified. 
2. Access Riglhts. 
A discrete measure ot'the access capabilities of'active entities. Each entity within 
the 3-L architecture will be , iven access rights, the greatest access rights being 
granted solely to security administrators. 
3. Required Access Riý, hts. 
The access rights required by an entity to fain access to the named entity. 
4. Authentication Details 
Any authentication requirements that are necessary for access to be granted, such 
as additional authentication mechanisms, use of smart cards, local environment 
conditions etc. 
The authentication details and access right requirements foram the conditions that must be 
met for access to an entity to be granted to an active entity. 
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4.6.2 Logging and Auditing Security Relevant Events 
Auditing is the recording of specific events for future reference and is a necessary part of 
any security system, since it provides a means for intrusion detection and accountability. 
The simple knowledge that a system has auditing capabilities can be enough to keep 
authorised users from abusing, their privileges. It can be used as a historic record, providing 
a review of past events, or as a real-time event loh used in the examination of user activity 
patterns. Audit lobs have traditionally been used as a record of past events that can be used 
to track any misuse of the system by hackers [57 ]. To this end it has been used in the 
determination cif' which user's accounts a hacker uses when on the system. This is 
accomplished through the inspection of account activity and detection of discrepancies, 
such as periods of activity outside cat' \Vork hours (a common indicator of illegal user 
account activity ). Auditing also helps in the discovery of what an attacker is doing while 
illegally logged onto a system, giving the system administrator the ability to assess any 
lama e caused by the attacker. 
The DNIC will act as the auditin collection point for the 3-L system. Auditing is 
accomplished by all three levels of the 3-L architecture, but the majority of analysis will be 
provided by the DMMIC or a specialised audit analysis machine. 
The DMC has the sole responsibility of lo 0 
ing the inter-domain communication 
information some examples of potential auditing information may be: 
1. attempted association; 
2. incorrect termination of association; 
3. transport errors. 
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The LSS has the responsibility of lo in the domain communication as well as the object 
manipulation and user information some examples of auditing information are: 
1. user login events; 
2. object manipnulation 
for example 
creation, deletion, modification of file objects; 
3. attempted violations of object security. 
The local security unit has the responsibility of operating environment relevant information 
such as the use of sI)ecilic operating system ( OS ) commands or discretionary functions 
that the security administrator feels require auditing. Examples of LSU audit information 
are: 
1. use UI'vvolatile ConmmandS 
2. CPU time, 
I hours of'activity. 
The DMC should be capable of loading all auditing information during off-peak and 
carryiný out a detailed cell-line analysis of the clays events looking for any activity that 
matches previous patterns of unsecure activity. Such examples may be: 
1. repeated login failures; 
2. login ot'users from unusual physical locations; 
3. activity at unusual hours through the day; 
which can be done using an expert system [58 ], It may not always be necessary to do this 
and it should therefore be at the discretion of the security administrator. The level to which 
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the analysis of auditing information goes down to ( the lowest level being OS commands of 
the LSU ) needs to be discretionary as user activity on a LAN can be large and therefore the 
auditing information can become unwieldy. The security administrator who is suspicious of 
some strange activity Must he capable of requesting a füll system audit where analysis does 
go down to the lowest level. 
The monitoring agent is absent from the LSU because it is envisaged that the OPENA with 
its API will interact \yith the existing operating, system to provide the necessary low level 
auditing information. 
4.6.3 Generation, Storage and Distribution Of Cr. v n -aI)lIic Keys 
The DMC and LSSs act as certification authorities within a security domain; each LSS 
certifies that a specific user and LSU Zias a specific public key and distributes the certificate 
Within the domain. The 1)N1C certifies that each LSS has a specific public key and releases 
the list of LSS certificates at re ular intervals. The list may be stored in one distributed 
database as suggested in the X509 recommendations, separately by each LSS or presented 
upon request by a level entity. 
All LSSs within a domain maintain, or have access to the certificates that certify the current 
public keys of all other LSSs and there local users. If a user requests a confidential 
communication via its LSU with another user within the same domain they request the 
service from their local LSS (LSS 1). LSS I obtains the certificate for the second LSS 
(LSS2), as indicated by the address passed to it by USER I in their request. LSS 1 contacts 
LSS2 and obtains the certificate containing USER2's public key, this information is then 
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passed back to USERI. Negotiation of a session symmetric key can take place 
confidentially and the communications between USER I and USER2 occur afterwards using 
the symmetric key decided upon within the negotiations. The LSUs do not now need the 
intervention of the LSSs for türther communication since the LSUs OPENA uses the secure 
channel of communication for application communication. 
The problem of key generation and distribution is most acute at the initial set-up of a system 
when using the 3-L architecture and at proceeding additions of new level entities such as 
LSUs and LSSs. 
The addition Of' new users can be accomplished using the same process that the existing 
operating system uses. The CISS Atli Will interact with the new user account creation 
process and can either be called by it, or call it aller a request by a security administrator. 
The normal (. )S required inlbrºimtion Would then he gathered along with the additional 
information that C'ISS requires for all new accounts. The necessary CISS information will 
include the length of modulus for generation of a key pair, the services that the user will 
require or have access to, the user's access privileges, etc. 
Adding a new LSU will require the registering of the LSU with the local LSS. For 
maximum security the LSS key pair would have to be generated at the LSU and then the 
public part keyed into the LSS by a security administrator. The security administrator 
would also key in the LSS's public-key, thus allowing the LSS to communicate 
confidentially with the new LSU. Adding a new LSS requires similar steps as that of adding 
a new LSU except the keying in of public key parts is done at the LSS and DMC levels. 
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Once an initial set of keys has been initialised within the 3-L architecture the continuing 
management of the keys can be done in-line, that is over the network. Keys can be 
generated and distributed using the current keys to confidentially communicate new keys. 
Every level of the hierarchy is capable of generating cryptographic keys eliminating the 
necessity for coi milnication of private keys over the network. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Hardware Implementation of 
CISS Security Mechanisms 
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5.1 Introduction 
The cryptographic algorithms involved within the required security mechanisms of CISS 
(see Chapter 3), and therefore necessary as part of the three level architecture, are complex 
and processer intensive. However, they are very important and play an essential part in 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity and proof mechanisms. Any usable security system, 
such as the one being developed through the CISS projects of the Network Research 
Group, must provide these services and also conform to a set of simple rules that help 
designers construct effective products. 
" The product must be easy to use: 
how easy a system is to use is mainly determined by the interface that is 
presented to the user and the study of human computer interaction has led to 
the belief that graphical interfaces are best; providing the user with a 
multitude of windows, buttons, and menus. The plethora of Graphical User 
/iiierfcice ( GUI design kits and their popularity, such as the Microsoft 
Visual ranke [S9 [60 ], confirm the direction user interfaces are taking. By 
designing an apparently simple GUI it is possible for the user to accomplish 
complicated tasks easily. 
" The product Hurst be of value to the user: 
the value or usefulness a user finds in a product depends upon the 
application. The system that is in development within the Network Research 
Group is CISS, designed to be useful to people requiring data protection in a 
static environment i. e. upon a single computer system or in an active 
environment such as the communication of data across networks. 
101 
('lurpler Fiº'e: Hardware Im1)lernenlaliOn of C'I. SS Security Mechanisms 
" The product must nm efficiently and quickly: 
the product must min efficiently upon most machines in use at present, in that 
it should make good use of memory and available resources. There is little 
point in producing a system that can only be run upon a top end machine ( as 
there will be few buyers ). The speed at which an application runs is very 
important as most people that work with computers are familiar with the 
frustration associated with waiting for a system to boot up. Therefore, it is 
necessary to optimise a system so that it produces as little waiting time as 
possible upon computer systems that have a variety of processing 
capabilities. 
In CISS the most obvious point at which processing time is a potential problem is during 
the use of security mechanisms that require cryptographic processes and it is here that a 
hardware implementation would benetit the system's speed most. It is also at this point that 
the ditlerences between old machines and new machines ( i. e. their comparative 
technological levels and processing capabilities ) become greatly exaggerated as they 
perform intensive processing of the complex algorithms. To combat both these problems 
hardware was designed to remove the bulk of cryptographic processing from the machines 
themselves, and place it within custom boards that can provide all the cryptographic 
functionality required by CISS. 
Shepherd [61 ] suggested that a complete implementation of the CISS agents should be 
provided within hardware. This is unlikely in practice as such a solution would be of 
considerable expense to any organisation interested in the use of CISS, due to the high level 
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of expenditure that would be necessary at initial purchase and any custom hardware built to 
provide the entire CISS functionality would very soon become outdated by the rapid 
advancement in chip fabrication and consequently processing power. It would be much 
better to provide modular security devices that may be pieced together around existing 
systems, in effect creating a suite of security products, and strengthening the modular 
concept of CISS and its additive potential to existing systems. 
This chapter describes a card ( named ENCDEC ) developed for the Network Research 
Group's CISS projects to help speed up the system by making available hardware 
implementations of necessary cryptographic algorithms. 
5.2 Sum Interfaces 
The implementation or the CISS concept under discussion was developed upon a Sun 
microsystem SPARC workstation in UNIX. Sun provide three interfaces for the connection 
of hardware to their systems. 
" RS 2 32 [62 ]; 
The RS-232-C standard is a technical specification laid down by the Electronic 
Industries Association for the interface between Data ('omnnmicalinns Equipment 
(DCE) and Armer M-mi,, al / quipmuwnl (DTE), for example the RS 232 interface 
would be used in the connection of a modem to a personal computer. 
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The standard can be used for communications within the ranke of zero upto 2500 
bytes per second and it can be used in an asynchronous or synchronous mode for 
serial data communications. 
" SCSI [63 ]; 
Small Computer Systems Interface is ANSI standard X3.131 wherein a peripheral bus 
and command set are defined. SCSI is an eight bit I/O bus that allows the addition of 
peripherals such as disk drives, tape drives and printers with minimal disruption to the 
existing host system. The SCSI bus provides both asynchronous and synchronous 
handshaking. Asynchronous operation requires a handshake after every byte 
transferred, synchronous operation transfers a series of bytes before each handshake 
giving a maximum transfer speed of S Mbytes. 
The interface allows up to eight devices to be connected, of which, any two ( an 
initiater and a target) may use the interfäce to transfer data between themselves at any 
given moment. The SCSI architecture uses a bus arbitration scheme that awards 
priorities to the different devices. The SCSI bus has eighteen signals, nine for control, 
and nine for data. 
" SBus [64 ] 
This is a proprietary connection system similar to the Local Bus system in PCs. The 
SBus specifications were published by Sun in late 1989, detailing the I/O bus 
developed by Sun microsystems themselves. I/O devices such as video cards, cards 
utilising digital signal processors, and graphics accelerators have migrated to this 
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connection system due to its high performance and open architecture. However, the 
SBus is a new 1/0 connection system and with the physical size of a single SBus 
board being approximately Scm by 14cm it is best suited for VLSI technology. 
5.2.1 Choice of Interface 
From the interfaces available on the Sun system the ENCDEC device was built for 
connection to the SBus, for the following reasons. 
1. The SBus is internal to the system box which potentially provides the best physical 
security because there are no electronic components immediately accessible ( including 
wires ). Most system boxes can be locked to prevent anyone opening tip the system 
box, for reasons of thelt or vandalism etc. 
2. The SBus can attain speeds Lill to 25MHz giving it the ability for very high speed 
applications and a peak datarate of' I00h1ß per second at 32 bits. The SBus also has 
extended transfer capabilities allowing it to transfer data in 64 bit words giving it a 
maxilI1U111 capacity of 2OOM111 per second. 
3. SBus devices have the ability to obtain direct memory access (DMA) by taking control 
of the bus and completing transfers directly to/from memory. 
4. The SBus has a 32 bit data bus as opposed to the 8 bit bus of SCSI and the serial line of 
RS-232. 
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5.3 SBus 
5.3.1 Physical Aspects 
The SBus is a board level expansion bus that is meant for use within areas that have limited 
space available. It was designed for components that are surface mounted quad flat 
packages. The SBus uses 82 signals for information transfer and control, with an additional 
14 power and ground connections, giving 96 connections in all. 
The SBus uses a high density 96-pin connector; SBus cards come in two sizes single or 
double width, with one or two connectors respectively. 
Tye Total Length Total Width 
Single 146.7mm 83.82mm 
Double 146.7mm 170.28mm 
The SBus is located within the system unit and therefore has strict restrictions placed upon 
its physical dimensions and those of the components placed upon the board. 
Back 
Front 
Above View 
v 
System Unit SBus Board 
Casing 
-r 4MM 
20 32mmT 
14. &M 
Front Back 
SBus Connectors Mother Board 
Table 5-1 SBus Physical Dimensions 
Side view 
Figure 5-1 System Unit and SBus Component Gap 
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SBus Controller 
and MMU --- 
SBus 
RAM 
Video 
DMA 
Expansion 
Slot 
Figure 5-2 S13tis Symmetric System 
5.3.2 Direct Virtual Memory Access 
Devices connected to the SBus place a virtual address on the bus, prior to any transfer of 
data, which is translated by the memory management unit of the system into a physical 
address. This is known as I)irecl ('filial Aki wry Accexc ( DVMA ), which is a slight 
modification of 1)ireci AI'inol y Access ( DMA ). DVMA helps simplify the operating 
system and software memory management tasks of a computer system. When virtual 
memory addressing schemes are used, an address translation is required to convert the 
virtual address into a real physical address. The functional unit within the Suns that does 
this is the SBus controller and memory management unit ( MMU ), see Figure 5-2. 
The direct accessing of any memory location by devices connected to the system, which 
DVMA allows, is a powerful memory access scheme that allows connected devices to 
obtain information they require the moment they require it. There is no need for buffering 
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information (which can greatly slow down an interfacing scheme ) between the device and 
the system's memory. 
5.3.3 Masters and Slaves 
Boards that are built to connect to the SBus come in two varieties maskers and slaves. A 
master device on the SBus will request control of the SBus from the SBus control unit; it is 
the job of the SBus control unit to arbitrate between requests from masters that wish to use 
the bus, and to prevent overuse by any one device. Once the master device has control of 
the bus it is then in control of the reading and writing of data to and from system memory 
through the use of the system's memory management unit. Once the master has completed 
its transfer to/from memory it relinquishes control of the bus, making it available for other 
devices. A slave device connected to the bus waits until a bus master decides to read data 
from or write data to it. 
Master devices can maximise the throughput of data transferred across the bus. They are 
capable of doing this because they can operate upon data that they have previously read into 
their own memory, and then request control of the bus so that a result may be written back 
to system memory. There is no need for the system or SBus controller to check on the 
device's state by pollind it, an action that would be necessary if the device was an SBus 
slave. It is therefore clear that an SBus master can obtain the best speeds due to its 
potential to take control of the SBus when it is needed. However, because a bus master 
requires greater functionality than a slave when interfacing to the bus, the circuitry of the 
device gets a little more expensive and slightly more complex but these negative aspects are 
easily compensated for by the increased capabilities of the device. 
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5.3.4 Bus Cycle 
As with any bus, there are only two activities that take place across it, the reading and 
writing of data to or from memory. Irrespective of whether the memory happens to be a 
device register or a location in RAM, all locations are memory mapped and specified by a 
single physical address. The basic read and write SBus cycles can be found in Appendix B. 
The SBus uses a data word of 32 bits and a big-endian addressing scheme, meaning that the 
significance of bytes in a word decreases as the address of the bytes increase. Data transfer 
can be conducted using data of length S. 16,2, or 64 bits during a single cycle. When 64 
bits is transferred the master device must tine-multiplex the Rd, Siz(2: 0) and PA(27: 0) lines 
for transferring the most significant 32 bits of the double word. 
Data transfer can occur in cane of three ways across the SBus. 
1. Standard. 
The normal transfer is as described previously and Ibilows the basic read/write 
cycles shown in r\ppendix B. The basic cycle for data transfer is split into two parts 
the translation cycle and the slave cycle. 
The translation cycle begins when the master device asserts its Bus Request (*BR ) 
line and on detection of a Bus Grant ( *BG asserted ) signal, initiated by the SBus 
controller, places the virtual address on the data lines which are subsequently 
sampled by the SBus controller. The master must also assert the data size lines 
(SIZ(2: 0)) and the Read Write indicator (Rd), then it drives the data lines D(3 1: 0) if 
it is writing to the system or another SBus device. 
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The bus controller asserts the Address Strobe line ( AS ) once it has made the 
address translation, indicating the beginning of the slave cycle. It then places the 
physical address on the address lines ( PA(27: 0) ) and asserts the Slave Select (SEL) 
line to indicate which SBus slave is to be accessed. If information is being read by 
the master then the slave must place the information on D(3 1: 0), keeping it stable 
until RD falls. 
2. Atomic transfers. 
When the master does not release the BR line at the SBus controllers acknowledging 
BG assertion, it is indicating, its need for an atomic transfer. In this mode the master 
retains control of the bus tier two or more bus cycles. This capability allows for 
more etlicient transfers otlar e amounts of data. 
3. Burst mode translcrs. 
Burst mode transfers allow the master to transfer multiple data words within one bus 
cycle. The master does this by transmitting the base address for the data at the start 
of the transfer and then relies upon the slave to place the data in the order it receives 
it. Burst modes can be used in two/four/eight and sixteen word bursts. 
It would be beneficial for any device built for connection to the SBus if they could transfer 
data in all of the three methods above. Methods two and three give a greater bandwidth 
and throughput than one, increasing the speed at which a device can access any required 
data. 
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5.3.5 Desired SBus Capabilities 
From an examination of the SBus characteristics described previously, it was decided that 
the following qualities were necessary when implementing the ENCDEC card. 
1. The ENCDEC device would take up one SBus slot using a single SBus card. This was 
determined by price as well as the convenience of having the remaining SBus slot free 
within the available system for envisaged future upgrades. 
2. The ENCDEC device would be a bus master rather than a slave, giving it the best 
possible throughput and potential processing efficiency. 
3. The ENCDEC device should be capable of transferring data in any of the three modes 
described in section 5.3.4, giviý g it the greatest possible data transfer rate for the 
system. 
The next decision made was on the method of construction for the device. Although the 
SBus is meant to be used by devices with surtace mount technology, it was decided due to 
pressures of cost and available equipment that the prototype board should be constructed 
using wire wrap and DIP ( Dual In Parallel ) CNIOS technology chips. Because of the size 
of DIPS it was also decided that the device would have to be constructed as a prototype in 
two halves, one halt' would be the interface board that would connect to the Sun 
workstation and the other half would provide general processing capabilities to allow 
custom cryptographic chips to be easily incorporated. 
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5.4 Interface Board 
5.4.1 SBus Interface 
The necessary logic for the connection of a device to the SBus is rather complicated. This 
reason has led to products being developed that can aid the hardware developer in the 
provision of interface logic for SBus devices. One such product is the L64853A SBus 
DMA controller [65 ], produced by LSI Logic. For a developer to produce their own 
circuitry to interface to the SBus would require considerable effort and expense in the 
fabrication of the needed circuitry. A custom design would however be beneficial for a 
finished product as there would then be less oil-the-shelf chips available for the construction 
of a rival product. 
The L64853A Internal block dim , ram can be seen below. 
r-Channel Contiplf` E-Channel 
Acidness Address Latch SBus Physical (E A(2316))-Io' Address º Decode 
Address 
(PAMY), PA(23: 0)) 
(E_AD(s1i 5O 0)) )) 
32 Byte .º (E 
H" 
E-Coche ,. 
º Address -"-ý 'BR 
SBus 'BG Arbitration 
D-Channel and 
Data(D_D(7: 0))f.. Multiplexer '--ý--- -º 
, -iý, SBus Interface 
32 Byte . _. º D_Cache t-! Data 4*SBus Doto(D(31: 0)) 
DtAACCi'Io tblirt 4 º" 
D_Channel, CMA Aci<'r Conta 7'. 
Control :: r. lA NO Ad; r n. rnn'r: r q -- i 
^MA t Ivi tiyte CamlCr "- 
1 
Figure 5-3 L64853A 
As can be seen from Figure 5-3) the DMA controller has one interface to the SBus and two 
interfaces to devices connected to it, the E-channel and the D-channel. The E-channel has 
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16 bit access to the DMA controller and the D-channel has eight bit access. The key 
features of the L64853A controller are: 
1. it supports byte, halfword, word or four word burst transfers; 
2. it has a maximum transfer of 8.3 MBytes/second at 25 MHz, assuming an SBus latency 
of up to 40 clock cycles; 
3. provides buffering of data unpacking or packing the data into bytes or half words; 
4. has bus master capabilities ror data transfer. 
These features meet most of the desired SBus interface capabilities discussed earlier in 
section 53.5. 
The E-channel allows 16 or 8 bit transfers to the DMA memory cache, with a higher 
priority than the D-channel. This means that if two requests for services come in from the 
peripheral channels then the E-channel'vill be served first. The E-channel supports DMA 
read and write operations in master node and resister read/writes in slave mode. The E- 
channel is programmed usin external registers which provide byte counters, control/status 
etc. 
The D-channel allows only S bit transfers to the DMA memory cache, as with the E-channel 
SBus read and writes are conducted in bus master mode whereas register read and writes 
are in slave mode. The DMA controller provides registers for controlling the DMA actions; 
a control status register, address counter, next address, byte counter, and next byte counter. 
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Because the DMA controller provides the registers for the D-channel, and use of the E- 
channel would require the addition of several external registers and control circuitry for 16 
bit access to the memory cache, it was decided to use the D rather than the E-channel for 
connection to the processing board. 
The D-channel internal registers are written to by the OS device drivers that control the 
input and output of user data to the card, the device drivers provided for the ENCDEC 
prototype are described within Chapter 6. When an SBus master writes or reads the 
controller's registers the controller is operating as an SBus slave. There is no way for a D- 
channel peripheral to read or write the DMA controller's internal registers easily. 
5.4.1.1 Register Read iu, d l1 rites (. Slare A1mIe) 
The internal and external registers of the D-channel peripheral are read and written in the 
following manner 
1. The SBus master that wishes to read or write to the D-channel registers places the 
virtual address upon the SBus lines D[3,1: 0] which is then translated into a physical 
address by the SBus controller's M MU. The physical address is placed upon the 
PA[27: 0] lines and a *SEI is asserted that corresponds to the DMA controllers SBus 
slot. 
2. The DMA controller reads the PA[X: Y] lines and interprets whether an external or 
internal register is identified. 
3. Access to external caches are clone using a transfer size of one byte. There is no 
buffering of the data within the D-channel cache, it is written straight to the D-channel 
peripheral. 
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4. The DMA controller asserts *ACK I informing the SBus controller that Slave-mode 
operation is over. 
5.4.1.2 External 1)-chnniiel re11i. cters 
The only external register that is provided by the interface card is a transfer status register 
that informs the D-channel peripheral whether the interface board is in the process of 
reading or writing data. The external register is a latch ( LATCH ) that can be polled by the 
processing board. 
5.4.1.3 I)-Channel Read (Vaster Mode) 
This is the transference ot'data From an SBus device to the D-channel cache. 
1. The D-channel peripheral asserts the D_REQ line indicating that it wishes to make use 
of the [)NIA transfer iiicilities. The control/status register has been programmed by the 
device driver software indicatin, that a read operation is to take place, the device driver 
software would also have prog5ranimed the address register. 
2. DMA controller asserts *BR to request control of the bus. When the SBus controller 
asserts *BG the DMA controller places the virtual address stored in the address counter 
register on the D[ 11: 0] lines. 
3. The SBus controller's MMU translates the virtual address into a physical address and 
places it on PA[27: 0] 
4. When *ACK2 is asserted the DMA controller reads the D[3 1: 0] lines until all four 
words are transferred into the D channel cache. 
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5. The DMA controller then asserts *D ACK and *D WR and begins transfer of the data 
to the D-channel peripheral (the processing board in the case of the ENCDEC 
prototype). 
6. The data in the D-channel cache is then written on the D 
_D[7: 
0] lines by the DMA 
controller until transfer of the cache data is complete. 
5.4.1.4 1)-Channel Write (Master »rode) 
This is the transference of data from the D-channel cache to the system memory or to 
another SBus device. 
1. The D-channel peripheral (ENCDEC processor) asserts D_REQ to request a DMA 
transfer from the DMA controller. 
2. DMA controller asserts *D_ACK and *D_RD in response to the ENCDEC processor. 
3. The DMA controller reads data on the D_D[7: 0] lines into the D_cache till it is full. 
4. DMA controller asserts *BR and awaits the *BG signal from the SBus controller. 
S. The DMA controller places the contents of its address counter register onto lines 
D[31: 0). 
6. The SBus controller's MMU translates the virtual address and places the physical 
address onto line PA[27: 0]. 
7. The DMA controller outputs the contents of its D-channel cache onto the SBus D[31: 0] 
lines. 
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To read in multiple blocks of 2-hits of data it is necessary to use the following procedure: 
1. Load up the D-channel control and status register setting EN_CNT = 1. 
2. Load the transfer size into Byte Counter 
3. Load the starting address into the D-channel address counter register 
4. Initiate the D-channel controller transfer 
5. Once the byte counter reaches zero the DMA controller will assert the SBus *INTREQ 
signal signifying the end of the transfer. 
5.4.1.5 Hardware 1ººilºlc'n: c'ntalion c, f, llaster Mode Traºº. cfers 
Bearing in mind the operation of the DMA controller during DMA transfers, the hardware 
implementation to täcilitate these activities consists of a RAM chip, a ripple counter and 
various logic chips. The RAM gives a maximum storage capacity of 8K bytes, and acts as a 
memory for data, that is about to, or has just been, transferred along the SBus D[31: 0] 
lines. For the duration of the DMA controller's assertion of its *D RD or *D WR lines, 
indicating a data transfer to/or from the RAM chip, the D_D[7: O] lines must remain stable; 
on the rising edge of the DMA controller's *D_RD/*D_WR signal the ripple counter's 
output is incremented once, and subsequently addresses the next byte to be accessed in the 
RAM chip. 
The DMA controller provides the logic necessary for use of an external or internal (default) 
identification PROM more details of the PROM are given in the next section. 
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5.4.1.6 FCode PROM 
Every device that connects to the SBus must have a hwgl-an, mahle ReaJJ-Only Memory 
(PROM) that identities the device, if a PROM is not found at the base address of an SBus 
slot then the slot is ignored. The PROM may contain additional software written in Forth 
that allows the device to be used in the booting sequence of the machine or for self 
diagnostics. The self diagnostic functions and general debugging of a device can be done 
prior to reboot by placing the Sun in Open PROM Forth Toolkit [66 ] mode which uses the 
Forth interpreter in the unit's boot ROM, and running the boards FCode [67 ] routines 
directly through toolkit commands. The Forth toolkit is extremely useful and a relatively 
powerful tool, it can be used to access all memory locations of the Sun workstation. Best 
use of the tool for debugging is accomplished through Forth programs that can be written to 
run under the toolkit and conduct extensive debugging functions. 
During a Sun station's 1OOtin up process the system probes all SBus slots and attempts to 
access the devices address 0, at which an FCode PROM should sit. The address range 
liven over to the PROW) should be in the ranke of 30-60 bytes for simple cards, but 
potentially the entire physical address range of the Sous slot can be available. 
The structure of information within the FCode PROM is 
" Header: 
" magic number; 
" version number; 
" length; 
" checksum; 
" body ( contains FCode program ); 
" end token. 
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The information stored within the FCode PROM of the ENCDEC card can be seen below: 
FCode-versionl 
hex 
" encdec, josw" NAME 
" encdec, 1" MODEL 
30 INTR 
MY-ADDRESS 10000 + MY-SPACE XDRPHYS 
c XDRINT XDR+ 
MY-ADDRESS 20000 + MY-SPACE XDRPHYS XDR+ 
4 XDRINT XDR+ 
" reg" ATTRIBUTE 
endO 
NAME defines a name by which the device can be matched with the correct OS driver. 
" MODEL defines the model of the card for the manufacturer's purpose. 
" INTR defines the priority level of the device's interrupt signal within the OS. 
" The lines beginning with MY-ADDRESS are used to provide the address for the 
property reg that identifies where the device's registers are located. The first MY- 
ADDRESS segment identifies the DMA controller register, the second identifies the 
peripheral register. 
The first two and final line are used by a tokenizer to produce a file that can then be 
downloaded to a PROM burner, and therefore do not exist in the FCode PROM. The 
tokenizer converts Forth source code into FCode binary format that can be read by the 
systems open boot ROM. 
The PROM containing the FCode information is the FCODE chip found in Appendix B, 
Figure B-2. The active low input on the DMA controller ID CS is pulled high using a 4.7k 
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ohm resistor indicating that an external ROM is to be used and not the default internal 
identification number of OxFE$10102. The SBus controller accesses the FCode PROM 
placing 00 on PA[X: Y] the register select lines of the DN(A controller. 
5.4.2 Concluding Remarks on the Interface Board 
The interface board provides an SBus interface with DVMA master capabilities. It has the 
potential of serving multiple peripherals Along with the DVMA registers it has an 8-bit 
register for direct communication with the system. Up to S KBytes of data may be stored 
on the card a capacity that can be easily expanded, earlier versions of the card could store 
twice as much. 
The interface board is a general IpurpOse interface to the SBus and provides a quick and 
easy way of attaching a peripheral with general processing capabilities to it. The interface 
to the SBus intertüre board is simple and easy to use and requires only 4 control signals. 
The Interface board connections can be seen below in Figure 5-4. 
PB WR 
PB RD 
PB TR 
PB RR 
PB REQ 
SBus 
PB_D(7: 0) 
PB L(7: 0) 
Figure 5-4 Overview of Interface Board 
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5.5 Processing Board 
With the interface complete and ready for use it was necessary to decide how the 
information would be processed once transferred to the interface board. The original 
concept for this project was the optimisation of CISS by implementing the slowest parts of 
CISS within hardware, however, the project that was undertaken in conjunction with this, 
that would have produced a complete CISS prototype in software ran behind schedule and 
did not get a system running in time for a proper analysis to take place. 
With the original concept of this project in mind it was decided that the processing board 
should be as adaptable as possible so that implementation of CISS functionality could be 
accomplished quickly and relatively easily. The best way of providing a general purpose 
platform for developing a prototype is to use a micro-processor and implement any of the 
functions that are required through firmware. 
The processor chosen to be at the heart of the processing board ( PB ) was a Motorola 
68000, the circuit diagram of the PB can be found in Appendix B, Figure B-3. 
In its default state the PB is idle and awaiting data to be written to the interface board. 
While in its default state the PB polls the external register of the interface board, examining 
the state of PB 01. A low PB 01 indicates that there is no fresh data stored within the 
interface board's memory, A high PB_01 indicates that data is held within the interface 
boards memory ready for reading by the processing board. The processing board memory 
mapping for accessing the interface board can be seen in Table 5-2. 
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Address Description 
Ox42S0001 Ram Write 
0x4 300001 Ram Read 
0x4400000 Register Read 
Table 5-2 Memory slapping for SBus Interface 
All information is read from the intertlice board using one address to access the interface 
memory ( INT RAM ) during an iººirºfiºce rrucl, at the end of a successful interface read the 
ripple counter ( RIP ) addresses the next byte of data, making it available for the next 
interface read. A single address is also used to access the interface memory during an 
i,, ie face w/l/e, at the end or a successful interface write the ripple counter addresses the 
next interface memory location ready für data to be stored on the next write cycle. 
Data sent to the I'ß via the interfäce board is entered in a standard form ( PB-packet ), it is 
made up of a six byte header and a variable length data segment. 
" Header 
"1 byte- Function 
"3 bytes- Function dependent 
" 2-byte- Message_length 
" Message 
" Variable length data 
Once the PB detects a high PB_0I it reads the first six bytes of data in the interface RAM, 
which make up the Pß-packet header, and writes it to its on board memory at address 
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0x200000,8500 bytes of memory are reserved for storage of the PB-packet beginning at 
address 0x200000. 
There are currently six functions that are implemented upon the ENCDEC prototype: 
1. load DES key, 
2. DES; 
3. load RSA key; 
4. RSA; 
5. multiplier load; 
G. 1110Cdular multiplication. 
The fiinclioii / jW of the header informs the PB which of the implemented functions are to 
be used. 
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
RSA DES KEYLD MIULT DECRYPT MMULTLOAD BEGIN END 
Figure 5-5 Command Word 
The BEGIN and END bits are necessary for the DES cryptographic process and their use is 
described in section 5.7.4. 
Once the header has been read into PB memory the message length section is passed to an 
accumulator and the data section is loaded into the PB memory, beginning at address 
0x200006. 
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The 
. 
function byte of the packet header is then used to call the subroutine that implements 
the indicated function. The firmware for the Pß can be found in Appendix B. Once the 
subroutine has completed its actions the data is ready to be written to the interface board in 
an interface write. Any modifications to the length of the PB-packets data portion will have 
been recorded in the P13-packets The messckge_Iength is loaded into an 
accumulator and used to transfer the correct number of bytes to the interface memory. The 
PB then requests a DMA access to the SBus from the interface board by asserting 
PB_REQ. 
Once the information has been written from the interface board to system memory the PB 
returns to its det, lUlt state. 
The following sections 5.6, and 5.7 describe the implementation of the RSA (see section 
2.4) and DES (see section 2.5) algorithms within the ENCDEC board. 
An overview of the ENCDEC prototype can be seen below in Figure 5-6. 
DES .º 
Processing - SBus Board Interface 
RSA 1- º 
ENCDEC Board 
Figure 5-6 ENCDEC Board Overview 
--ºSBus 
124 
Chapter Eire: Ifurcf rc, re Incplemelacrlioii of'(7SS', S'ecurilyMechanism s 
The fimclion byte of the packet header is then used to call the subroutine that implements 
the indicated function. The firmware for the PB can be found in Appendix B. Once the 
subroutine has completed its actions the data is ready to be written to the interface board in 
an interface write. Any modifications to the length of the PB-packets data portion will have 
been recorded in the P13-packets The iuesscWe_ el qlh is loaded into an 
accumulator and used to transfer the correct number of bytes to the interface memory. The 
PB then requests a DMA access to the SBus from the interface board by asserting 
PB_REQ. 
Once the information has been written from the intertlice board to system memory the PB 
returns to its delimit state. 
The following sections ä. 0, and 5.7 describe the implementation of the RSA (see section 
2.4) and DES (see section 2.5) alkorithills within the ENCDEC board. 
An overview of the ENCDEC prototype can be seen below in Figure 5-6. 
DES º 
RSA iº 
Processing's 
Board 
ENCDEC Board 
Saus 
Interface 
Figure 5-6 ENCDEC Board Overview 
--ºSBus 
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5.6 Hardware implementation of the RSA Crvntosystem 
5.6.1 Review of RSA Hardware 
In section 2.7 there was a brief discussion on the reasons behind the slow implementation of 
the RSA algorithnm, and the chapter was concluded stressing the need for a hardware 
implementation of RSA if the algorithm was to be used within a security mechanism. Below 
is a partial list of available RSA chips taken from [68 ], [69 ] 
Company Baud rate (K) per 
512 Bits 
Bits Per 
Chip 
AT&T 19 298 
British Telecom 5.1 256 
Calmos Syst. INC 25 59; 
C'ryptec: h i? 512 
C'yIink 6.5 1024 
Table 5-3 Ilse IIardware 
Current research within the Network Research group includes an optimised modular 
exponentiation VLSI implementation for RSA [70 ] with expected results of 1 11K bits per 
second using a 506 bit modulus. 
5.6.2 Crypt eck PQR 512 RSA Hardware Implementation 
Of the few manuhcturers that produce chips capable of RSA calculations by far the best 
that can be found at this present time (with a product available for sale) is CRYPTECH. 
What follows is a description of the CRYPTECH chip and the chosen strategy for 
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implementing RSA calculations upon it, the ENCDEC implementation of the chip can be 
found in Appendix B Figure B-4. 
CRYPTECH produce the PQR 512 [71 ] ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) in a 
QFP 100 (Quad Flat Package), requiring surface mount technology. It has been designed to 
optimise modular exponentiation, which is the operation that makes up the bulk of the RSA 
algorithm: 
y=x° mod n; 
where y, x, e and n are integers. 
The PQR 512 has been built to allow it to be connected in parallel with other 512s, giving it 
a greater key handling range. 
CRYPTECH combine two of the PQR 512s with an 8kx8 static RAM (Random Access 
Memory) chip to make the PQR 1024 module, giving enhanced performance and twice the 
512's key length handling. The static RAM of the PQR module is divided into key and data 
segments of 512 blocks each, there are 8 blocks of memory for both data and key storage. 
A single PQR 512 can handle keylengths of up to 513 bits, encrypting at 32kbits/s, while the 
PQR 1024 can handle keylengths of up to 1033 bits at 1 Gkbits/s. 
PQR 512 
32 <_ Keylength <_ 513 
PQR 1024 
32 5 Keylength <_ 1033 
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Because the PQR 5 12 can only handle keylengths below 5 1) bits in length it was decided to 
use the PQR 1024 module. A keylength of 512 bits is now considered the minimum key 
length that should be used in RSA [72 ]. The security of RSA depends upon the difficulty 
of factorisation, therefore, having a larger key makes RSA more secure, see Chapter 1 for 
more details. Although the security provided by a key of 1033 bits is at the current level of 
processor speed and täctorisation techniques overkill, hardware must be designed to have a 
reasonably long useful life since hardware is generally expensive to up grade. 
The external interface of' the PQR 1024 is similar to that of a SkxS RAM. Its physical 
dimensions are 73 nim by 63 nmm. 
'RESET º 
CLK 
INAC 4 
'UCS º 
'RW º1 Gnd 
*OE º PQR 
Module 
Address Bus (13) 
klkbl 
ppp- 
Data Bus (8) 
Figure 5-7 PQR Logical Interface 
The PQR 1024 module is CMOS (Complemental) Metal Oxide Surface) technology which 
accepts TTL level signals on all pins but the CLOCK input. 
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The PQR module can be in any of 4 different states. The state it is in is controlled through 
6 address triggered commands. 
ppp- indicates a block of key memory. 
Mapped 
Address 
COMMAND A12-AO FUNCTION 
OxAO200C ABORT I xxxx xxxx x110 Software Reset 
0xAO2004 PLEND I xxxx xxxx x010 Terminate Key Access 
OxAO2006 INTEN I xxxx xxxx x011 Unmasks INAC 
OxAO200E INTDI I xxxx xxxx xl lI Masks INAC 
0xA02008 START IpiX xxxx xI Ox Execute Internal Program 
OxAO2000 PLORE I pppX xxxx xOOx Resets A Block Of Key 
Memory 
Table 5-4 Address Triggered Commands 
Abort 
Reset 
End of 
Program 
PLEND 
KEY ACCESS 
STATE(N) 
INAC =I 
º 
DEFAULT 
STATE 
º INAC =1 
END of 
Reset 
Figure 5-8 PQit States 
--} 
PLO RE(N) 
KEY RESET 
STATE(N) 
INAC=0 
1.1k/aufl Stale : The chip enters this state just after a reset, and on normal termination of 
a internal program execution or key access. 
2. Keay Reset State : This is where a block of key memory is reset. 
PROGRAM 
EXECUTING 
STATE(N) 
INAC =0 
START(N) 
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3. Key Access State : In this state the PQR module allows the reading and writing of key 
memory blocks. 
4. Program Execution State : In this state the PQR module executes an internal program 
made up of 11 internal commands. 
Table 5-5 below shows the 11 internal commands, 
MNEMONIC FUNCTIONALITY 
END XXX Terminate Program 
INITMOD XXX Initialise the number in the internal register as the modulus 
LOADOUT VAR Load data from internal register to data memo block VAR 
LOADIN VAR Load data from data memo block VAR into internal register 
MULTPL VAR Multiply data_memory block VAR with the internal register, result in 
internal register 
SQUARE VAR Raise the data in the internal register to a power of 2 
SHRIGH XXX One bit shift right of internal register 
SHLEFT XXX One bit shift Left of internal register 
EXPON VAR Use VAR to produce the next four steps in an exponent calculation based 
on Knuth(see section 5.6.4.3) 
PRESET VAR Used to indicate the amount in bits that is to be moved from or too the 
internal register 
Table 5-5 Internal Commands 
Mnemonic is an 8 bit number; 
<Command><Variable> 
<1 byte > 
where command is the upper 4 bits and VAR is the lower 4 bits. If the command is 
followed by an XXX then the lower 4 bits should be set to 0000. 
5.6.3 RSA Packet 
Information is sent to the PB as described in section 5.5. The packet configuration sent to 
the board for an RSA process is described below. 
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" Header 
" Function 
" Blank 
" Mod_length 
Length of the modulus used in the modular exponentiation calculation. 
" Exp_length 
Length of the exponent used in the modular exponentiation calculation. 
" Message_length 
" Message 
" data 
variable length 
An RSA process using the ENCDEC card is split into two phases: 
1. RSA Keyload; 
2. RSA Calculation. 
5.6.4 RSA Keyload 
The first step in an RSA calculation when using the ENCDEC board is the loading of an 
RSA key. An RSA keyload is initiated by the RSA and KEYLOAD bits being set within the 
function byte of the RSA-packet header. The dnwci field within the message portion of the 
RSA-packet is used to store the modulus and the exponent, in that order. 
Two areas in the PB's memory have been set aside for the storage of the modulus defined in 
the data field. 130 bytes have been allocated from the base address of 0x202134, for 
storing an unmodified modulus, and another 130 bytes from the base address 0x202328 is 
allocated for the twos complement of the modulus, see section 5.6.5.3 for further 
explanation. 
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The modulus and the exponent defined within the RSA-packet are used in the construction 
of a program that is used by the PQR module to perform calculations. The program is 
formed from the 11 internal commands described in section 5.6.2, and is stored within one 
of the PQR's key blocks during the PQR's key access state, which it enters after receiving 
the PLORE addressable command In the case of the ENCDEC card the key storage block 
used for program storage was 0, access to the memory block is ended once the PQR 
receives the PLEND signal, returning the PQR module to its default state. Once the 
program is loaded and the PLENI) signal sent it is not possible for the program to be read 
again, therefore, the risk that an attacker capable of' somehow halting an RSA calculation 
being capable of reading a keypart is removed. 
The program created and written to the PQR's key memory for calculating a modular 
exponentiation can be divided into tear tarts: 
1. Toad and mit lause the modulus., 
2. load the mcssage component arthe calculation 
, pertUflll 
the calculation, 3 
4, output the result. 
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5.6.41 Load and Initialise the i lothilus 
The internal architecture of the f'QR processor can be seen in Figure 5-9. 
Internal Register 
Controller 
and 
Instruction 
Interpreter 
Modulo Adder 
I Memory 
Access 
-- --- -- - -- - ---- Unit 
PQR Memory 
Interface 
f iý; ure 5-9 I'QR Internal Architecture 
The internal register is designed tier input/Output purposes, it is a serial shift register 
connected to the memory access limit. Bits are shined in a /easel . siýgnircanl 
bit ( LSb ) to 
most sigrri/icclIll hip ( i\ISb ) direction, the PQR 1024's internal register is 1040 bits long. 
Prior to any modular exponentiation a modulus must be initialised to the PQR. There are 
two preparation steps that the modulus must undergo for correct initialisation. 
1. The value in the internal reister to be initialised must be the two's complement of the 
actual modulus. 
2. The first bit of the complemented modulus must be placed upon the 3rd bit place of the 
internal register. 
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The two's complement of the modulus is calculated by the 68000 through an exclusive 
ORing of the modulus with a value equal to 2''1', where KL is the effective length of the 
modulus calculated as the length of the modulus in bits up to and including the MSb equal 
to 1, and the addition of I to the resulting number. The length of the complemented 
modulus is equal to the effective length. 
Example 
modulus = 01 10 001 11 110 1101 
therefore, the ellective length = KL = 15 
2's complement =(1 10 001 1 1110 1101) XOR (111111111111111)+1 
001 1 100 0001 0010 +I 
001 1 100 0001 001 
The two's complemented modulus is stored by the 68000 in data memory block 7 during 
the RSA keyload phase in preparation Ihr initialisation when the PQR program is run in 
phase 2 of the RSA calculation. The complemented modulus is aligned upon the first byte 
of memory and any tree memory in the data memory block is cleared. 
A copy of the two's complemented modulus is stored in the PB memory allocated for such 
storage. The complemented modulus is held in preparation for the final calculation of the 
modular exponential calculation, see section 5.6.5.3. 
The complemented modulus stored within data memory block 7 is left shifted into the 
internal register through the use of PRESET and LOADIN 7 internal instructions. 
133 
Chapter Five: Hardware Implementation of CISS Security Mechanisms 
Rather than creating a program to shift the exact number of bits equal to the modulus length 
a more general strategy was chosen for loading data into the internal register. Data was 
loaded into the register placing the MSb of the data in the MSb position of the register, this 
was accomplished by shifting in data 1040 bits at a time, the same length as the internal 
register of the PQR 1024, and then using the SHRIGH and SHLEFT commands to properly 
align the data within the register in accordance to the specific needs of the PQR processor 
(see below). Due to the design of the PQR module the preset value must be equal to the 
number of bits to be loaded into the register minus two, 
PRESET = number of bits to be loaded -2 
therefore, for the strategy decided upon the PRESET is set to 1038. 
Because of the design of the PQR module the modulus must be aligned upon the 3rd MSb 
position. To accomplish this two SHRIGH commands are used to position the modulus; 
use of SHRIGH places a zero in the left most bit position of the internal register. 
The command INITMOD is then given which transfers the complemented modulus within 
the internal register to a modulus register. 
5.6.4.2 Load the Message Component 
The value of the message component must be less than the value of the modulus. At this 
stage of the ENCDEC's processing the data will have been correctly framed ensuring that 
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its value is within the necessary parameters, for details of framing see Chapter 6. The 
message data stored within block 0 of data memory is loaded into the internal register by 
use of the PRESET and LOADIN 0 commands. As in the previous section the preset value 
must be two less than the length of data to be transferred, the strategy previously employed 
to load the modulus into the internal register is again adopted here. However, this time the 
data must be aligned so that its MSb is aligned upon the second bit position of the register, 
therefore, only one SHRIGH is used. 
Once the correct alignment of the data has taken place a copy of the data is transferred to 
data memory block 0, ready for use during the calculation phase. 
5.6.4.3 Calculation 
The PQR module can implement two mathematical operations square and multiply. These 
are initiated through their respective internal command calls SQUARE and MULTIPLY. 
An exponentiation calculation is represented by a series of multiply and square operations. 
To calculate exponentiations the PQR module uses a left to right algorithm. 
For example, 
R=m` 
The left to right algorithm: 
" begin with the most significant bit of the exponent e, set accumulator a to 1; 
" each 1 is a square and multiply operation, a= mat; 
" each 0 bit is a square operation, a= a2; 
" R=a. 
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Therefore, 
if the exponent is equal to, 
0010 1100 0101 
By making a=m we can skip the most significant bit equal to 1 and then 
carry on as usual. 
The list of operations is 
S, SM, sm, S, S, S, SM, S, SM 
where S= square, an SM = square and multiply 
The data is first loaded from data memory block 0 into the internal register using the 
strategy already described. The internal register now acts as the accumulator for 
performing the exponentiation. The S and SM operators are calculated for the first nibble 
of the exponent and the relevant PQR internal commands are used, i. e. SQUARE and 
MULTIPLY, both these functions use the data stored in data block 0 for manipulation of 
the accumulator. Every other nibble of the exponent is used as the argument for the internal 
command E7''P which automatically generates the necessary S and SM operations for a 
nibble. 
5.6.4.4 Result 
Because of the PQR design the result of a calculation is 1 bit longer than the modulus and 
fulfils the following rule, 
0: 5 result <2* modulus. 
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The value remaining in the internal register at the end of the calculation phase is the result. 
The result is not on the correct byte boundaries and it is therefore necessary to re-align the 
result so that its least significant bit is correctly byte aligned within the internal register; this 
can be accomplished through the use of SI-IRIGH commands. The number of SHRIGH 
instructions necessary is found by using the following algorithm. 
IF ((KL+1) nod 8) EQUAL TO 0 
do not shift ri,, ht 
ELSE 
SHRIGH (S-(KL+I) mod 8) tines 
END 
The result in the internal register is then read out using the PRESET and LOADOU I 
command. The program is terminated using the internal command END, returning the PQR 
processor into its default state. The result of the calculation can now be read externally 
from data block I, however, it must be tested for having a greater value than the modulus, if 
it has a greater value the modulus must he subtracted frone the result to obtain the result 
mod (m). 
5.6.5 RSA Calculation 
The second phase of an RSA calculation is indicated by the setting of the RSA bit within the 
RSA-packet header funcliu,, byte. The c/aiu field of the RSA-packet contains the data to be 
encrypted/decrypted The data has been framed so that it is a multiple of the modulus 
defined in the key load phase. 
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The RSA calculation can be divided into two sections: 
1. loading of data; 
2. control of the PQR module; 
3. final calculation of the result. 
5.6.5.1 Loading of Data 
The data to be encrypted/decrypted in the modular exponentiation calculation is written to 
block 0 of PQR data memory, in blocks equal to the modulus length, by the 68000, the data 
is aligned upon the first byte of menmory and any tree space in the memory block is cleared, 
i. e. set to zero. The PQR data memory block 0 is memory mapped at the PB address 
OxA0000. 
5.6.5.2 Co, ztrol (f 1/u' PQ/? inodule 
Once the data has been written to the PQR module the 68000 sends the addressable 
command STARTO, indicating that the PQR module should run the internal command 
program stored within the key memory area 0. The 68000 then polls the PQR INAC line, 
the INAC line shows when the PQR module leaves the program execution phase, when the 
INAC line goes low indicating the end of execution the 68000 reads the result of the PQR 
calculation. 
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5.6.5.3 Final Calculation of the Result 
The result read from the PQR module is compared to the modulus stored at 0x202134, if 
the result is less than the modulus it is written to the PB memory reserved for the data field 
of the RSA-packet, over the original data. If the result is larger than, or equal to, the 
modulus the result is added to the complimented modulus stored at address 0x202328 and 
then written to the memory reserved for the data field. 
The three steps of the second phase are run until all the data within the RSA-packet has 
undergone the RSA calculation, once this is done the PB writes the RSA-packet back to the 
interface board as described in section 5.5. 
5.7 Hardware Implementation of the DES Cryptosystem 
5.7.1 CRY121C102 
The DES chip chosen for use within the ENCDEC prototype was the CRYPTECH 
CRY121C102 [73]. The DES chip provides high data encryption speeds, of around 
20Mbits/second, and its easy interfacing. The DES chip comes in two packages a 48 pin 
DIP and a 68 pin PLCC, for prototyping purposes we used the 48 pin DIP. The ENCDEC 
implementation of the DES chip can be found in Appendix B Figure B-5. 
The DES chip is logically divided into two parts: 
" an internal DES processor; 
" an input/output shell that interfaces with the internal processor and the rest of the world. 
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DO... D31 INPUT/OUTPUT SHELL 
A0, Al-- -------º 
'CS, 'R/W, 'DS-- ---- -- -º 
'DTACK. - 
"FLAG1, 'FLAG2"------ --- 
'DMA ACK----- 
'RESET--- --- -ý 
X-tal 
20 MHz :- 
Figure 5-10 DES Chip 
The DES processor is manipulated through the use of its numerous registers. 
9 Two input data registers: 
that are used for the butTering of data awaiting processing by the internal DES 
processing segment of the chip. 
9 An output data roister: 
holds the result of' a DES calculation performed on plaintext in a previous 
calculation. 
"A command and a command modit'y register: 
the command register is a temporary butler for the commands used in the 
programming of the DES chip, see below. The command modify register holds 
data that modifies the commands held in the command register. The contents of 
the modify register is not cleared once read by the internal DES processor. 
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" Four configuration registers: 
all four resisters are addressed at the same location. Lines D7 to D4 are used in 
the selection of a specific register, while D3-DO are written into it. Through these 
registers it is possible to configure the bus width, ROM key load, the Flag 1 
request line and the Flab 2 request line. 
" Three status registers 
The status registers are used by the external processor to check on the I/O shell, 
the internal DES processors control logic and the status of the internal DES 
processors key registers. 
The various registers are accessed by the use of the input lines Al and AO. 
Al M) Register 
0 0 Data 
0 I Configuration 
1 0 Command 
Command Modify 
"Fahle 5-6 DES Status Registers 
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Single Commands 
Hex Mnemonic Description 
EC-EF LEK 1-LEK4 Load external key in key register 1-4 
C8-CB SLKI-SLK4 Select key 1-4 for en/decryption 
DO RSD Reset all work registers 
D8 RST Reset all work and key registers 
AS DES Execute DES on work register 1 
A9 DESI Execute DES" on work register I 
89 NOP Dummy command 
CO LIV Load initial vector 
C2 RF V React final vector 
Table 5-7 1)ES Single Commands 
The single commands are provided for the initialisation and subsequent clearing up 
processes that must be done before and after the processing of data. The single commands 
may also be used in the provision of isolated commands that must be used while data is still 
secure within the chip. 
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Continuous Commands 
Command Modifier Mnemonic Description 
00 0 CE_ECB Pipelined encryption ECB 
00 1 CE_CBC Pipelined encryption CBC 
00 2 CE_CFBS Pipelined encryption CFB8 
00 3 CE_OFBS Pipelined encryption OFB8 
10 E CE_CFBI Pipelined encryption CFB1 
10 F CE OFB I Pipelined encryption OFB 1 
01 8 CD_ECB Pipelined decryption ECB 
01 9 CD_CBC Pipelined decryption CBC 
01 A CDCFBS Pipelined decryption CFB8 
01 B CDOFBS Pipelined decryption OFB8 
10 E CDCFB I Pipelined decryption CFB 1 
10 F CD OFB I Pipelined decryption OFB 1 
02 S MRE_ECB Minimum Response ENC 
0 S MRD ECB Minimum Response DEC 
Takle 5-8 DES Continuous Commands 
The continuous commands are used for bulk encryption/decryption, a continuous command 
stays valid as long as data is being read in and out of the chip. A continuous command is 
stopped by placing new information into the data register and then overwriting the 
continuous command with a new command such as NOP ( no operation ). 
5.7.2 DES Packets 
It was felt unnecessary to provide the cipher feedback and output feedback modes of 
operation as they were originally developed for stream cipher applications. The two 
remaining nodes electronic codebook and cipher block chaining were settled upon to 
provide the bulk of cryptographic processing in confidentiality mechanisms due to their 
faster speed of encryption at the cost of minor amounts of padding. A description of the 
DES modes of operation can be found in Chapter 2. 
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Information that is written to the ENCDEC board for a symmetric cryptographic process is 
presented in packets. Each packet comprises of a header and the message, the header is six 
bytes long comprising of four one byte words and one two byte word. 
" HEADER 
" Function 
" For future implementation 
" Mode 
8-bit word indicatinn, the DES mode to be used: 
ECB = OxOS 
CBC = 0x04 
OFB = 0x02 
CFß=OxOI 
" For future Implementation 
" Message lenoth 
" MESSAGE 
" Data 
5.7.3 DES key load 
When using the board in a DES operation the key must first be loaded into one of the ten 
key memories. Any future operations can use the key and IV by simply referencing the key 
location 0-9. The processing board has set aside on board storage for 10 DES keys and 
their initial vectors that are necessary for some of the DES modes of operation. The key 
storage base address is at 0x203000 and has been allocated 240 bytes of memory. 160 
bytes of memory are used in the storage of the key and IV. The other 80 bytes are used in 
the storage of working lVs, i. e. the IV used in the encryption/decryption of data sent to the 
board in multiple packets. Once the keys are stored upon the board they may be used to 
speed up operations that require numerous plaintext messages to be encrypted/decrypted, 
by avoiding the continual loading of new keys. 
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The assembly code function kc'yfd is used to store the key and is called if the DES and 
KEYLOAD bits are set within the DES packet header FUNCTION word. In the keyld 
phase of a DES operation the first eight bytes of the DATA field will be the DES key and 
the second eight the IV. 
5.7.4 DES Calculation 
The second phase of a DES operation is the actual encryption/decryption process, where 
plaintext/ciphertext is sent to the board for DES processing. The MESSAGE section of the 
DES packet will contain the information to be processed. 
The ENCDEC card must be notified when the first packet and last packet of plaintext or 
ciphertext is sent for DES encryyIption/decryption. This is accomplished by the setting of the 
BEGIN and END bits in the header FUNCTION word. 
" For encryption: 
the first packet must be indicated so that the correct IV is used in the 
cryptographic process, for instance the second packet of five being encrypted with 
the DES mode CBC would need to use the stored IV as opposed to the original 
that was sent to the board. The final packet must be indicated so that the packet 
may be padded out. The ciphertext will be up to eight bytes longer than the 
plaintext, the expansion is necessary because of DES processing blocks of 64 bits 
at a time. Before the final packet of a plaintext message is encrypted it is padded, 
this operation makes the plaintext length a multiple of 64 bits, the final byte of the 
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plain-text is the length of the necessary padding in bytes, if the plaintext is already a 
multiple of 64 bits the message is padded by 64 bits and the final byte holds the 
value eight; all the padded bytes except for the final one are set to a random byte 
sized word. The size of the ciphertext is then stored in MESSAGE LENGTH of 
the DES packet header, see section 5.7.2. 
" For decryption: 
as with the encryption process it is necessary to know what packet of the plaintext 
is being processed so that the correct IV is used, and the final packet must be 
indicated to the ENCDEC board so that the padding information can be removed 
and the plaintext returned to its original size. The size of the plaintext is then 
stored in the M1ESSAGE_LENGTH orthe DES packet header. 
The continuous functions were used to program the actual encryption/decryption routines 
of the DES chip. The contilnuOus C0I1 minds have been highly pipelined giving a better 
performance than the single commands. The pipelining means that while data is undergoing 
the cryptographic process the output of the previous process is being made available while 
the next input is being entered. 
r Out N-2 
I inp N Out N-1 inp N+1 
I 
Out N inp N+2 
DES Execution N-1 DES Execution N 
-j 
DES Execution N+1 
Figurc 5-11 DES I'ipelining 
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The process for ECB using the DES chip can be seen in the Figure 5-12. The ECB DES 
mode is chosen by setting the P_ECB bit in the MODE word of the DES packet header. 
Check if I%Ö shell is empty 
Check if key is present 
Enter the 'SLK command 
Enter the command modifier 
i Enter the CE ECB/CD_ECB command 
Enter 8 byte of input data in 
order to fill pipeline 
Enter 8 byte of input da Repeat as many 
Read 8 byte of output data times as needed 
Enter the NOP command 
Read 8 byte of output data 
Figure 5-12 ECU Process 
The key is loaded into the DES chip by the routine IA-e),, the They function loads a key into 
the internal key register I. and then indicates to the DES processor that it is to use the key 
contained in register I for fixture DES calculations. 8 bytes of data are then written to the 
DES chips I/O register. The resisters memory map can be found in Table 5-9. 
Address Description 
0x$00000 Input/output register 
0x$00002 Command/StatusI register 
0x$00004 Command Modify/Status3 register 
OxS00006 Configuration/Status2 register 
Table 5-9 DES Register Address 
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Once the keys have been loaded the command modify register is loaded with the value OxOO 
and the DES command of CE_ECB or CD_ECB are stored within the command register, 
depending on whether a encryption or decryption is required. Once the DES chip is 
correctly programmed the 68000 enters the me routine. By polling the status registers of 
the DES chip it is possible to obtain information about the current state of the chip. The 
registers are located at the same address as the configuration and command registers; status 
registers are accessed on a read cycle while the others are accessed on write cycles. The 
enc routine loads eight bytes of data into the input register of the DES chip which are then 
processed by the internal DES processor. The 68000 polls the DES status register 1 first to 
check whether an error has occurred during the calculation and then to see if there is a valid 
DES output to be read. An error will only occur if there is a hardware fault with the 
ENCDEC card. When there is a valid word stored in the output register the word is read 
from the DES chip and stored at the same block of memory as the original 8 bytes. The 
data from the DES packet is written to the DES chip till all data has been processed, it then 
awaits writing to the interflice card. 
The CBC mode of operation is chosen by setting the P_CBC bit in the mode word of the 
DES packet header. The process of implementing the DES CBC mode using the DES chip 
is summarised in Figure 5-13. 
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Check if I/O shell is present 
Check If key is present 
Enter the 'SLK command 
Enter the LIV command 
Enter 8 byte initial vector 
Enter the command modifier 
Enter the CE_CBC/CD_ CBC command! 
Enter 8 byte of input data in 
order to fill pipeline 
Enter 8 byte of input data 1 Repeat as 
Read 8 byte of output data needed 
Enter the NOP command 
Read 8 byte of output data 
Enter the RFV command 
Read 8 byte final vector 
Figure 5-13 CIIC Process 
The 69000 checks the START bit in the DES packet header FUNCTION word. If the start 
bit is high then the initial IV is loaded into the DES chip proceeding the command LIV, that 
tells the DES chip the next block of data written to its input register will be an initial vector. 
If the START bit is not set then the working IV will be written to the DES chip. The 
command modify register has the value OxOI written to it and the command P CBC is 
written to the DES command register. The f action enc is called and the procedure is as 
described above. 
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6.1 ENCDEC Device Driver 
UNIX [74 ] is made up of three parts, the UNIX kernel, user processes and a system of data 
files stored in secondary memory. The kernel is at the centre of the system, it controls all 
access to the CPU, primary memory, and I/O devices. The user processes request resources 
from the kernel on behalf of the users, and the kernel assigns the resources, such as 
processing time, as requested. 
Input/output (I/O) in UNIX is handled very simply, in that all I/O is presumed to be 
conducted upon tiles, some of which, in fact, will be hardware devices. The kernel 
maintains a overall tilesystem that maps user requests onto the necessary system resource, 
be it an area in secondary memory or a device connected to the system. The UNIX file 
system is made up cif'. 
1. regular tiles; 
2. directories; 
3. special files; 
4. symbolic links etc. 
The Files that are used for accessing devices are the special files that are collected within the 
`/dev' directory. A list of all devices that may be attached to the UNIX system are indexed 
via two arrays the cd'rsu' ( switch table for character devices )or he%m, ºw ( switch table for 
block devices ). A block device is capable of storing data in fixed block sizes and later 
retrieving them. Devices that must read data in variable size blocks are character devices. 
The devsw tables contain entries to a device driver's `top half, ' these are the routines that 
are called by the user processes. The `bottom halt routines are called on the assertion of an 
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interrupt by the device. Because the ENCDEC prototype board does not meet the 
specifications to be a block driver it is configured as a character device. 
(INIX 
ENCDEC ! - 
[3ýýard :. 
UNIX 
KERNEL ] User H_ . Top iº Process 
Device 
Driver 
Figure 6-1 Device Driver Overview 
The ENCDEC cdevsw entry is 
-, 
A- 
User 
encdec_open, encdec_close, encdec_read, encdec write, encdec_ioctl, encdec_reset, 
encdec_select, encdec_mniap, (Struct streamtab 
*) encdec_str) 
These are known as the entry points to the device driver. 
There are two ways in which a device driver can be loaded within the UNIX kernel and its 
entry points placed within the devsw lists, during autoconfiguration and through the use of 
modload. All physical devices upon a UNIX system have two stnictures assigned to them 
dev_iiºfo and dev_np. s. 
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dev_info: 
" clevi_hcu"eiil: pointer to dev_info structure that corresponds to the parent device, 
in the case of the ENCDEC board the parent is SBus device; 
" deri next: pointer to dev_info structure of any sibling devices, system dependent; 
" c/c'vi_Awes: a pointer to the dev_info structures of any child devices; 
" clevincime: a pointer to a character stringy that is contained within the FCode 
PROM of the device, in the ENCDEC board's case this is "encdec, josw"; 
" dcri_nreg: number of registers the device has, the ENCDEC board has four 
registers; 
"d vi_ninir: number of interrupts the device has, the ENCDEC board has a single 
interrupt; 
" devi_ii, tr: a pointer to dev_intr structure that hold information on the devices 
interrupt level; 
" clew cfriº'c'r: a pointer to the dev_ops structure of the device; 
" cleº'i cluln: a pointer to private data; 
" t1evi nnclc'icl: id number of this device from the FCode PROM. 
" clevi_umü: logical unit number Of this device. 
dev_ops: 
" clcrGrev: device driver revision number; 
" ck'ro icfeiiii/i': a pointer to the device driver's identifyO routine, see below; 
" dJevo_ aihich: a pointer to the device driver's -attachO 
routine, see below. 
A device driver can be contiýured into the UNIX kernel through the use of the configo 
command adding the dev_ops structure of the device-driver to the ops list which the kernel 
maintains. When the kernel starts execution it begins its boot time initialisation including its 
autoconfiýuration process. In open boot PROM systems this involves the probing of SBus 
slots for FCode PROM,, and the creation of a c%'v inrn structure list. Once all SBus slots 
have been probed, and a dev_info structure created for each device found, the system 
attempts to attach a device driver to the device and till the c%r_c ps field of the dev info 
structure. The kernel does this by using the identifyO routines held within its ops list to 
identify the device drivers to which physical devices belong. 
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The second way to introduce a device driver to the UNIX kernel is to use the modload 
command. The modload command uses the initialisation routine that must be part of a 
loadable device driver and the vd pseudo driver that is part of the kernel. The vd driver is 
passed a vdldrv structure that is used to load a device driver. 
vdldrv: 
" di"r_magic: magic number that tells the vd driver the type of loadable module, in 
the ENCDEC board's case this is set to VDMAGIC_DRV indicating that it is a 
device driver and not a pseudo driver; 
" clip,, ai, e: a pointer to the device driver's name, "encdec"; 
" dr' ck'_oyp. v: a pointer to a dev_ops structure initialised by the device-drivers 
initialisation routine. 
" cli"r_hck 'su : this is a pointer to the bdevsw structure defined by the device_driver 
in this case in is set to NULL. 
" cri, c"clc sir: this is a pointer to the cdevsw structure defined by the ENCDEC 
device driver. 
" ch"r h/ocknrujor: indicates the line in the bdevsw list kept by the kernel that is the 
device drivers entry, in the ENCDEC board's case this is set to 0, it has no 
preconfiugured entry. 
" clýºc/zuýnýujor: as the drv_blockmajor except within the cdevsw list, set to 0 as 
there is no preconfiýured entry for the ENCDEC board. 
The device driver provided with the prototype board is one that allows the loading of 
device-drivers into the kernel. This eases any debugging that is necessary and does not 
require the kernel to be remade. 
6.1.1 Autocontiguration Support 
If a device driver is conli"ured into the system and loaded during autoconfiguration, at 
boot time, it requires two routines ickul fy and oll ach. These routines must be present even 
if the device is not to be configured during autoconfig as they are called by the vd driver 
during the loading process of loadable drivers. 
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6.1.1.1 encrlec idenlifrO 
When this routine is called, it is passed a single argument which should be the name of the 
ENCDEC device contained within the device's FCode PROM. The name of the ENCDEC 
prototype board is "encdecjosw". If the routine is called with the correct name, the fact is 
recorded within a static variable and a successful identification is returned to the system. 
6.1.1.2 encclec attach) 
On the successful identification the encdec attach routine is called. The attach routine: 
1. allocates device driver state memory, the data structures required for operation of the 
device; 
2. maps the device registers into kernel memory and stores the addresses into data 
structures, the addresses are obtained from Information within the dev_info structure for 
the encdec device, these would include the ENCDEC external register, and internal 
registers; 
3. alerts the system to the highest blocking priority i'ar DVMA mapping; 
4. adds an entry within the kernels interrupt handling routine for the driver's interrupt 
service; 
5. initialises the device. 
6.1.1.3 encdec rdlc, udO 
This is the initialisation routine called by the vd-pseudo driver during modload, modunload 
and modstat. Three commands are catered for by the routine: 
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" VDLOAD: The driver initialises the ENCDEC board according to any configuration 
information passed to the initialisation routine by mociload and links in the vd entry point 
struct with that of the cdevsw set aside for loadable drivers. 
" VDUNLOAD: The initialisation routine verities that the ENCDEC board is not in the 
middle of an operation and if it isn't it is unloaded and the necessary cleanup operations 
are done. 
" VDSTAT: The initialisation routine tills in the vds_modinfo data structure detailing the 
current status of the ENCDEC board. 
6.1.2 Driver Entry Paints 
6.1.2.1 encdec openo 
The ENCDEC device can be accessed through the special tile it has been assigned within 
the `/dev' directory. Before any operation can be carried out using the device it, must first 
be opened. When a user process uses either openO or fopenO C commands with the special 
filename as an argument the encdec_openO routine is called. The enedec_openO routine 
checks to see if the device has been opened previously. If it has been an error is reported, 
otherwise the device is initialised and inhibited from being opened by another process. The 
routine then returns control, indicating success to the user process. 
6.1.2.2 cncdec closeO 
The encdec_closeO routine is called whenever the C functions fcloseO or closeO are used 
and the special device file is indicated. The encdec_close() routine tidies up the device and 
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then closes it down, and signals the system telling it that the device cannot be used until it is 
reopened. 
6.1.2.3 enc(k'c rear! O and Cnrrlrcwrrite 
A user process uses any of the file read(/write( routines within the C language giving the 
device special filename as an argument to read or write information to the ENCDEC board. 
For example: 
a user program might call the rL'U[IO system call; 
read(tileno, address, nbytes), 
the kernel then calls the drivers re'cn/O routine; 
encdec_read((Iev, uio). 
The process for 1/0 using a device driver to interlace with a device can be seen below. 
1. Read or write routine is called. 
2. The appropriate entry point routine is called and initiates activity on the device 
while blocking any other attempts to access the board. 
3. The CPU passes control to some other process. 
4. The device completes its action and issues an interrupt request, the interrupt is 
serviced by the kernel and the encdec_intrO routine is called. 
5. The interrupt handler starts up the process that called the device entry point 
routine and control is passed back to the user process that requested the I/O 
service. 
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The encdec read() and encdec write() routines call a kernel support routine physio() that 
breaks up large transfers of data into segments that the device can handle. The physioO 
routine in turn calls the encdec_strateýy() routine described below for the actual transfer of 
data to and from the board. 
6.1.3 Interrupt Support 
6.1.3.1 ENCI)EC intro 
When this routine is used it takes the appropriate action to deal with the interrupt called. In 
the case of the ENCDEC board, there are two reasons for an interrupt to occur: 
1. an error has occurred upon the hoard; 
2. a request for SBus control and subsequent DVNIA is being made for the completion of a 
requested read/write. 
In the first case the board is reset and any actions that were being carried out must be 
resubmitted. In the second case the device interrupt request is reset and control is returned 
to the system. The user process that requested the read/write service is then sent a signal to 
show successful completion. 
6.1.3.2 ENCDECJwwIlO 
The encdec_poll() routine is called when there are several devices sharing the same interrupt 
priority. The poll() routine checks the ENCDEC board's register to verify whether it has 
requested the interrupt. If the ENCDEC board did request the interrupt then the poll 
routine calls the encdec_intrO routine. 
158 
('lici/ýIcýr . ýix:. tinfiwure Implementation of (ISS Security Mechanisms 
6.1.4 Private Support Routines 
6.1.4.1 ENCI)EC strute;; rO 
The encdec_strategy routine provides common code for the _read and write routines 
in the 
transfer of data to and from the board. The encdec_strategy routine is called by the kernel 
support routine physio. 
6.2 Long Integer 
Most public cryptosystems require Tong integer arithmetic. The integer size is usually 
anywhere up to 1024 bits in length and to deal with this problem a basic library of long 
integer functions was developed, to provide the functions for the mathematical module of 
CISS. All cryptographic routines can be constructed from the basic operators addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, and division. The diagram below shows the hierarchy for the 
provision of security services within the CISS architecture. 
Use( Recýuü t tnc: rýS 
1 
Security i SE+curity 
Services ( protocols 
Security 
Mod ou .rc 
4f 
a 
M at rre n rot ical 
Modules 
SMI3 
Figure 6-2 Mathematical Module 
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The long integer libraries have been written for the high level languages C and C++ which 
provide easy porting to the UNIX system, for which a prototype CISS has been developed. 
It is therefore necessary to provide optimised versions of these to any mathematical modules 
that are attempting to provide the cryptographic algorithms used within CISS through 
software. The long, integer library is included upon a disk with this thesis and the header file 
for the long integer modules can be found in Appendix C. 
The C++ library defines a class `long integer' and overloads the operators so that pro-rams 
that use the long integer library can simply use the normal operators when manipulating 
Ion; integers, making program generation using the developed library tidier and easier to 
read. However, in C the operators cannot be overloaded and separate functions have been 
developed to provide the needed lünctionality, C libraries were necessary for current 
compatibility with UNIX. 
6.2.1 The Four Basic Algorithms 
The four basic algorithms of+, -, / and *[75 ], used by the mathematical module developed 
are detailed in Appendix C. Because computers are mainly optimised to deal with words 
that are multiples of 8 bits in length the long integer library uses numbers of base 256. 
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6.2.2 Further Operations 
With modifications the four basic algorithms were made capable of dealing with negative 
integers. The basic algorithms for mathematical operations can be represented as: 
1. S= add(A, B) (Addition); 
2. D= subtract(A, B) (Subtraction); 
3. P= multiply(A, B) (Multiplication); 
4. Q, R = divide(A, B) (Division). 
What follows are the most essential algorithms found within the long integer library that 
allows the implementation of the RSA algorithm. 
6.2.2.1 Modulus 
The calculation of the modulus is accomplished through the use of the basic division 
algorithm. Given two integers A= (A,, A2, A3,...... A)b and B= (B1, B21 B3,..... Bn)b we 
wish to form the radix-b modulus of A mod B. We use the basic division algorithm 
discarding the quotient and using the final M= (An, +1...... Af, +n)b / d, (d is found in Appendix 
C). 
1. P, R= divide(A, B) 
2. M=R 
The algorithm gives us the function: 
M= mod(A, B) (Modulus). 
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6.2.2.2 ? Iodular Exponentiation 
Exponentiation is performed using the left to right algorithm as described in section 5.6.4.3. 
Given three integers, 
A= (Al, A2, A;,..... A)2, 
B= (B 
U,, 
B, 
»-1, 
B111.2 
..... 
Boh, 
and M= (M I, M2, M:...... ML)2. 
We wish to calculate E= A' nod M 
1. Acc = 1, j= in. where in is the first non-zero position. 
2.1fß; =I goto 9 
,. IfBj=0 
4. Acc = multiply(Acc, Ace) 
5. Acc = mod(Acc, M) 
6. j=j -I 
7. Ifj<0goto 15 
S. Soto 2 
9. Acc = multiply(Acc, Acc) 
IO. Acc = multiply(Acc, A) 
I I. Acc = mod(Acc, M) 
12. j=j-I 
13. Ifj<Ototo 15 
14. goto 2 
15. E=Acc 
The algorithm provides the function: 
E= mod-exp(A, B, Ni) Modular Exponentiation. 
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6.2.2.3 Greatest Common Divisor 
This is also called Euclid's Algorithm and it is used within the RSA algorithm has been 
demonstrated in Chapter 2. Given two positive integers (A, B) we wish to find their 
greatest common divisor. Euclid's algorithm gives us the function, 
X= GCD(A, B), where X is the greatest divisor. 
I. s=A, t=B 
2. IfS 5 Ogoto7 
3. d=s 
4. s= mod(t, s) 
5. t=d 
6. goto 2 
7. X=d 
6.2.2.4 Multiplicative Inverse 
The extended Euclid algorithm is also required within the RSA algorithm, it allows us to 
calculate the multiplicative inverse of A modulo n, where A* u =1 (mod M). 
Update(a, b) 
1. temp =b 
2. b= subtract(a, multiply(y, temp)) 
3. a= temp 
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Euclid's extended algorithm, u= inverse(A, M) 
1. g=M, h=A, w=1, z=0, v=0, r=1 
2. if h50 goto 6 
3. y=Q, where Q, R = divide(g, h) 
4. update(g, h), update(w, z), update(v, r) 
5. goto 2 
6. u= mod(v, M) 
6.3 RSA 
The functions provided for the provision of RSA functionality obey the following naming 
policy: 
EC_function_name() is a software function; 
ED_function_name() is a function that utilises the ENCDEC board functionality. 
Both the RSA software library and the ENCDEC board access routines have been written in 
C and C++, the header files for both can be found in Appendix C. 
6.3.1 RSA Framing 
Because the RSA algorithm works on blocks of data, the size of which is dependent upon 
the modulus used for the RSA calculations, it is necessary to frame data that is encrypted. 
Framing can also help against the use of a replay attack using captured encrypted frames. 
There is no policy for framing and it is system dependent, the framing strategy chosen for 
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the ENCDEC board is compatible with the CRYPTECH policy [76 ]. Framing is necessary 
for block cryptographic systems, as data to be encrypted will rarely be of the correct size 
and will therefore need at least a basic form of filling and the information to indicate the 
amount of filling that was used. 
A message to be encrypted is therefore seperated into discrete packets whose size is the 
same as the modulus of the key pair used and whose numerical value is less than that of the 
modulus. 
Data Dat 
Framing Deframin 
Encryption Decryption 
Transmission 
Figure 6-3 Framing Within a Cryptosysicm 
A frame is made of tear seý, ments: 
1. header: 2 bytes; 
2. framing infbnnation: variable; 
3. fillup data: variable length; 
4. message: variable length. 
Header Byte I Header Byte 2 
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The frame header is made up of 2 bytes. Byte 1 must be one less than the most significant 
byte of the modulus, making sure that the overall numerical value of the frame is less than 
the modulus. Byte 2 indicates what information is contained within the information field of 
the frame. The byte 2 value is indicated below 
MSbit 
1. set to 0 
2. set to 1 
3. optional field present 
4. application data present 
5. timestamp present 
6. length field present 
7. status&routing field present 
8. frame order field present 
LSbit 
The optional field and application data field are one and four bytes long respectively. The 
timestamp is four bytes long and used to help combat replay attacks. The length field is 
used to indicate the length of the message portion of the frame in the last frame of the 
stream. The status&routing field is 1 byte in length, the first nibble indicates the position of 
the frame within a stream and the second may be used for routing information but is unused 
at this moment. 
A first nibble of value 0001 indicates the first frame. 
A first nibble of value 0010 indicates the final frame. 
A first nibble of value 0011 indicates a single frame. 
The frame order field is used at the decryption end of the RSA process in the sequencing of 
frames in a stream, it is a modulo 256 counter, using a single byte. 
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The fillup portion of a frame is the data used to pad out the frame so that it is of the same 
length as the modulus. The framing, protocols fills the message with random bytes which 
are removed from the message deft aming by using the length field of the information 
portion of the message. 
The final portion of a frame is the message portion, the actual data that is to be sent 
confidentially. 
6.3.2 Keay Generation 
The key generation for an RSA key pair is described within Appendix A. The routines 
written for the facilitation ol'key ueneration are: 
" 
_Pz_ý'critj"O 
Tests a long integer a specified number of tines for primality. 
" 
_Ipz_,, 
enO 
Generates a prime number with a specified first nibble, using a 
specified number orprimality tests. 
" 
_Ipz_i)air_genO 
Generates a pair of strong prime numbers, with a specified length and 
first nibble Ihr their product. 
" _pz_key_stelpO 
Produces an RSA key pair, from two prime numbers. 
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6.3.3 Key Storage 
RSA keys are stored within files that can be encrypted by a CISS private key or held secure 
by some other means. Two tiles are required for an RSA key pair, both files hold one 
exponent and the modulus. The exponent and modulus both occupy fields of 92 bytes 
length. 
A key structure, as defined within the header tiles found in Appendix C, consists of two 
segments of type long integer, an exponent and the modulus. 
" _keytile_trat'oO 
Stores the contents of a keytile in a key structure. 
" _kcyst ruct_tratoO 
Transtlorms a key structure into a keyfile, with specified name. 
A keyfile looks like: 
Exponent 92 bytes Modulus 92 bytes 
6.3.4 Encryption/Decryption 
Information to be encrypted can be passed to the RSA functions as a data structure or as a 
file. The two functions used for encryption/decryption are: 
" _file_cryptO 
Encrypts/decrypts the contents of a file and writes the result of the RSA 
calculation to another tile, 
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" _data_cryptO 
Encrypts/decrypts the contents of a data structure writing the result of the 
RSA calculation to another data structure. 
6.4 DES 
The functions provided for DES functionality obey the following naming criteria: 
ED function name() are the functions interfacing with the ENCDEC board; 
ECfunction nameO are the functions implementing DES in software. 
Framing for the DES process is simple. The final byte of a message contains the number of 
bytes used to fill the final DES cryptographic block. The padding is filled with random 
numbers. 
6.4.1 Key Generation 
The key is generated through the use of the, 
" 
_generate_des_keyO, 
function, that generates a DES key through the selection of 8 random bytes. 
When the key is generated an initialisation vector is also generated ( see Chapter 1, which 
describes the use of IVs within DES modes of operation). 
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6.4.2 Key Storage 
The two functions are. 
" 
_des_key_write_to_tile() 
Stores the DES key and IV within a file according to the format shown 
below. 
" des_key_read_ti-om_fileO; 
Reads the contents of a DES key file and stores the key and IV into a DES 
key structure. 
A DES key tile is made up of two parts 
8-byte DES key S-byte IV 
6.4.3 Encryption/Decryption 
Encryption/Decryption usin the DES algorithm is performed by: 
a 
Encrypts/decrypts the contents or a file using the DES algorithm and stores 
the results within a tile. 
" _des_dataO; 
Encrypts/decrypts the contents of a data structure using the DES algorithm 
and stores the result within another data structure 
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6.5 Conclusion 
The software routines written to accomplish the RSA and DES algorithms are the mirror of 
the routines written to interface with the ENCDEC prototype, allowing a good 
development platform on which security can be built, with easy interchangeability during 
development. The long integer library, of which a few of the most important functions were 
described, provides the required functionality for the mathematical module within CISS 
using RSA as its asymmetric cryptosystem. The software implementation of RSA was 
constructed using the lon integer library. 
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Chapter 7 
7. User Authentication Mechanism for a 
Local Security Unit 
This chapter describes new research into an authentication 
mechanism that can be used by the LSU of the 3-L architecture. The 
chapter begins by describing the basic concepts user authentication 
and keystroke analysis. The experiment is then presented in three 
parts: sampling; analysis and optimisation. The results from the 
analysis and optimisation sections of the experiment are discussed 
Finally, the application of keystroke analysis within CISS is 
discussed 
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7.1 Introduction 
Secured computer systems aim to protect the data processing services they provide and the 
data they store within memory. The first line of defence that any computer system has 
against malicious attacks is to deny access to potential attackers. The only way that this can 
be done is to identify the person that is attempting to log onto the system, and thereby 
determine whether they have a legitimate right to services. 
Obtaining access to a computer system through coercion of a legitimate user is a possibility 
that no authentication mechanism can deal with, unless the system is sensitive to duress. 
This sensitivity is not always enviable as it can lead to antagonising an attacker and 
endangering the user; imagine an armed robbery where a voice activated lock will not open 
because the bank manager is under extreme stress. This chapter does not attempt to deal 
with such an occurrence and it is felt that the only way to combat this type of attack is 
through the implementation of a good security policy. 
In Chapter 4 the 3-L architecture was described and the LSU defined. One of the most 
important functions that the LSU has is in the provision of user authentication mechanisms. 
7.2 User Authentication 
An individual possesses three qualities that may be used to identify them [77 ]: 
" what the individual knows; 
9 what the individual owns physically; 
" what the individual is. 
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Any or all of these qualities can be used in a user authentication mechanism, with the 
strongest authentication mechanisms using more than one of these qualities. 
7.2.1 What They Know 
Authentication systems exploiting this quality generally require the individual to know a 
secret password which must be presented when challenged. Other systems may use a 
database that contains detailed personal knowledge about its users. For example, whenever 
someone attempts to login they are asked random questions, such as, birthdates of 
offspring, names of relatives, favourite item of music, and the answer given is compared to 
those in the database. 
The password is the most common authentication mechanism in use at present. When a 
user logs into a computer system he is usually challenged for a password, this password is 
usually cryptographically protected and kept in a database indexed by the user's login name. 
If users choose their passwords according to common security policy [78 ], then the 
password mechanism is very secure, especially when augmented with a limited amount of 
unsuccessful logon attempts (i. e. a "three tries and you are out" policy). 
However, it has been shown in various studies [79 ], that no matter how theoretically secure 
a password mechanism is, its overall security is compromised very easily by: 
" users picking easily guessable words such as, "password, " "drowssap, " or using words 
derived from their login names, or found in dictionaries. Dictionary words are 
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particularly dangerous because programs exist to crack user accounts [80 ], by simply 
using an exhaustive search technique to obtain passwords; 
9 because some users communicate their passwords to other users, or write them down 
near their terminals, for example the BT [81 ] case. 
Even with its faults, the password mechanism is still in wide use as the sole form of user 
authentication on many computer systems. The low cost of implementing a password 
mechanism and the familiarity users have with the mechanism makes certain that for the 
foreseeable future it will continue to be the most popular form of authentication. 
7.2.2 What They Own 
In this situation the legitimate user will have a toke» that must be presented when 
challenged. The token usually takes the form of a magnetic stripe card or increasingly a 
smart card [82 ]. The difference between the two cards is a matter of intelligence, the smart 
card, as its name implies, has some intelligence in the form of on-board processing 
capabilities. The present smart card technology is split into two main areas: active cards 
and second generation cards. Active cards are meant to be used in a stand alone mode 
where power and processing is done on-board, while second generation cards are passive 
and require a card reader which provides power. However, most cards in use fall into the 
area between the two. 
The use of tokens has increased in everyday life, with almost everybody carrying one (e. g. 
Automatic Teller Machines cards). Tokens used in an authentication mechanism require the 
purchase of specialised equipment. For example, in the case of magnetic stripe cards, not 
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only must a magnetic stripe card reader be purchased for all physical locations where user 
authentication is deemed necessary, but so must cards for all users on the system. This 
initial outlay of capital on specialised equipment can make a token scheme prohibitive in 
most environments except those that require high security, such as government installations, 
banks, etc. 
With the continuing reduction of processor size, smart cards are being used in `see through' 
authentication mechanisms [83 ], that do not necessarily require a specialised reader but 
require the purchasing of smart cards for all users. 
Tokens used in an authentication mechanism can provide good security, but users are 
fallible and may lose or forget them. The token may also be stolen, seriously compromising 
security. 
7.2.3 What They Are 
When a biological characteristic can be used to identify an individual it is called a biometric. 
Biometrics can be divided into two groups, active and passive [83]. A passive biometric is 
a physical characteristic that may be scanned with no effort by the subject other than the 
exhibition of said characteristic, e. g. finger-prints, or facial features. An active biometric is 
hand writing [84 ], or voice patterns [85 ] 
In a biometric authentication system an attacker can only hope to imitate the characteristic 
that the mechanism uses to identify legitimate users. Some of the biometrics that have been 
researched are human faces, speech, finger prints, body odour and iris patterns. Due to the 
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technologies employed in biometric measurement the field is relatively new and has not 
found many applications in existing authentication mechanisms.. 
However, biometrics offer potentially the best form of user authentication since they 
measure actual characteristics of what a user is. As with any authentication mechanism they 
are not fool proof. In passive biometric authentication mechanisms the user must present a 
part of the body to identify themselves. It is of course possible for an attacker to obtain the 
necessary body part. However, the effort and will on the part of the attacker must be far 
greater than that necessary, for example to steal a slip of paper with a user's password on it. 
It is also possible for two people to have similar active characteristics and therefore fool an 
active biometric authentication mechanism, but, if an attacker happens to have a dissimilar 
active biometric they must make an extreme effort to mimic the user. 
Biometrics used in an authentication mechanism offer several advantages: 
" requires very little training for users to use (grandma friendly); 
" there is no risk of losing, or having a token stolen as there is in a token mechanism; 
" no risk of having an item of knowledge (password) becoming known. 
However, biometrics also have several disadvantages: 
" all passive systems require processing equipment either audio, visual or chemical that can 
be very expensive; 
" the processing of biometric data can be very processer intensive; 
" the information to deceive a system may be acquired from the user through sampling; 
" they are never perfect, recognition of a subject is generally given as a degree of 
confidence. 
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Biometric authentication systems utilise the only measurement that actually tests the identity 
of a person. It can be argued that the first two qualities merely identify the knowledge of a 
password and the token itself, not the person themselves. 
Potentially the most useful mechanism was one which exploited a biometric measurement, 
either active or passive. Most biometric measurements such as voice recognition, finger 
print classifiers, and vein pattern recognition require very specialised equipment, which in 
most cases is very expensive. This chapter investigates and discusses a cheap solution for 
an active biometric security mechanism, that can easily be introduced into most existing 
systems using the most common authentication mechanism - the password. 
7.2.4 Typing Analysis 
In 1975 Spillane [86 ], proposed that just like handwriting, typing styles were an active 
biometric measurement. When analysing typing, various factors can be measured, for 
example: 
" inter-keystroke timing (the timing between consecutive key depressions); 
" depression time (the length of time a key is depressed); 
9 pressure of key depression. 
Further research [87 ], [88 ], [89 1 into the area of typing analysis has confirmed Spillane's 
proposal. An advantage of typing analysis over other biometric systems is that it minimises 
some of the general disadvantages present in them: 
1. it potentially requires no extra equipment; 
2. most of the data processing can be done in an initial learning phase. 
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Typing analysis is accomplished in one of two ways: statically or dynamically. 
Static analysis is conducted upon text strings that do not change. There are two points at 
which such analysis could significantly augment the security of a computer system; in the 
initial authentication of a user (i. e. at login) and whenever a volatile command is used. At 
login there are usually two points that are ideal for static typing analysis, at the entry of user 
name and the corresponding password. A volatile command is one which when used can be 
potentially harmful. They are commands that generally delete or modify data stored within 
computer memory, such as the `deltree' or `del' commands in MS-DOS [90 ]. 
Dynamic analysis is conducted upon previously unknown text strings that are entered by a 
user. The entry characteristics can be stored and analysed later or they may be analysed in 
real-time, allowing continuous supervision of a session. 
The effectiveness of a user authentication mechanism can be measured using two figures; 
the false rejectioii rate (FRR) and the false acceptance rate (FAR). The FRR represents 
the percentage of legitimate users actually classified by the user authentication mechanism 
as attackers. The FAR is the percentage of attackers classified by the mechanism as 
legitimate users. 
The use of static typing analysis in a security system can be used to increase the security of 
the most widespread authentication mechanism; the password. It is to this end that the 
proposed static typing classifier was investigated. 
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7.3 Overview of the investigation 
The investigation conducted into typing analysis can be split into three phases: 
1. sampling; 
2. classification of typing samples; 
3. data optimisation. 
What follows is a description of the three phases. 
7.3.1 Sampling 
7.3.1.1 Sample Collection 
The typing samples collected for the investigation were taken using an IBM PC with a 386- 
33MHz DX processor using a standard UK configuration Qwerty keyboard. Through 
examination of other research in the area of typing analysis [87], [88], [89], [91 ], [92 ], it 
was decided that the inter-keystroke timing was the best discriminator of people's typing 
styles, and one of the few useful typing characteristics for static analysis. The sampling 
program was written in C, utilising the DOS keyboard interrupts to time the intervals 
between key depressions. 
7.3.1.2 Reference Torts 
Every subject that took part in the experiment entered four set reference text strings. The 
four strings were as follows: 
180 
Chapter Seven: User Authentication Mechanism for a Local Security Unit 
REF 1: "PRINT'; 
REF2 : "TRANSFERENCE'; 
REF3 : "RED SKY AT NIGHT"; 
REF4 : "RUGBY PLA YERS ODD SHAPED BALLY'; 
At the end of each text entry the subjects had to depress the return key. 
The text strings were chosen to make good use of the keyboard, such as cross digraphs that 
use both halves of the keyboard, REF1 was chosen for familiarity to the test subjects, as it is 
one of the most common words that a computer literate person will type, all four reference 
texts use the three main rows of keys on a Qwerty keyboard and REF4 is unusual in the 
combination of words and digraphs. 
The subjects were forced to use static text strings to make classification of their samples as 
difficult as possible; common sense dictates that typing styles are exaggerated when users 
type in familiar text strings such as their names. The choice of set strings of text represents 
a worst case scenario for typing analysis of passwords ( where all users have the same 
password) and the real situation of volatile commands that are set by the operating system 
being used and common to all users. The four text strings were also graduated in length to 
evaluate what effect it had on classification of samples. 
Before the test subjects began typing they were told: 
1. speed was a factor; 
2. any mistakes made during entry would cause the entry to be invalid and they would have 
to enter the whole text string again. 
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A screen shot of the entry system can be seen below 
Figure 7-1 Text Entry screen shot 
Fifteen subjects took part in the experiment, who were all reasonably familiar with typing, 
coming from a computing background. Every subject entered each text string 35 times, 
making all entries at one 10-15 minute sitting. The inter-keystroke times were recorded by 
the sampling program and stored within files. 
7.3.2 Classification of Typing Samples 
7.3.2.1 Current Classification Techniques 
Classification of patterns conventially falls into three methods. 
1. nearest neighbour techniques; 
2. statistical techniques, 
3. artificial intelligence ( Al ) pattern recognition schemes. 
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Nearest neighbour techniques[93] utilise distance metrics such as Hamming, or Euclidean, 
to determine the distance of an unclassified pattern to classified patterns. A threshold 
distance needs to be set so that unclassified patterns that have a distance below the 
threshold are classified as a recognised pattern. 
Statistical techniques such as the Bayes classifier [94], require that a probability density 
function be chosen, such as the Gaussian or Normal models; co-variance, standard 
deviation, and mean of the training set are calculated and the unclassified pattern is tested. 
As in the nearest neighbour techniques it is necessary to calculate a threshold value above 
which an input pattern is classified as a recognised pattern. 
AI techniques for pattern recognition employ the use of neural networks for example 
ADALINE networks [95], or the multi-layer perceptron [96]. These take vector inputs and 
produce a vector output that is used as an indication of classification. 
When the first two techniques are applied to typing analysis they can work on the separate 
digraphs or the entire sample as a whole. When working upon separate digraphs a 
percentage threshold must be chosen above which the entire sample is classified as coming 
from a legitimate user. 
From the three techniques of classification it was chosen to investigate the use of the multi- 
layer perceptron. The reason for choosing the multi-layer perceptron lies in the fact that it 
is one of the few classification techniques that can solve problems involving non-linear 
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separability, and the potentially infinite variety of individual typing styles suggests that 
typing analysis is a non linear problem. 
y Class 2 
ofi. Class 1 
x 
Figure 7-2 Linearly and Non-Linearly Separable Problem 
7.3.2.2 The Perceptron 
;s1 
A 
The human brain exhibits several qualities of which hardware designers and software 
programmers wish computers were capable. Although computers can calculate problems 
quicker than a human, they lack the robust nature that evolution has made part of the brain. 
A brain is capable of processing many instructions at the same time, this parallel processing 
allows us too walk, talk, and process visual data, simultaneously, without a noticeable 
deterioration in performance. Damage in part of the brain does not result in a complete 
shutdown, known as faule toleraºrce, continuing damage results in graceful degradation. 
The brain also has the ability to lean, solutions to problems, it is not necessary for it to be 
programmed for all eventualities. It is because of these abilities of the human brain that 
research in the development of artificial intelligence based on principles learnt through 
neurobiology has become mainstream. One of the biggest areas of research is the field of 
pattern recognition, whether in seismic activity or fluctuations in the stock market. 
y, Class 2 
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Wherever it is possible that a pattern may exist a researcher will try to point an artificial 
intelligence algorithm at the problem. 
The brain is such a robust processing mechanism because it uses distributed processing. 
Instead of building a very specialised structure, natural selection has determined that it is 
better to build lots of generalised structures that share work. In the brain these generalised 
structures are called neurons [97 ], the brain has at least 1010 neurons. 
Figure 7-3 Biological Neuron 
In 1943 McCulloch and Pitts proposed a model of a biological neuron. It was not till 1962 
that simple collections of the basic neuron model became known as Perccptrons [98 ]. 
Xi 
0 
Xi+I 
Figure 7-4 Model Neuron 
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The output o(t) of a perceptron is calculated through a feedforward algorithm, w, is 
the weight of the ith input, x, is the ith input and 0 is the threshold value. 
o(l) =fW, (I)x; (1)+0(1) 
. =o 
where, 
f(x)=1 x>O 
f(x)=0 x<_0 
The perceptron gets better at solving a problem as its weights are adjusted through a 
learning algorithm. In supervised learning this is done by comparing the output of the 
perceptron to that wanted. 
If o(1) is correct, w, (1+1) = w, (/) 
If o(t) = 0, and it should be 1, i+ß, (1+1) = iv, (1)+x, (! ) 
If o(t) = 1, and it should be 0, w, (t+ 1) = iv, (t) - x, (t) 
Perceptrons can provide solutions for only linear problems, ( for example a simple non- 
linearly separable problem is the exclusive-OR ) because of this problem perceptrons took a 
back seat in research. It was not until 1986 that they made a re-emergence when 
Rumelhart, McClelland and Williams[99], put forward their learning rule for multi-layer 
perceptrons, and thus gave perceptrons the ability to solve non-linearly separable problems. 
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7.3.2.3 The Multi-Layer Perceptron 
A multi-layer perceptron has an input layer, an output, and at least one hidden layer which is 
not directly connected to the outside world. The topology of a multi-layer perceptron can 
be seen in Figure 7-5. 
Figure 7-5 Multi-Layer Perceptron Model 
The output of the stimulator layer is s; where 1Si5». 
The output for the hidden layer nodes is calculated using, 
hi =f(ýsw; j+01) 
where 15 j5p, 9, is the threshold value for node j in the hidden layer, v1 is the 
input line weighting. 
Unlike the simple perceptron the multi-layer perceptron's output function is a sigmoid, to 
allow for a modified learning algorithm. 
wheref(x)= 
1+1 -k r e 
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The output from the output layer nodes is calculated using, 
P 
hiiv 7k) jk +1 
i=l 
where 1: 5 k5q, TA is the threshold value for node k of the output layer, wok is the 
input line weighting. 
The learning algorithm employed for the multi-layer perceptron used in the experiment was 
the `back-propagation' algorithm [99 ]. The back propagation algorithm tries to minimise 
the error of each node's output. The algorithm starts calculating errors from the output 
layer and then propagates the error back to the hidden layer till the errors for all nodes is 
known. 
The back-propagation algorithm. 
1: The error is calculated for each output node ok such that the error of the output node di 
Is 
dk (') = Ok (00 - Ok 
(l))(Tk (') 
- Ok 
(0) 
for all k where Tk is the expected output of node ok. 
2: The output error ej for each node in the hidden layer is calculated using 
9 
ef(1ý - Sj(t)(1-Sj(l)) 
LW 
jk(1)dk(1) 
k=1 
for allj. 
3: Adjust the weights connecting the output and hidden layers 
AWJk = ahf(t)dk(t) 
188 
Chapter Seven: User Authentication Mechanism for a Local Security Unit 
for all j, where a is a positive constant controlling learning rate 
4: Adjust the input weights to the hidden layer 
Av; / =ßs1(t)ei(1), 
for all i, where s, is the output from the input nodes and ß is a positive constant 
controlling learning rate. 
5: Adjust the threshold of all nodes: 
For output nodes 
Ook (t) =a dk(1); 
For hidden layers 
AFj(1)=ae; (1). 
As has been previously stated the back-propagation algorithm attempts to find the minimum 
error, however, early in the training cycle it is possible for the perceptron net to get stuck in 
a local minima; to combat this an extra term is introduced, the momentum term. This term 
is added to the weight adaptation equation in steps 3 and 4 of the learning algorithm. 
For example the step 3 equation becomes 
LwJ, k = ahj(t)dk(1)+m(wJk(1)- 'jk(1-1)) 
where m is a positive constant called the momentum factor. 
7.3.2.4 Neural-Net software 
So that the principles of the multi-layer perceptron could be more readily understood it was 
decided that the software should be written from scratch to implement the neural nets. The 
language used was C++, the header files generated can be seen in Appendix C. 
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Three classes were defined: node, path and net. An arbitrary perceptron net was built by 
defining the overall structure of the perceptron net in the object net; the net class describes 
the structure of the nodes and their functions, stimulators, thinkers, responders. The net 
object holds a list of nodes that are used to describe the make up of all nodes within the net, 
containing information such as threshold values etc. The node class also contains a list of 
path object that are the weighted input connections to the node. The code used to generate 
the nniulti-layer perceptrons can be found on a disk included in this thesis. 
While the neural nets were being trained it was possible to observe the error values of the 
output node on a graph This gives an idea of how well the neural net is performing,. 
Figure 7-6 Neural Net Learning, Screen Shot 
A multi-layer perceptron network was created for each REF text for every test subject. 
Each test subject's networks were taught to distinguish their keystroke timings from the 
other test subjects. The neural net, if working perfectly, would give an output of I if the 
specific user's timings were the input vector, and a0 if the input vector was one of the other 
14 test subjects. However, multi-layer perceptrons rarely give perfect outputs so a 
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threshold scheme had to be set. It was decided to evaluate the efficacy of three threshold 
values 0.7,0.8, and 0.9, any value output by the network above these thresholds was taken 
as recognition of a specific test subject. 
7.3.2.5 Learning Ratios 
A neural net learns through repeated exposure to training vectors. It was decided that the 
first twenty-five samples of every user would be used as a training set for the neural net. 
The final ten samples of every test subject were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
trained multi-layer perceptron. The positive training set ( comprised from the first 25 
samples of the subject to be identified by the neural net) were un-filtered, it is possible to 
filter training inputs to remove uncharacteristic samples, using for example a kohonen net 
[100 ], to identify those samples that are not characteristic and excluding them from the 
training process. However, it was felt that it would be more beneficial to see how the multi- 
layer perceptron performed on raw data. 
The basic topology of the initial multi-layer perceptron was: 
" input nodes equal to the number of digraphs in the REF text; 
" one hidden layer, with a number of nodes equal to twice the input nodes; 
"a single output node. 
Initially a pilot study was conducted into how long the training cycle of the multi-layer 
perceptron should be. It was soon discovered that anything below 2000 cycles gave poor 
results, with results improving as the number of training cycles was increased. No benefit 
was found from training the neural net beyond 4000 cycles. 
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Therefore, the neural net was trained with 4000 presentations of training samples. The 
training vector used for each cycle was chosen randomly from the training set. However, 
when the results were evaluated they gave an FRR of 100% and an FAR of 0% for all 
threshold values. Obviously the multi-layer perceptron was not receiving a large enough 
proportion of positive samples from the user it was meant to identify. To combat this lack 
of true samples a learning ratio bias was introduced into the network training phase. 
T: F, 
where T is the number of true samples picked randomly from the training set of the 
specific subject to be identified, and F is the number of samples picked randomly from the 
other subjects' training sets. 
Therefore, a ratio of 1: 1 presents one true sample for every false sample. 
Gradually increasing the learning ratio of a multi-layer perceptron trained to recognise 
REF2, using the basic network topology, can be seen in Figure 7-7 below. 
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Figure 7-7 Basic Network REF 2 Results 
As can be seen from the results, a decision must be made on the type of classification error 
to be minimised. A low FRR produced by larger learning ratios causes the network to give 
a higher FAR. A low FRR is wanted when the static analysis of typing is directed at volatile 
commands, since it is assumed that the majority of users initiating a volatile command are 
legitimate users. When analysis is conducted at login, security demands a low FAR, since 
access control wishes a minimum of illegitimate users to gain entry to a system. 
7.3.2.6 Network Topology 
The Kolmogrov mapping neural network existence theorem [101 ], states that it is never 
necessary to have more than three layers in a multi-layer perceptron i. e. an input layer, 2 
hidden layers and an output layer, to solve a classification problem. Of course it is very 
hard to find the specific three or two layer configuration that can solve a particular problem. 
An attempt was made to find the best configuration for a multi-layer perceptron to solve the 
typing classification problem. Numerous two hidden layer topologies were investigated but 
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the slight benefit, if any, that they made to a reduction in the two indicators (FAR and FRR) 
did not compensate for the additional processing time in the training phase of the network 
The effect that changing the number of nodes in a single hidden layer was also investigated, 
but here too no improvement was found on the basic net topology. 
7.3.2.7 Basic Results 
The networks were evaluated with the final 10 typing samples of each subject, giving for 
test purposes 150 legitimate attempts and 2100 attempts of illegitimate access. 
Using the basic network topology and a learning ratio of 1: 1 gave the results below. 
0.7 0.8 0.9 
12 8 4 
4 4 3 
REF 1 5 4 2 
3 2 2 
Average 6 5 3 
0.7 0.8 0 
,9 30 42 58 
22 25 34 
24 27 34 
REF 4 53 38 43 
0 32 33 42 
FAR given as % FRR given as 
Table 7-1 Ratio 1: 1 Results 
A ratio of 4: 1 gave the results below. 
0.7 0.8 09 
24 21 15 
8 6 5 
8 6 5 
4 3 2 
0 11 9 6 
FAR given as 
07 08 09 
10 15 26 
REF 2 15 19 25 
21 23 27 
REF 4 28 32 40 
Average-] 19 22 30 
FRR given as 
Table 7-2 Ratio 4: 1 Results 
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As can be seen in tables 7-1 and 7-2 above, a moderate increase in the learning ratio helped 
the neural network reduce the FRR for all REF texts. It is interesting to note that the FAR 
results are very much better than the FRR for networks trained with the 1: 1 ratio. The 
better FAR results were still present when the network was trained using a 4: 1 ratio, 
however, the difference between the two indicators was considerably reduced. 
The low FAR made the network appear more suitable for login security, as the FRR is still a 
little high for use in a volatile command security mechanism. However, as was discussed 
above, the FRR can be reduced through larger learning ratios but at the cost of increasing 
the FAR. 
7.3.2.8 Use of ]Multiple Reference Texts 
Since the neural network analysis seemed more suited to a login security mechanism it was 
decided to investigate the use of two reference texts, thus emulating the login process 
where a username and password are used. This is a worse case scenario where all users 
have the same name and password. 
Two neural nets were employed in this two reference strategy, one for the login name and 
the other for the password. Every attempt of authentication to the system is placed into one 
of three categories depending on the combined result of the neural nets. 
" (R)ejected - both samples were rejected by their respective neural networks. 
" (L)ow - one of the two samples was rejected. 
" (H)igh - Both samples were accepted 
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REF 1 and REF 2 
79 96 -2- 76 22 2 
09 
-L? - 
17 
Impostor attempts (%) 
4 111 
User Attempts (%) 
Table 7-3 Two Reference Results (REF1 and REF2) 
REF 2 and REF 3 
1.1 T4 -R T -T M 
R7 41 IR SR 
89 55 
9 99 95 43 
Impostor Attempts (%) User Attempts (%) 
Table 7-4 Two Reference Results (REF2 and REFS) 
As can be seen, it is possible to increase the security significantly, using a threshold value of 
0.9 and a requirement of at least an L category result, the FRR can be brought down to 7% 
and the FAR to 8%. 
7.3.2.9 Classification Conclusion 
The results from phase 2 of the experiment are very encouraging. It must be remembered 
that this method of user authentication is not suggested as a total solution but is meant as a 
way of increasing the level of security on a password mechanism cheaply and relatively 
painlessly in terms of the complexity of adding it to the system. The experiment was 
implemented in such a way as to make life as difficult as possible for the classifier, and from 
the results obtained the multi-layer perceptron has coped very well. 
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Two conclusions that can be drawn from the results given by the neural net are: 
1. that the optimum text length for identification purposes involving keystroke analysis is 
greater than 5 and less than 31, optimally around 13-20 letters long; 
2. the combination of two texts in a login phase would provide adequate security for almost 
any login mechanism. 
7.3.3 Data Optimisation 
The next part of the investigation was an attempt to improve the results of the basic multi- 
layer perceptron through optimisation of the input vectors. Starting from an initial 
conjecture that: 
"each individual has specific digraphs that are particularly characteristic of their 
typing style, " 
the possibility of identifying characteristic digraphs was researched. 
The optimisation technique must sort out which of the digraphs used in a REF text are 
characteristic of the subject to be identified, it was decided that a genetic algorithm [102 ] 
would be used for optimisation, as this was a new application within security. 
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7.3.3.1 Genetic Algorithm 
As with the perceptron the genetic algorithm (GA), came about through research into an 
aspect of the real world; evolution, and more specifically the mechanism behind it, that 
provides the necessary small increments in performance for natural selection to work, 
genetics. Evolution is a natural sorting mechanism that seeks to optimise performance of 
living entities, it relies upon the fact that the more successful individuals of any group will 
pass on their genetic information to their children. In the process of breeding there is a 
chance that the genetic material passed onto the next generation will be mutated, 
introducing a characteristic that was not previously present in the groups genetic pool. If 
this mutation is a contributing factor to the success of an individual then it is likely to be 
passed onto the next generation. 
Genetic algorithms are slightly different from other algorithms that perform search and 
optimisation procedures in several ways: 
" GAs conduct their search from several points and not from a single point; 
0 GAs use probabilistic rules and not deterministic ones; 
" GAs need only know the objective function and no other auxiliary information; 
" GAs need only a coding of the parameter set and not the parameters themselves. 
7.3.3.1.1 Parameter Set Coding 
Genetic algorithms require that the parameter set be coded into a finite length string. The 
parameter set in the case of our investigation will be the digraphs present in each reference 
text. The string representing the possible digraphs is known as a gene and the values it 
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takes on are called alleles. The gene is used to calculate the input vectors that are used for 
a neural net of the basic topology. A bit value of 1 in the gene means that the 
corresponding digraph is used, a bit value of 0 and it is not used. 
For example: 
REF 2=TRANSFERENCE[return]; 
therefore a bit representation will have 12 bits and an allele value from 1 to 212; 
a gene that has an allele value of 1 A31! = 000110100011; 
will use the timing from digraphs 'NS', 'SF', `ER', TO and `E[return]' as the input 
vector to the multi-layer perceptron. 
At the beginning of the search a population size is chosen which can be any size greater than 
two. Each member of the population has a genotype, the genotype being the total genetic 
information for an individual member of a group. The population in the case of typing 
analysis is made up ofgenolj pes that contain the gene describing the digraphs to be used by 
the neural network. For the initial generation the genotypes had randomly selected allele 
values. 
7.3.3.1.2 Selection 
The next step is to discover which individuals of a population are better at the task of 
identifying a test subjects keystroke timing,. this is achieved by giving each member of a 
generation a fitness value, the higher the fitness, the better the individual was at identifying 
the subject. To obtain the fitness of an individual a multi-layer perceptron was constructed 
using the basic topology and trained using only those digraphs selected by the digraph gene. 
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Each perceptron net was trained using 4000 presentations of samples from the training set, 
the resulting network was then presented with 200 randomly chosen samples from the 
training set to obtain an average fitness of the individual, 
200 
average fitness -" 200 
where d,, is the output error of the neural network on the nth presentation of a 
sample. 
Once the fitness has been calculated for all individuals in the current generation a 
probabilistic function selects which individuals will reproduce. Those individuals with 
higher fitness values have a better chance than those with lower fitness values of 
contributing their genetic coding towards the next generation. Selection is performed in our 
case by a roulette wheel function. Each individual of the current generation is given a 
portion of a roulette wheel in proportion to their fitness value, a random number is then 
generated and the section of the roulette wheel the number falls into indicates the individual 
picked to become a parent. This process means that there is always a chance that the most 
successful individual of a generation will not contribute to the next generation. A partner is 
then chosen for the first individual picked in the same manner. 
Figure 7-8 Roulette Wheel 
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Z3.3.1.3 Fitness Scaling 
Fitness scaling is introduced because of the chance of having extraordinary individuals in 
early generations that can monopolise the selection process. These individuals may produce 
better results but they might not be able to produce the best. So a way must be found to 
curb there large selection chances. To do this a function is introduced and can be seen in 
the Figure 7-9. 
a+b 
sf=af+b 
sf- 
Scaled 
fitness sf . .................... 
.......... sf.. 
0 L. t.. 
1 1--. 1 
Pitncss 
Figure 7-9 Scaling Function 
This function curbs the fitness of extraordinary individuals in early generations and 
exaggerates the difference of close individuals in later generations. 
7.3.3.1.4 Reproduction 
Once a set of parents has been picked the next step is for them to reproduce. Reproduction 
is accomplished through the division of the two digraph genes and their subsequent 
recombination into two offspring, this is collectively known as crossover. However, 
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crossover may not always occur and in such a situation the offspring are just copies of their 
parents, the probability of crossover occurring is equal to pcross. 
In crossover a random number is generated, RA where, 
15RA <_L-1, 
and L is the length of the digraph gene. 
The random number (RA) is then used as a division point for the two digraph genes and 
each parent contributes one part of their split gene to one of the two offspring. 
Rp 3 
11 
10 11 10110 
1 V. .º 
lot 11001 
RA= 3 
10 li 0011 
1010110 
Figure 7-10 Crossover 
Once the recombination is over, there is a chance per bit location that a mutation might have 
occurred. The chance for a mutation is small but necessary since it can contribute genetic 
sequences which may not have been present in the initial generation and have no way of 
coming about through crossover. If a bit in the gene sequence has mutated it has simply 
reversed its value i. e. a1 changes to a 0, and vice versa. 
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7.3.3.1.5 Results nfa GA 
As with the perceptron, genetic algorithms rarely give perfect answers due to their 
probabilistic nature. To obtain a result the genetic algorithm is run for a number of 
generations and the 
best performer in the final generation is the winner, in the case of typing 
analysis it is hoped that the best individual of the final generation will identify those digraphs 
that are most characteristic of a test subject, potentially improving the neural networks 
performance. 
7.3.3.2 Genetic , 
-1 /gnritI: i i Sofhrnre 
The genetic alýorithn'i sott\vare was written in C++, using Turbo C 3.0. A number of 
classes were developed so that they could be used in GA problems generally. The header 
files for the generated code can be found in Appendix C. 
When the GA is training it is possible to watch the procedure using a the graphic display 
drivers developed tier graphing in IDOS A screen shot of a GA training, can be seen below. 
Figure 7-11 Screenshot of GA Training 
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7.3.3.3 Results of Optimisation through the use of GAs 
The experiments into the optimisation of digraph selection was conducted on four subjects 
chosen at random, it was necessary to limit the number of subjects because of the length of 
time it took to calculate the fitness for each member of a generation. Although only four 
subjects were optimised the entire training set was used to train the neural nets and to 
evaluate the GA selection of digraphs. 
The basic results; using every digraph and each reference with the basic neural net topology, 
a learning ratio of 1: 1 and a training cycle of 4000 presentations are: 
0.7 0.8 0.9 
14 8 4 
7 6 5 
3 3 2 
REFA- 3 3 2 
Avenge 7 5 3 
0 .7 
0.8 0 .9 
31 42 59 
REF 2 17 19 25 
40 49 55 
REF 4 23 27 38 
Avernae 28 34 44 
FAR given as % FRR given as % 
Table 7-5 GA Basic Results 
One of the subjects chosen was the most inconsistent typists from the test subjects, it was 
their inconsistency that provided the high FRR for REF 3. 
7.3.3.3.1 Experiment 1 
In the first experiment a population of 12 was used and the number of generations that the 
genetic algorithm went on for was 20. The results of the optimisation can be seen below. 
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0.7 0.8 0.9 
14 8 6 
REF 2 7 7 5 
8 6 4 
2 2 1 
Avenge 8 6 4 
FAR 
07 0.8 0.9 
32 44 54 
REEI 12 15 30 
29 32 43 
16 20 29 
Average 22 28 39 
Table 7-6 GA Exp 1 Results 
FRR 
Di a ii 
REE 3 10 16 
RFF 4 16 30 
Table 7-7 GA Expl. Digraphs 
The results show an overall improvement in the performance of the neural net when using 
GA selected digraphs. However, in the case of REF1 there were not enough digraphs 
present to allow a proper selection by the genetic algorithm, leading to results almost 
equivalent to that attained through using all digraphs. The best performance by the genetic 
algorithm was in the selection of digraphs from REF 4, the FRR was reduced by 8% on 
average and the FAR by 1%. This improvement can be explained through the large choice 
of digraphs, allowing the best digraphs to be picked that minimised both the FRR and the 
FAR. 
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7.3.3.3.2 Experiment 2 
In experiment two a population of 12 was used and the number of generations that the 
genetic algorithm went on for was 40. However, this time the genetic algorithms fitness 
was adjusted in respect to how few digraphs were used for identification. 
0.7 0.8 0.9 
20 9 5 
REF2 11 9 7 
REF 3 8 7 4 
3 3 2 
Average 11 7 5 
FAR 
0.7 0.8 09 
31 53 63 
19 26 39 
W 
29 32 41 
23 26 37 
0 26 34 45 
Table 7-8 GA Exp2 Results 
FRR 
DiR Diamphs- 
RFF 
7 30 
Table 7-10 GA Exp2 Digraphs 
7.3.3.4 Optimisation Conclusion 
As can be seen by the results the application of genetic algorithm can reduce the number of 
digraphs required to identify a user. The results showed a general improvement over the 
straight classification with no data optimisation. 
7.4 Application of Keystroke Authentication within CISS 
If used as an additional security mechanism at login the OPENA would be responsible for 
the collection of keystroke timings, as it is the only agent that directly interfaces to the OS. 
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The weights, thresholds and digraphs to be used by the authentication mechanism in 
construction of the multi-layer perceptron would be stored within the extended security 
segment of the SMIB indexed by the user's login name. 
When an attempt is made to gain access to a user's account the UA or OPENA requests a 
secure access from the SSA. The SSA then requests that the UA prompt the user for their 
login name and password. The information gathered from the OPENA about the keystroke 
timings is passed to the SSA which passes them to the SMA. The SMA then interrogates 
the SMIB to check that the login name and password are valid and then for the information 
necessary to construct the multi-layer perceptron. The SMA then inputs the keystroke 
timings to the multi-layer perceptron and if the output is above the necessary threshold the 
user gains access. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The results from this investigation are encouraging in that they show considerable accuracy 
without too much refinement for a worst case scenario. The algorithm worked very well 
when multiple reference texts were used. Therefore, this authentication mechanism can be 
used within the login scenario with little more refinement. 
However, the second static use proposed for it in section 7.2, at the entry of a volatile 
command requires more thought. If the suggested authentication mechanism was used the 
user would have to give multiple samples for each volatile command that would use this 
authentication mechanism. No user would want to provide the number of samples required, 
so alternative strategies must be thought of. Two examples are given below. 
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1. The user when using a volatile command is challenged for his password. This 0 
may sound as if it would become annoying. However, windows and UNIX 
already challenge as to the surety of their command, it would take little 
adaptation to adjust these OSs to request a password instead. 
2. The user is allowed to initiate a volatile command as many times as it takes for 
the authentication mechanism to obtain enough samples for the teaching of its 
neural net. Thereafter the authentication mechanism will examine the keystroke 
timings of the volatile command entry. 
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Chapter 8 
8. Monitoring Agent Specification 
This chapter develops a conceptual modelfor a monitoring system 
that can be used to provide extendedfinvionality withill the 
monitoring agent (? f CISS. After a brief discussion of the threats 
against which modern securilysystems have consistentlyfailed to 
protect. A basic model is defined wilh a definition of what a 
monitoring systems objectives should be. The basic model is then 
expanded and its application withitt the monitoring agent of CISS is 
described. 
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8.1 Introduction 
Almost all security features placed on computer systems are preventative. Whether they are 
smart cards, passwords or biometric identification systems, they are barriers placed in the 
way of an attacker attempting to gain unauthorised access to a computer system. Chapter 7 
described a new additive module which may be used to bolster security wherever it is 
possible to obtain keystroke timings. As useful as this technique is for access control once 
an attacker has by-passed it, it becomes redundant. 
Conventional computer security systerns have repeatedly failed to deal with three major 
security problems [103 ], [104 ], (105 ]: 
1. illegal use of a system by an unauthorised user once access controls have been 
compromised; 
2. abuse of privileges by an authorised user; 
3. anomalous behaviour of system resources. 
Most computer systems have no way of discovering that an attacker has obtained user 
rights on the system; tile term for an attacker that assumes a user's rights through 
unauthorised use of their account is niamliterader. The only tools that a security 
administrator has to aid him in the discovery of a masquerader are those provided through 
auditing facilities. Historically, the primary need for auditing in computer systems was for 
the calculation of charges that were incurred by user activity upon the system, therefore 
auditing facilities are not generally designed with the features necessary for good security. 
While many existing operating systems such as UNIX and VMS [106 ] offer limited 
auditing facilities, the amount of auditing information that can be generated is vast. For 
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instance, auditing facilities for VMS image termination data generates 20 Mbytes ( and 
upwards ) of information per a week for 100 users, a more detailed audit could result in a 
log thousands of megabytes long. Clearly the information cannot be processed by a single 
security administrator, and even if it was, discovery of a masquerader through the use of 
audit logs would have been made too late to prevent a masquerader from causing any 
damage. 
Users of a system that abuse their privileges are another difficult problem for security 
administrators to deal with. Abuse can be present in many forms, from the simple act of 
using processing time for 'net surfing, ' to actively attempting to by-pass security 
mechanisms for malicious purposes such as the tampering of files belonging to another user. 
Anderson [107 ], gives a system abuser the title of misfeasor and users attempting to by- 
pass security, clandestine users. The only way that this kind of activity can be detected is 
through the search of audit logs for indicative events that suggest abuse by a user, a search 
that could be through Mbytes of data. User abuse is potentially the most dangerous security 
breach as a regular user will have a good idea of where to direct attacks for the most 
damage, or where the most valuable information is kept upon a system. 
The final problem that is difficult for conventional security systems to deal iWith is 
anomalous behaviour of system resources, particularly software. Anomalous behaviour in 
software is generally caused by one of two reasons: 
bugs in badly written programs which can cause strange events, for instance the first 
release of Microsofts Word 6 came complete with approximately three thousand bugs; 
211 
Chapter Eight: Monitoring Agent Specification 
2. a malicious program [108 ] which has been introduced into the system; potentially 
causing data damage, denial of service, loss of confidentiality etc. 
Malicious software can come in many forms. 
" Viruses: 
These are self replicating programs containing a payload that can be 
delivered to cause malicious damage or inconvenience the user. An offshoot 
of the virus is the iroi-ni, which is a virus that causes damage through its own 
replication and subsequent tying up of system resources. 
" Trojan horses: 
This is a program that disguises itself within an innocent program to gain 
entry to a system. When tile program is run, so is the malicious section of 
code. 
" Bombs: 
There are generally two types of bomb, logic and lime. A logic bomb 
monitors a system until a certain logical condition is met, for example the 
removal of a person's name from the pay roll list. Once the condition is met 
the bomb goes off, damaging some part of the system. The time bomb waits 
for a certain time, maybe a 'Friday 13th' before it goes off. 
Computer viruses are the most well known of all malicious software, though the distinction 
is not always as clear as the above categorisations might imply. Computer viruses have 
become much more complex as their writers have employed more sophisticated techniques 
in the creation of malicious software. One of the main tools a security administrator has in 
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the combat of computer viruses are virus scanners. Virus scanners operate by maintaining a 
list of known machine code patterns that appear within viruses and using them to search for 
matching patterns in files. If any of the patterns are found a suspected virus is reported. 
However, a recent release by the 'Dark Avenger, ' [1091 is a virus pair that has 2 billion 
valid combinations for its source code. As with real viruses, its ability to rapidly produce 
dissimilar offspring make detection and elimination of it very difficult. Virus scanners, that 
operate through the matching of known byte combinations within viruses are unable to deal 
with the great magnitude of combinations. The most dangerous viruses are what are termed 
as 'stealth ' viruses. This group of viruses receive their name because of their method of 
infection-, the virus hides itself within the code of an innocent looking program ( host 
program ) and when the host program is run copies of the virus are made. Viral actions are ID, 
carried out, such as denial of service or data modification, and the system becomes infected. 
For example in DOS a host program may be any. exe file. With the increasing availability of 
programs via the Internet, stealth viruses and Trojan horses are becoming a source of major 
concern for security administrators. 
One method of dealing with tile security problems described above is through the continual 
surveillance of system activity. If the following two premises are true then the development 
of a system to deal with the security problems discussed is possible. 
1. It is possible to learn the normal activity of a system, its resources, and the users upon it, 
so that its behaviour can be predicted. 
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2. A masquerader, privilege abuser, or virus, exhibit anomalous activity that can be detected 
as not being part of the normal system behaviour and the correct counter measures can 
be implemented to prevent/limit damage. 
The reasoning behind the two premises is as follows. 
* The behaviour of a system cannot be unpredictable for any length of time as that would 
provide no platform for any productive work to be done on it. User behaviour can be 
categorised due to two prevalent factors: humans form habits that are peculiar to them, 
for instance there are multiple ways to open a file and once a user uses one way they 
rarely change even though it may not be tile most efficient way, job specialisation for 
example a secretary on the system will use different system resources than a 
programmer. 
e Anomalous behaviour is any that falls outside of the norm for a specific entity. In the 
case of a masquerader the control behaviour pattern would be that of the user whose 
account is being used. It can be assumed that a masquerader will not perform the usual 
tasks that the user would be expected to since the masquerader is not there to perform as 
the legal user but instead there for exploration, or malicious damage. Programs should 
behave in a predictable manner. If they do not, for instance when infected by a stealth 
virus, they may exhibit file modifications or writes to memory that are uncharacteristic. 
A potential privilege abuser may show indicative signs by excessive browsing, the 
attainment of super user status, or the ability to assume another user's id. 
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The security problems discussed above can be partially solved through the strict application 
of a security policy, which may include regulations on: 
1. use of the system and the user's privileges, 'Just because a file can be read does not mean 
that a user should read it; ' 
2. the introduction of non-authorised programs upon systems; I 
3. the use of isolated computers to test software. 
However, policies and rules are notoriously ignored by many users and a firmer approach Z 
must be taken. This chapter describes a conceptual monitoring scheme within CISS and the 
3-L architecture aimed at combating the previously described security problems. It is a 
specification for tile CISS monitoring agent that has been overlooked in previous literature, 
see chapter 3. It offers great potential in local security and domain security. 
A monitoring scheme has three stages. 
Analysis 
Monitor Response &A k4.. ... 
. *.... .:: 
0 
Figure 8-1 Stages of Intrusion Detection 
" Monitor: 
system variables that are capable of being used to indicate anomalous behaviour must 
be monitored for real time analysis, and stored for historical analysis. 
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" Analysis: 
using the measurements of the system variables monitored the monitoring scheme 
must be capable of recognising anomalous behaviour upon the computer system. 0 
" Response: 
depending on the conclusions reached by the analysis of indicators a response must be 
formed and implemented, limiting the damage to data upon the computer system and 
the protection of services to users. 
8.2 The Basic Model 
The suggested monitoring scheme can be divided into four sections as can be seen in Figure 
8-2, below. 
The general aims of a monitoring system should be: 
1. tile detection of intrusion; 
2. the detection of abuse; 
3. the detection of malicious software; 
4. the implementation of counter measures. 
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Figure 8-2 Monitoring Agent: Basic Model 
The monitoring systern should be capable of dealing with both real-time events and a 
detailed analysis of historic events. Real-time analysis will allow the system to immediately 
limit damage caused by masqueraders and abusers. However, because the system must run 
in real time, it is necessary to 11mit tile aniount of data processed. Therefore, it will be 
necessary for a subset of all chta being collected to be used in tile real-time section of the 
monitoring system, implying that some sort of filtering 111LISt take place to decide what data 
is to be used. 
The detailed analysis of historic events can use complete audit logs and process the data 
looking for anomalous behaviour dUrIng off-peak hours, thereby reducing the impact on 
system performance. 
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8.2.1 Sampler 
The sampler section must record system activity, which can be accomplished for example 
through the use of software interrupts or TSR programs in DOS. The sampler records such 
things as keystroke timings for use within the security mechanism described in chapter 7. 
The sampler audits all data required by the security policy in place, all of the data will be 
stored in audit logs while a subset is used within the real-time monitoring. 
8.2.2 Knowledge Base 
The knowledge base keeps the suni of knowledge that tile monitoring system requires to 
operate. All auditing information for any session must be maintained by the knowledge base 
along with tile run-time variables and the static conditions set by the implemented security 
policy. The basic information that tile knowledge base holds is indicated below.. 
1. Security policy: 
this section would keep the security policy of the local domain so as to organise 
the monitoring within an overall security strategy. 
2. Security log: 
a record of recent events that have taken place upon the system. 
3. Profiles: 
for every user/resource a profile of system activity would be provided, see 
section 8.3.3.1. 
4. Sampling: 
information for generation of security logs. 
S. Analysis 
information that is required by the analysis techniques. 
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6. Response 
information that is required by the responder. 
8.2.3 Analyser 
The analyser takes information from the monitor and compares it with data stored within 
the knowledge base and from conclusions it makes determines whether a security violation 
has taken place. The three methods used in this task are given below. 
1. Expert system: 
through tile use of rules and the triggering of those rules an expert system is 
capable of analysing data with tile same problem solving capability of a true 
expert. 
2. Statistical modelling: 
through the use of mean and standard deviation models or of comparisons of 
recent events to known statistical models deviation from a previous pattern can 
be detected. 
3. Pattern classifier: 
uses Al techniques for pattern recognition techniques to detect deviations from 
the norm. 
8.2.4 Responder 
Through information contained within the knowledge base and the output of the analyser 
the responder must decide and implement an action. It may be that the responder will 
219 
Chapter Eighl: Monitoring Agent Specification 
decide that no immediate action is necessary or that further events must be monitored or 
that a security violation has occurred and that a response is called for. The response that 
the responder may take will depend upon the security policy. For example, it may request 
further proof of identity from a suspected masquerader or simply logout the suspected 
masquerader from the system. 
8.3 Concepttial Monitoring Ap-ent 
Taking the basic model described in 8.2 it will now be expanded to detail the various 
components, describing how they may be included within the CISS monitoring agent. 
Because it is necessary for the monitoring agent to keep records for its own functions an 
additional segment must be added to the SMIB - the monitor segment. This segment is 
divided into: 
1. sampling; 
2. analysis; 
3. response. 
As described in the basic model and to be further defined in section 8.3, the profiles of 
users/system resources will be stored within the existing extended security segment. The 
security policy is enforced through the set-up of CISS. 
8.3.1 Sampler 
As was mentioned in chapter 3, there are three points at which CISS and the outside world 
interface. Therefore, it is necessary that the task of sampling measurements is divided 
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amongst the three agents the: operational environment agent, user agent and security 
administration agent. In implementations where the SAA and UA functionality is divided, 
the MA must be capable of interacting directly with the UA. This requires a modification to 
the interaction of agents, and the subsequent addition of an MA-UA communication 
protocol. The measurements obtained through sampling will be used in the generation of 
log entries and the production of profiles, see section 8.3.3.1. 
8.3.2 Security Logs 
Historically the best method a security administrator had in the detection of malicious 
users/processes was through tile analysis of security logs. Detailed audit logs are essential 
for automated monitoring, preferably they should be designed according to the domain's 
security needs, rather than its accounting requirements. The introduction of CISS to an 
existing system should allow the generation of specialised security logs through information 
gathered by the API of tile OPENA. 
Therefore, the monitoring agent's functionality must be expanded from its original 
specification in chapter 3, to provide full audit facilities for the local environment. The 
generation of a single log that represents the whole of the local environment's activity is 
more efficient than the generation of numerous logs for specific applications, a strategy that 
was implied by CISSs original specification. The generation of a single security log allows 
CISS to produce generic security logs for different computing platforms, making it capable 
to perform analysis within a heterogeneous network. 
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Through the use of security log entries a history of user activity can be built up. From this 
information a profile ( see section 8.3.3.1 ) can be generated that describes the user's 
normal activity upon the system. This profile can then be used in the detection of 
anomalous behaviour during any future sessions using the user's account. 
8.3. Zl Logs Entries 
The first step in the design of a monitoring scheme must be in the decision of what 
resources to monitor upon the system, and therefore how detailed the audit log should be. 
There have been studies [ 106] carried out on tile effects of auditing and the levels to which 
it should be applied. The argument has always been that the lower the level of auditing the 
harder it is to circumvent. Therefore the difficulty for privilege abusers, specifically 
clandestine users, in performing malicious acts is increased. However, with low level 
auditing one is left with tile fact that a lot of information will be generated, requiring large 
amounts of resources to be dedicated to sitling through the logs for security breaches. 
Higher level auditing, such as at the application level, produces less auditing information but 
can potentially be by-passed through the use of lower level commands. Therefore, a 
medium between the two is necessary. 
The sampling section of the monitoring segment in the SMIB holds information on: 
the level of auditing required by the security policy and security administrator, 
specific sampling requests which are requested by the analysis techniques, see section 
8.3.3. 
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To prevent unnecessary processing and storage of security log entries the monitoring agent 
will refine the information sent to it by the three agents involved in sampling and only 
archive entries that are specified by the entries within the sampling section of the SMIB. 
The log entries are stored within the security log segment of the CISS's SMIB. Potentially 
the entries can be encrypted and only readable by the security administrator who would 
have the necessary key to decrypt them. However, the entries must be available to the 
monitoring agent for further use in the generation of profiles and automated audit analysis. 
The security log should be subdivided into two sections: 
*a low level audit log that stores the usage of system resources; 
*a log of system activity that is used to store tile Iligher level measurements potentially 
useful for security mechanisms such as non-repudiation. Activities are defined in section 
8.3.2.1. 
The logical section of the monitoring agent responsible for the formatting and storage of 
security log entries is tile archiver. 
The basic audit entry should be made up of five basic fields. 
e Initiator: 
usually a user, though in certain circumstances it %vill be a process calling another 
process. 
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* System resource: 
can be a file, command, or hardware module. 
o Action: 
is usually one of those described in table 8.2-1 below. 
o Measurement: 
can be one of the four described in table 8.2-2, dependent upon the action and system 
resource. 
o Time-stamp: 
is the time at which the action upon the system resource occurred. 
Action Description 
Execute Initiate a process 
Terminate Halt a process 
Read Read data from a systeLn resource 
Write Write data to a systern resource 
Modiýv Modify a syst ern resource 
Open Open a svstem resource 
Close Close a system resource 
Create Create a system resource 
Delete Delete a system resource 
sage TUse of system resource 
Table 8-1 Actions 
Measurement Description 
Time This is the time that an event took place e. g. login time 
or logout time 
Duration This is the length of time an event took place for, e. g. 
duration of a session 
Cardinal This is the number of times an event occurred or 
describes a quantity. 
Binary Whether an event occurred or not. 
Fable 8-2 Monitoring Measurement 
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For example a user Fred has an id 0001 uses the program copy. exe to copy the contents of 
a file 'first' to a second file 'second. ' 
[000 1, copy. exe, execute, 1,0 1: 44: 13: 28: 09: 95] 
[0001-copy. exe, first, open, 1,01: 44: 13: 28: 08: 95] 
[0001-copy. exe, second, open, 1,01: 44: 13: 28: 08: 95] 
[000 1 -copy. exe, first, read, 1040,01: 44: 13: 28: 08: 95] 
[0001-copy. exe, second, write, 1040,01: 44: 13: 28: 08: 95] 
[0001-copy. exe, first, close, 1,01: 44: 13: 28: 08: 95] 
[0001-copy. exe, second, close, 1,01: 44: 13: 28: 08: 95] 
System Resources Description 
CPU CPU usage 
1/0 Input/output devices used 
Directories Directories used within a session 
Files Files manipulated within a session_ J 
System Calls System calls within a session 
Table 8-3 Sample System Resources 
The audit log is a low level record of potentially all system calls, the second type of record 
kept should be at a more abstract level, in tile basic model this is called the activity log 
entry, e. g. login, logout. 
e Initiator: 
o as before. 
* Activity: 
can be anything taken at a more abstract level than the audit logs, for example login, 
or logout. 
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9 Measurement: 
is one of the four basic measures described within table 8.3-2. 
9 Audit-record-list: 
this is the list of low level audit entries that make up the activity. 
o Time-stamp: 
as before, 
Application Activities 
Editor Editors used, files edited etc. 
Window Command Use of windows dUring a session 
Web servers Use of web servers within a session 
Spreadsheets Types of spreadsheets used 
Mailer Electronic mail, read, written etc. 
Table 8-4 Sample Activities 
8.3. Z2 TheSamplingAgents 
The UA interacts directly with the user and provides a way for the user to request security 
services directly from CISS. The type of requests that are made will be logged in the 
activity segment of the SMIB security log, tile corresponding system usage measurements 
will be logged in the low level section of the security log. The SAA will be monitored 
mainly for a record of security administrator activity and not for the detection of malicious 
activity. The OPENA provides all of the low level sampling through its API which 
interfaces with the local operating system to obtain the necessary auditing information, the 
OPENA must also interface with other applications to obtain information on their usage. 
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Within the 3-L architecture it is expected that the majority of sampling will be accomplished 
within the LSU, where information will be gathered and transferred to the LSSs that are 
larger machines with the capability of processing and analysing the data. I 
8.3.3 Analysis 
There are three methods of analysis that should be used within the monitoring scheme: 
statistical; rule-based, and AL There are three types of analysis that should be provided 
through application of the methods: 
1. real-time analysis - tile detection of anomalous activity during a user's session; 
2. historical analysis - tile minutiae analysis of system activity performed off-line and 
periodically, 
3. damage analysis - the assessment of damage caused by anomalous activity. 
Analysis is conducted upon the information gathered through the monitoring scheme, as 
described within section 8.3. A recent approach to the monitoring of system activity is 
through the use of profiles generated for system resources. 
8.3.3.1 Profiles 
A profile is a set of measures kept upon an individual resource/entity that can be used in the 
identification of the individual. Prior research [I 10 ], [I II], indicates that this approach, 
though not perfect, is a strong security mechanism for detecting intrusion upon a system. 
Profiling can be divided into three, sections. 
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1. Data filterin: 
through the correct data selection the most indicative measures are used while the rest 
are discarded to reduce processing. This is also a function of the analysis section of 
the monitoring agent. 0 
2. Profile creation: 
from the filtered measures a control profile is created that indicates the boundaries of 
normal behaviour. 
3. Profile Refinement: 
the profile is continuously refined so that it is up to date. 
MoniToring Agont 
System 
System 
womules 
OPENA 
I/ SMIBA 
4p 
r-roo"an 
Figure 8-3 Proriler 
Within the monitoring scheme there are two profiles used to describe an entity's normal 
behaviour, the activity profile and the behavioural profile. 
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The basic activity profile is shown below. 
* Entity: 
is the user/process that the profile belongs to. I 
* Activity: 
is the activity that this profile describes. 
o Analysis technique: 
is the technique chosen for the detection of anomalous behaviour in the activity 
defined earlier. 
e List-of-audit records: 
is the list of low level audit entries that define the range of valid audit entries that 
make up the activity. 
9 Threshold: 
is the level at which the analysis technique output indicates an anomalous activity. 
* Contributive value: 
is combined with other contributive values when the activity profile is used in 
conjunction with other profiles for behavioural profiles. 
o Last-update: 
is the date at which tile profile was last updated either through automatic update or 
manual update. 
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The basic behavioural profile is. 
o Entity: 
as before. 
o Activity list: 
is the list of activities that contribute to the behavioural profile. 
o Analysis technique: 
is the technique used to detect anomalous behaviour. 
9 Threshold: 
is the value at which the analysis technique indicates anomalous behaviour is being 
exhibited, the threshold may not be a single value but in the case of a statistical 
technique it may be the standard deviation and mean of the activities. 
o Last-update: 
as before. 
jAudit entry 11 Audit EHnt2] Audit Entry 3 
ctivit Profile 
"k A 
FBehavioural Pr-cfi-I-e 
Figure 8-4 Prorile Monitoring 
Because profiles are meant to be representative of the users normal activity it is important 
to keep them up to date. This can be done through the acquisition of sample activity during 
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normal sessions. Automatic updating in this form can be accomplished daily or weekly, 0 
depending on the activity of tile user. Updating a profile would only take place at the 
termination of a successful session. This reduces the chance of contamination of a profile 
by possible masquerader activity. The logical section within the monitoring agent that is 
responsible for profile refinement is the profile refiner. 
The surreptitious updating of profiles can lead to tile problem of slow change. If privilege 
abusers know that profiling is being used with automatic updates they may attempt to 0 
slowly modify their behaviour over time, consequently altering their profiles. Thus they 
may not exhibit anomalous behaviour even when abusing the system. For example, a 
privilege abuser can gradually introduce file browsing into his normal list of activities and 
then slowly increase his browsing activities. 
The second way to update a profile is for the security administrator to force an update by 
requesting it through tile SAA. This would be required at initial set-up of the system, at the 
addition of a new user, or at tile addition of new software. 
Here is an example in the use of behavioural profiles. 
'Session Start-up. ' This can be described as the first five minutes of a user's session. User 
Fred starts up in the usual way, he begins any login session with three activities. First, the 
compulsory login, secondly he checks his mail, and thirdly browses the news. It is not 
unusual for users to forin liabits such as this. The behavioural profile kept within the 
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knowledge base of a monitoring scheme would have been built up over a number of Fred's 
past sessions. 
If Fred did not perform within the boundaries of his profile it would not necessarily follow 
that he is a masquerader. However, the monitoring scheme would be at a heightened level 
of suspicion. If enough anomalous activity was picked up over the course of one session by 
the analyser the monitoring system may decide that a challenge is necessary or that some 
other counter measure is called for. 
The discussion of profiles has so far been limited to those of the human users. Using the 
profile scheme described above it is possible to create profiles for software, and pieces of 
hardware, such as computer terminals. 
Software profiles will be limited to activities. By attributing a piece of software with an 
activity profile it should be possible to detect any anomalous writes or reads, that could be 
indications of a Trojan horse or virus. Such activity when detected by the monitoring 
scheme's analyser may demand tile initiation of a virus scanner specifically targeting the 
suspect piece of software. If no virus is found the responder may tag the piece of software 
for the security administrators attention. The security administrator can then use the 
activity audit entries to examine exactly what the piece of software is doing. 
Anomalous activity detection of software using profiling will only work if the knowledge 
base holds profiles prior to infection. Any infected software introduced into the system for 
the first time will not be detected as exhibiting anomalous behaviour when the stealth virus 
232 
Chapter Eight: Monitoring Agent Specification 
delivers its payload. Since most organisations use a limited number of software packages it 
is possible that standard applications can be profiled and their profile introduced into the 
knowledge base prior to installation of the sof1ware upon the system these standard profiles 
can be generated either by the application suppliers or the CISS suppliers. 
Computer terminals can be given behaviour profiles so that their actions upon a network 
can be monitored for anomalous activity. Activities that a terminal may be audited for, and 
for which a behaviour profile may be generated include; network connections, remote 
logins, traffic intensity, etc. This sort of profiling can help in the prevention of machines 
being used for activities such as hacking. 
Profiles take time to be generated so tile most vulnerable time for a system is when a new 
entity is placed upon it ( user/software ). Therefore, until enough information has been 
gathered for an initial profile standard security mechanisms must suffice. 
8.3.3.2 Rule-BasedAnalysis 
Rule based analysis can be used in one of three ways: 
1. to automate the minutiae analysis of security logs; 
2. to perform real-time analysis of system activity, 
3. to form judgements about the overall state of security upon the system. 
Expert systems work through the application of knowledge engineering. Experts are 
interviewed by knowledge en0aineers that attempt to obtain the knowledge built up by the 
experts through experience in their respective fields. The knowledge is then represented as 
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rules which work upon objects. An engine is then developed that can make judgements 
upon the results of applying the rules to objects. Previous work has been done on the 
application of expert systems to the automation of security log analysis [112 ], [113 ]. 
These applications have proved effective. The use of expert systems within a real-time 
scenario has also been looked at in recent research by Baur[ 114 ] and Lunt[ 115 ]. 
The production of a generic log as described in section 8.3.2 allows the application of 
generic rules within the expert system. This would allow the CISS monitoring agent to be 
updated easily within a heterogeneous computer system, with better rules being sent out 
from the CISS supplier as they become available. 
The expert system requires rules upon several key facets of a system. 
1. Normal user activity: 
these rules will contain the necessary information to detect normal activity 
upon the system. 
2. Malicious user behaviour: 
these rules can be used to detect the patterns of behaviour that malicious users 
display, such as excessive browsing, attempts to gain another users privileges. 
3. Malicious soflware behaviour: 
these rules can help detect infected software which may display behaviour such 
as modifications to files, attempted writes to boot sectors etc. 
4. Current security policy: 
these rules will describe the current security policy within the domain and by 
their application, policy breakers will be detected. 
ý34 
Chaptet Eight: Monitoring AgentSpecification 
A more specific set of rules may be included to provide detection of specific attempts to 
circumvent OS security. Along with the rules described above there should be ininlediate 
[116 ] rules, which are hard and fast, making no use of collected or expected user 
behaviour, such as three failed attempts to login successfully and the user account is 
suspended. 
If the expert system is to be employed to perform comprehensive analysis of security logs 
then this can be done off-line allowing the rules the system uses to be more detailed. For a 
real-time application of expert systems to monitoring the rule sets should be limited so that 
the impact of system performance can be limited. 
8.3.4 Statistical Based Analysis 
This is where statistics are used to describe normal behaviour of a system and any behaviour 
that is detected and outside the normal bounds of the collected statistics is labelled 
anomalous and therefore suspect. The use of statistical methods for intrusion detection has 
been demonstrated by SR-1 International [117 ]. 
The sample data is maintained using profiles that are kept on individual users, which record 
frequency, mean and covariance of activity. When a user account is activated, information 
about the activity taking place is gathered through the sampler and compared against the 
recorded measurements within the SMIB indexed by the user accounts login name. The 
profile refiner limits tile number of variables used to those that are indicative of normal user 
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behaviour. The thresholds at which user behaviour is no longer normal is determined by the 
profile refiner segment of the statistical analyser. 
Statistical analysis can use models of distribution to detect anomalous behaviour. However, 
as these models may not be exact, errors in detection of anomalous activity [118 ] occur. 
8.3.5 Neural Net Based Analysis 
As was described in chapter 7, neural networks are capable of classifying patterns that are 
not apparent to humans. This ability gives them a great potential within the monitoring 
agent. However, because of their nature they require large amounts of learning data which 
may not always be readily available. Therefore, they should be used to analyse specific 
areas of activity, potentially the most characteristic areas of a user. By doing this the 
volume of necessary learning data is reduced making tile application of a neural net more 
viable. 
The advantages of using a neural net for analysis of system activity are that their application 
requires no assumptions about tile nature of the data to be analysed. For instance, the 
statistical analysis relies on the assumption that a statistical model can describe activity. The 
expert system relies upon the assumptions of humans, the neural network forms its own 
assumptions through learning directly from available data. 
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8.3.6 Analysis Within CISS 
secuflty 
Log Even 
Proftes 
Socu, Rv Lim 
Figure 8-5 Analysis Within CISS 
Within the monitoring agent there should be real-time analysis and off-line analysis. The II 
real time analysis will be made up of the three specifted analysers. 
1. The task of tile expert system will be to detect anonialous behaviOUr by applying the 
experience that Security experts have irnbued into it through the rules that they have 
generated for its inference engine. The expert systern will use a subset of the rules as 
dictated by the same experts while monitoring in real-time. 
2. The task of the statistical analyser is to detect anomalous behaviour of entities through 
activities outside of their norm as dictated by their profiles. This is more specific than 
that of the expert system, although the real-time expert system will use the results of 
statistical analyser in its own analysis. 
3. The neural network should be used in very specific cases where the samples that are 
needed for its training can be collected and the problem is very specific. 
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As well as the anomaly detection through activity profiles there should be other real time 
supervisory mechanisms requiring analysis such as keystroke timings, network traffic 
analysis etc. There is also an off-line security log analyser, that is an expert system with a 
full rule base, that can conduct thorough analysis of the security log. Anomalies detected 
through these mechanisms are reported to the evaluation block of Figure 8-5. 
The evaluation block can be either a simple surn threshold scheme with logic for further 
refinement of profiling and sampling, or it can be an expert system programmed to perform 
a decision on the current security of CISS through the data provided by the monitoring 
agents real-time analysers. 
The evaluation segment of the monitoring agent will have an awareness rating so that the 
greater the awareness the more sensitive the analyser becomes. For instance, numerous 
suspicious activity may occur in isolation without necessarily tipping the monitoring agent 
that a masquerader is present. The frequency of suspicious activity contributes to the 
awareness value so that continued Suspicious activity will eventual cause a response from 
the system. 
The exact location of analysis processing will be implementation dependent, with the 
optimum choice being the use of a dedicated monitoring processer that will analyse all the 
information within an organisation/divisional unit. 
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8.3.7 Responder 
The responder takes the result from the analysis section of the monitoring agent and forms a 
response dependent upon the current security policy. The response becomes more dramatic 
the worse the indications are from the analysis of system activity. For instance, if a user 
attains super-user status on a system and is not meant to have that ability then the user 
account may be frozen. A list of possible responses is given below, the further down the list 
the greater the security breach and the more extreme the result from the analyser. 
1. No action necessary. 
2. Raise awareness. 
3. Take action, such as: 
" challenge user; 
" protect files-, 
deny services; 
notify security administrator. 
4. Shutdown LSU. 
5. Shutdown LSS. 
6. Shutdown CISS. 
The responder is comprised of decision logic that may be in the form of an expert system. 
The actual response decided upon will be implemented via the SSA or the OPENA of the 
LSU, LSS, or DMC dependent upon the seriousness of the security breach. Shutdown of a 
specific level entity can be accomplished through revocation of the entity's public-key 
certificate and any SSids that are currently held by the entity. Without the means for 
authentication the entity will be effectively cut off from any services provided or protected 
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by CISS, this action may only be accomplished by the DMC and security administrator of a 
domain. 
8.4 Conclusion 
The monitoring agent described within this chapter uses three types of analysis techniques 
which when applied in isolation can be fallible. However, it is hoped that the analysis error 
can be reduced through the combination of the three techniques. A future implementation 
of the monitoring agent should minimise the error within the analysis section. 
This chapter has extended and described the monitoring agent in more detail than has 
appeared in literature previously. The necessity for a strong monitoring scheme has been 
demonstrated through documented cases referenced throughout this chapter. To combat 
these a generic log can be created that is independent upon the computing platform that 
CISS secures. Making it possible to use generic profiles of CISS activity along side specific 
profiles for OS activity. Tile interactions of the extended monitoring agent within 
conventional CISS and the new architecture described within Chapter 4 has been described, 
providing a framework for intrusion detection through behavioural monitoring using CISS. 
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Cha ter Nine 
9. Conclusion 
This chapter presents the authors conchiding thoughts about the 
research that has been conducted during the course of this project. It 
begins with a discussion on the achievements of the work presented 
within this thesis, followed by a discussion on the limitations of the 
work. To conchide, some thoughts are given on where continuation of 
the researchs-hould be concentrated. 
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9.1 Achievements of the Research Programme 
The research has accomplished the objectives as laid out in Chapter I in the following 
manner. 
1. The CISS model has been further developed, in particular a management architecture has 
been developed to increase the security that CISS provides within a security domain. 
The management architecture allows heterogeneous computing platforms to be 
connected together while attaining tile security requirements defined by a single policy. 
2. A prototype board that can be used to primarily speed up the local security unit, but may 
be used by any of tile three levels described within tile new management structure, has 
been developed. It provides RSA and DES cryptographic algorithms in hardware. 
During the development of the board a generic SBus connector was designed that 
provides easy attachment to tile SBus. Device drivers have been developed for the 
generic SBus connector. 
3. Software has been produced to mirror the functionality of the prototype board. While 
producing these functions a mathematical module has been constructed for the provision 
of arithmetic components within CISS, so attaining a good platform for the 
implementation of alternative cryptographic techniques within the software. 
4. A new access control mechanism has been investigated, applying neural networks and 
genetic algorithms to keystroke analysis. The experiment gave encouraging results, 
making further investigation warranted. The access control mechanism fits in well with 
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the philosophy of CISS, as it exploits an already common access control mechanism and 
may be easily added to most operating systems, while becoming invisible to users. 
S. Finally, the monitoring agent of CISS has been defined through the development of a 
general monitoring scheme that exploits the use of profiles to detect anomalous 
behaviour by users, software, and hardware. The use of the monitoring agent within the 
3-L architecture has been described and when implemented upon a LAN will reduce the 
need for multiple audit officers. 
9.2 Limitations of the Research 
One of the objectives of this research project was the optimisation of a software CISS 
prototype by implementation of functionality within hardware. The development of the 
CISS prototype was the domain of a second research project which unfortunately ran 
behind schedule and no prototype was produced during the time of active research within 
this research programme. Therefore, there could be no full analysis of the CISS system and 
consequently only limited implementation of functionality within hardware was 
accomplished. However, tile hardware constructed during this research project provides the 
most intensive processes in dedicated hardware, which will greatly improve performance of 
the prototype. 
The access control mechanism described in chapter seven produced results comparable, if 
not better, than other research on similar access control mechanisms conducted elsewhere. 
However, the application of neural networks and Al techniques never produce a hundred 
percent accuracy and it is inevitable that some errors will be present. 
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Although two models have been defined the 'proof of the pudding' is in the testing of the 
models through implementation. Unfortunately, it was not possible to test either of the 
models as no CISS implernentation exists, and the full monitoring scheme could be 
considered three years work in its own right. Even so it is important that the models have 
been defined at this stage as they are necessary for further development of CISS beyond a 
prototype and into a real security service provider. 
9.3 Sp2gestions and Scope for Future Work 
The primary requirement for future work is tile development of a prototype CISS, which 
can be analysed thoroughly and provides a fOUndation for optimisation. It was never within 
the scope of this project to create a prototype CISS. 
The ENCDEC board can be further developed so that it may be ready for retail as a 
supplemental cryptographic board, not necessarily as part of a CISS product. As computer I 
security becomes more important to businesses there will be a bigger demand for security 
products. 
There could be development of the monitoring agent either as part of CISS or as an isolated 
monitoring security mechanism for computer systems. The application of genetic 
programming and genetic algorithms should be looked at in the context of security as both 
these techniques appear to be powerful tools as yet unused within the security field. 
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A Description of the RSA Cryptosystem 
In 1976 Diffie and Hellman published "New Directions In Cryptography, " [30] in which 
they laid the ground work for public-key cryptography, and in so doing gave two important 
definitions of 'one-way functions' and 'trapdoor one way functions. ' 
A 'one way function' is one in whichj(x) is easy to calculate. 
y =Ax) (easy for a given x, where the exact form off is known), 
but, almost impossible to calculate x given y 
A 'trapdoor one way function' is a pair of functions, one of which acts as a one-way 
function while the other acts as a trapdoor, so that the calculation of the one-way function's 
inverse is possible. 
y=f (e, x) EquationA-1 
(d, y) Equation A-2 
y in Equation A- I is easily calculable for all x and e. However, given e and y it is infeasible 
to calculate x, this is the one-way function. Equation A-2 acts as the trapdoor, given d and y 
it is easy to calculate x. It should be impossible to calculate d given e and y, and without d 
it should be impossible to calculate x given y using Equation A-2. 
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Rivest, Shamir and Adleman's "A Method For Obtaining Digital Signatures And Public-Key 
Cryptography, " [3 1] presented a one-way trapdoor function used in RSA. 
There are three basic concepts of number theory that are required to understand the 
fundamentals of RSA. 
1) One of the most important theorems in number theory and modern cryptography is 
Fermat's Little Theorem [32], 
d-1 =I (mod n) 
where ci and it are any positive integers. 
Fermat's Little Theorem is tnie for all prime it. 
An integer it that satisfies Fermat's Little Theorem is called a pseudo-prime and any 
it that fails is a composite IlUmber. A pseudo-prinie may be proved composite when 
tested against another base ci. If an integer n passes several tests against different 01 
bases it is very probably prime. Very rarely will a composite integer satisfy Fermat's 
Little Theorem for all bases. Integgers that do this are known as Carmichael numbers 
[40], and to give an idea of how rare they are, there are only 255 of them below 
100,000,000. An example of Carmichael numbers are 561,1105 and 1729. 
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2) Euler's Totient Function [332] states that, 
xo("' =1 (mod n), 
where x and it are positive integers, x< it, and G. C. D(x, it) = 1. 
ý(ii) is Eulers totient function and is the number of integers less than ii that are co- 
prime with it. eg, 
O(S) =4 since only 1,3,5 and 7 share a GCD =I with 8 
If n is prinle then, 
eg, 
if n=7 
then 1,2,3,4,5,6 share a GCD =I with 7 
and 0(n) = 
If n is a composite nUniber made Lip of two prime factors p and q 
0ý)q) = Q)- 1)(q- 1) 
eg, 
ifp=3 andq=S 
then 1,2,4,7,8,11,13,14 share a GCD =I with 15 
and 0(n) = 
3) Where 0<e< in and GCD(m, e) = 1, 
de =I (mod n? ) 
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d has a unique solution. 
The trapdoor one-way function as suggested by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman is 0 In 
(x) =y= x' (imod n) 
The inverse function is 
f-'(y)=x=y" (modit), 
where x is a non-negative integer, 0: 9 x< it. 0 
For the RSA trapdoor one way function to work, x cd must equal x. 
If we make it = pq, where p and q are distinct large prime numbers, 
de = ý(ii) +1 
and that is the same as 
de =1 (imod ý(ii» 
Therefore we can calCLIlate a uniqUe SOILItiOll for d according to concept 3 above 
Using the trapdoor one way function, 
x ed = XC")+ I (mod n) 
= (x 
4(n) 
)x (niod n) 
Using Euler's theorem it can be redLIced to 
Xod =x (nnod n) 
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A Description of the DES Cryptosystem 
DES is a product cipher incorporating substitution, transposition and bit-by-bit modulo 2 
addition. The DES algorithm is shown below in Figure A-3. All data such as the I 
transposition and substitution tables can be found in DES tables section. 
lt. "T-. 0) KR-. 
y 
(+» 
Figure A-1 DES Algorithm 
DES requires an input block of 64 bits (LR), which undergoes an initial permulatim, IP, 
that is not key dependent. 
The input block is then split into two blocks of 32 bits, the left 32 bits (L,, ) and the right 32 
bits (R, ) . Blocks L, and R,, undergo 16 complex key dependent computations before going 
through an inverse of tile initial permutation IP-1. This is again not key dependent. 
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The complex key dependent calculations involve a block K of 48 bits derived from the key, 
and the Blocks L and R. 
LP=R 
R'= L (D f (R, K) 
Where (D is bit by bit modulo 2 addition 
We can use ty to describe tile nth iteration of the complex key dependent calculation, 
ý: ti: ý 16. 
L,, = R, j Equation A-3 
R,, = L,, -, 
ED f (R,, 
-,, 
K,, ) 
K,, is the 48 bits derived from tile key by KS, tile Key Scllec! Llleý. 
Key, Vcheihile 
KS(n, KEY) 
Figure A-4 illustrates llo%v Kil is calculated, 
KEY 
UFT 1. FFr 
9!! Ml ý; )--s- 1 
1 `of -- -- 2 (1.. 
y Uff . 
-ütt _T. 
(1'FRWfTV, j))_*K. 
P! TlEll, 
Figure A-2 Key Schedule 
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The 56 bits of the key (those bits that are not used for parity checking) are permuted using 
table Permitted Clioice I to form two 28 bit words Ch and Dit. These then undergo a left 
shift of I or 2 bits. Kh is formed from a transposition of the 56 bit binary number ChDit. 
However, only 48 bits are used in Kh. 
Key Dependent Complex Calculation 
The function of Equation A-3' is calculated using substitution boxes as in Figure A-5. 
R(32 ýIýTS) 
i 
(E) 
i 
48 BITS K(48 BUS) 
Ull JIUJJ JILIIJ JILIIJ I. I. L1.11 11.11.111111.111 
, 
11 
S, )( S, )( S, XýS. X, S, )( S. X S, X. S, Ml- -TTI'l- r Til TT1-1- -TT1-1- -Tri-l- '-Tni- -Trr 
(P) 
T' 
32 DI 
Figure A-3 Key Depeudent Function 
The 32 bit Rit block of data is permuted (using the permutation table E) into a 48 bit word 
and then modulo 2 addition is performed with Kit. Tile result of the modulo 2 addition is 
split into 8 6-bit words. Each 6-bit word undergoes a SUbstitution according to the 
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Substitution tables and resulting, in a 4-bit word. The SI substitution table can be seen 
below. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 12 11 12 13 14 15 
0 14 4 13 1 2 15 11 8 3 10 6 12 5 9 0 7 
1 0 15 7 4 14 2 13 1 10 6 12 11 9 5 3 8 
2 4 1 14 8 13 6 2 11 15 12 9 7 3 10 5 0 
3 15 12 18 2 4 9 1 7 5 11 ,3 
14 
, 
10 ,0 6 13 
Table A-1 SI Substitution Table 
The 6-bit word's most significant bit and least significant bit are combined to give a number 0 
between 0 and 3 used to index a row in the Substitution table, the 4 middle bits are used to 
index a column in the substitution table. Tile number found at the indexed location is a 
number between 0 and 15 that can be represented as a 4-bit word, eg if the 6 bit word was 
00 10 11 it WOUld be substitUted by 00 10. 
The combined result of tile 8 substitUtiOn boxes give a 32-bit word that is then permuted 
according to permutation P. This final 32-bit word is added bit by bit modulo 2 addition to 
Ln. 
The Key Dependent Complex Equation is performed 16 times. The resulting Rn and Ln are 
then combined to give a 64 bit output block which undergoes a final permutation. 
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DESTABLES 
58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2 
60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4 
62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6 
64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8 
57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1 
59 51 43 35 28 19 11 3 
61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5 
63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7 
Table A-1 Initial Permutation 
40 8 48 16 56 24 64 32 
39 7 47 15 55 23 63 31 
38 6 46 14 54 22 62 30 
37 5 45 13 53 21 61 29 
36 4 44 12 52 20 60 28 
33 3 43 11 51 19 59 27 
34 2 42 10 50 18 58 26 
33 1 41 9 49 17 57 2i 
Table A-2 Inverse Initial Permutation 
14 4 13 1 2 In 11 8 3 10 6 12 5 9 0 7 
0 15 7 4 14 2 13 1 10 6 12 11 9 5 3 8 
4 1 14 8 13 6 2 11 15 12 9 7 3 10 5 0 
15 12 8 2 4 9 1 7 5 11 3 14 10 0 6 13 
Table A-3 SI Substitution Table 
15 1 8 14 6 11 3 4 9 7 2 13 12 0 5 10 
3 13 4 7 15 2 8 14 12 0 1 10 6 9 11 5 
0 14 7 11 10 4 13 1 5 8 12 6 9 3 2 15 
13 8 10 1 3 15 4 2 11 6 7 12 0 5 14 9 
Table A-4 S2 Substitution Table 
10 0 9 14 6 3 15 5 1 13 12 7 11 4 2 8 
13 7 0 9 3 4 6 10 2 8 5 14 12 11 15 1 
13 6 4 9 8 15 3 0 11 1 2 12 5 10 14 7 
1 10 13 0 6 9 8 7 4 15 14 3 11 5 2 12 
Table A-5 S3 Substitution Table 
7 13 14 3 0 6 9 10 1 2 8 5 11 12 4 15 
13 8 11 5 6 15 0 3 4 7 2 12 1 10 14 9 
10 6 9 0 12 11 7 13 15 1 3 14 5 2 8 4 
3 15 0 6 10 1 13 8 
.9 
4 5 11 12 7 2 1.4 
Table A-6 S4 Substitution Table 
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2 12 4 1 7 10 11 6 8 5 3 15 13 0 14 9 
14 11 2 12 4 7 13 1 5 0 15 10 3 9 8 6 
4 2 1 11 10 13 7 8 15 9 12 5 6 3 0 14 
11 8 12 7 1 14 2 13 6 B 0 9 10 4 5 3 
Table A-7 S5 Substitution Table 
12 1 10 B 9 2 6 8 0 13 3 4 14 7 5 11 
10 15 4 2 7 12 9 5 6 1 13 14 0 11 3 8 
9 14 15 5 2 8 12 3 7 0 4 10 1 13 11 6 
4 3 2 12 9 5 1i 10 11 14 1 7 6 0 8 13 
Table A-8 S6 Substitution Table 
4 11 2 14 15 0 8 13 3 12 9 7 5 10 6 1 
13 0 11 7 4 9 1 10 14 3 5 12 2 15 8 6 
1 4 11 13 12 3 7 14 10 15 6 8 0 5 9 2 
6 11 13 8 1 4 10 7 5 0 15 14 2 3 12 
Table A-9 S7 Substitution Table 
13 2 8 4 6 15 11 1 10 9 3 14 5 0 12 7 
1 15 13 8 10 3 7 4 12 5 6 11 0 14 9 2 
7 11 4 1 9 12 14 2 6 10 13 15 3 5 8 
2 1 14 7 4 1 () 8 13 15 12 9 3 5 6 11 
Table A-10 SS Substitution Table 
32 1 2 345 
4 i 6 789 
8 9 10 11 12 13 
12 D 14 15 16 17 
16 17 IS 19 20 21 
20 21 22 23 24 25 
24 25 26 27 28 29 
28 29 30 31 32 1 
Table A-1 IE Permutation Table 
16 7 20 21 
29 12 28 17 
1 13 23 26 
5 18 31 10 
2 8 24 14 
32 27 3 9 
19 13 30 6 
22 11 4 25 
Table A-12 P Permutation Tible 
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57 49 41 33 25 17 9 
1 58 50 42 34 26 18 
10 2 59 51 43 35 27 
19 11 3 60 52 44 36 
63 55 47 39 31 23 15 
7 62 54 46 38 30 22 
14 6 61 53 45 37 29 
21 13 5 28 20 12 4 
Table A-13 Perinuted Choice 1 
14 17 11 24 1 5 
3 28 15 6 21 10 
23 19 12 4 26 8 
16 7 27 20 13 2 
41 52 31 37 47 55 
30 40 51 45 33 48 
44 49 39 56 34 53 
46 42 50 30 29 32 
Table A-14 Pernitited Choice 2 
ITERATION 
NUMBER 
NUAIBEROF 
LEFTSIIIFTS 
I _ 
2 
3 2 
4 2 
5 2 
6 2 
7 2 
8 2 
9 1 
10 2 
11 2 
12 2 
13 2 
14 2 
15 2 
16 1 
Table A-15 Left Shifts Table 
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Figure B-1 SBtis Timing Chart 
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Figure B-2 Interface Schematic 
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Figure B-3 Processing Board Schematic 
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Figure B-4 RSA Schematic e) 
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Figure B-5 DES Schematic 
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ENCDEC Board Firmware 
File hlult. S 
Language: 68000 Assembly 
Ilis is the finirware stored upon the Procemsing board 
dc. 1 $203M 
dc. 1 $000400 
ds. 1 $fe 
PHYSICAL ADDRESS OF COXIOPONEN-rs 
mem equ $200000 
ramre equ $430001 
ramwr equ $428001 
regre eclu $440000 
latch equ $600001 
desch equ $800000 
dc 
- st2 equ 
$800004 %yriw. 'read dc=dcs command regi-stcr 
dcni-st3 equ SROOO06 write'read don=do, command mod registcr 
dcn-st I equ $900002 write! read dco=dcs config rogi%tor 
mach equ $4100000 
INITIALISE BOMM *** 
move. b RS06, latch -. reset ram counter 
move. b #S9 Ualch . and deschip 
TEST To SEE IF DATAREADY IS SET 
loop: move. b regre, do 
andi. b #SO Ldo 
c1lipi. h NSO I, dO 
bile loop 
MOVE CON-PKTO 6SK I 
str: move. 1 hS200000, i I 
move. b N$02, latch 
move. b #SOO, Iatch 
'CONTROL PACKETS 
RSA 
- 
PACKET DES 1', \CKI-, *. T 
Function Funlion 
Blank 
longth hlod Util 
- Expjength Header 
length him xlm length 
- 
move. b tanire, (a 1)+ Joad con-Pk 
inove. b ramre. (aI)+ 
move. b ranirc. (a 1)+ 
move. b r,, tjiirc. (al)+ 
move. b raiiire. (al)+ 
move. b raiiirc, (al)+ 
Cl [ECK XVI LAT FUNCTION IS RE'QUESTED *** 
move. b S200000, do 
niovcq. b NS07, di 
bw d I, dO 
beq CIS 
bsr rsa 
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andi. b #$7f. S200000 
move. b S200000A0 
chf. subq. b #S0l, dI 
btst d I. dO 
beq C1111 
bsr dess 
andib #Sbf. S200000 
move. b S200000, dO 
chfl: subq. b #S02, dI 
btst d IAO 
beq CIM 
bsr t. -t 
andi. b #Sef, $200000 
move. b S200000A 
chf2: move. b S200000. dO 
andi. b #SID, dO 
beq chf3 
move. w M000.0 
bsr error 
MOVE DATA TO INTRAM 
chf3: Move. w S200004. dO 
move. b 9S02. latch 
moveb #$00. latch 
move. 1 OS20000O. aO 
loop6: move. b (4) ý. ralll%%T Joad intram %%ith 
niove. b (0)+, ratnur mew con-Pk 
move. b (i0)+, rajII%%T 
move. 1i (a0)+. ranI%%T 
move. 1i (aO) ý. ram%%T 
move. b (a0)+. ram%%r 
loop7: move. b (aO)f. ranmr Joad intram %% ith 
move. b (a0)+. raIII%%T 
move. b (4)+. rainwr 
movc. b (n0)+. r. un%%r 
move. b (a0)+. raM%%T 
move. b (a0)+. ram"r 
move. b (a0)+. ranmr 
move. b (a0)+. ram%%r 
sub. %v ftsooox. do -. Cllc jjjcý,,; 
1111i loop7 
skip: move. b M2. latch 
move. b ksoo. latch 
move. b Psol. latch 
SETUP DMA ACCESS 
loopg: move. b regre. L10 %vait for end ofrcad kigmil 
andi. b #$W. do 
cmpi. b MIA 
K-q looP8 
move. b h$03. latch 
nlovc. b Ml, latch 
jmp loop 
What rollows Are Ilic Various Subroutimm 
71is section is used to load new keys into the 
die relevant line ill the memoiy table. At the 
moment each line is 24 bytes long. enough to hold 
I DES key, An IV. and the cuffent working IV for 
on going enci)-ptionldeMption. 
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keyid: movem sr. -(a7) 
movend dO-d7/aO-a6. -(-. x7) 
move. b ASOO, Iatch 
cir di 
move. 1 #S200006, a0 
niove. 1 #$203000, al 
move. b #S18. d0 -. 'Mis indicalu% space available 
move. b $200003. dl 
mulu #SOO18, dI 
adda. 1 dl, al 
move. b dO, d2 
move. 1 al. a2 
move. 1 NS200006. a3 
keyl: rnove. b ranim(al)+ 
sub. b #S01, dO 
bno keyl 
keyll move. b (a2)+. (a3)+ 
sub. b 4SOU2 
bile key12 
movem. 1 (a7)+. dO-d7l,, tO-a6 
Irtr 
test: movem sr. -(a7) 
movend dO-d7/. iO-i6. -(a7) 
movem S200004. d0 
move. 1 #S200006. aO 
UP: move. b ramrc. (; %O)+ 
sub(j. w #so Ldo 
bile tip 
Move. w $200000AU 
move. 1 #S200006. a0 
move. 1 OS200006. al 
tfpl: niove. b (aO)+. dI 
move. b dl. (al)+ 
subilm #SO I, dO 
bile 11PI 
movem. 1 (a7)+. do-dWa0-a6 
rtr 
Mic cry I 2CI02 commands 
lekI equ Sec -. 1-mad Emcnial key 
lek2 equ Sed 
lek3 Cilu See 
IM equ ser 
slkI C(lu Ses -. Select Key 
slk2 Cqu SC9 
slk3 Cilu Sca 
slk4 equ Scb 
nop equ $89 
liv equ sco 
rfv equ Sc2 
des equ S. 18 J)ES on work regi%tcr I 
nve ecb ' equ 
$02 
ecb nud equ $03 
ce-fbg equ Soo 
cd-fbg eclu Sol 
71ia followin g sections deal with DES 
EtiMptiom/Decryption 
dess: movem sr. -(a7) 
movend dO-d7/aO-a6. -(a7) 
move. b S200000, do 
and. b #$20. dO 
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beq dlp2 
bsr kc5, ld 
and. b NSdES200000 
jmp desex 
dlp2: movem S200004. dO 
niove. 1 NS200006, aO 
dlpl: move. b raiiirc. (iO)+ 
sub(l. %v PSOOO I, dO 
bne dipi 
move. b S20000O. dO 
andi. b #SO Ldo 
beq dlp 
nio%, e. b S200000, dO 
andi. b #SO8. dO 
bne dlp 
cIr dO 
movem S200004A 
divu 9SO008. dO 
and. 1 #SIIIITJOOO. Cio 
ror. 1 NS08, dO 
ror. 1 #S08. do 
nio%-c. l #SO8. d3 
sub. %v dO. d3 
move. 1 #S200006. d2 
cir dI 
movem S200004. dl 
add. 1 dIA2 
add. 1 d3. d2 
niove. l d2. aO 
move. ti d3. -(; iO) 
add. w d3. S200004 
dip: move. b 0604.1atch 
Illove. 1) 41$00. S20 I IIA 
nlovo. b NSOO. S201 11.15 
move. b hsoo. latell 
lilo%, c. tl #SOO. (Icill %t3 
gilo%, c. b #s80. (Icil - Nt 
1 -. *1*Iiis %cts tlic ery 1 2c bus %ize 
lum. C. b #s 1 04: 11-NI 1 '1*Ili%* clcilt«% flic rcN'cr%*c Ilit in tlzig2 
cir dO 
movem S200004. do 
divu #$0009. dO 
and. 1 IVS0000111TAO 
move. 1 9$200006. aO 
1110%. C. 1 kS200006. al 
Illove. b S200002. d2 
move. b #$04. d I 
bw dl. d2 
bne Poch 
sub%b NSOIAI 
btst dl, d2 
bne cob 
subq. b #$Ol, dl 
bt: t d IA2 
beq dnx 
move. b NS09. d7 
AV cbC 
dnx: subq. b #SOJ, dl 
btst dl, d2 
beq dnxi 
niove. b #SOa. d7 
jillp Ibc 
stitlq. 11 #$0 I. d I 
btst dl. d2 
beq dii. x2 
move. b *$Ob, d7 
AV Ibc 
dax2: jnip uterr 
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uterr. move. b NSPI1.1101 
i-P uterr 
Electronic codetlook 
non pipelined 
ccb: jsr Ikey 
move. b S200000A 
andi. b #SO8. d2 
bile ecbdec 
ccb encryption 
move. b NSOO, dcrn -0 mo%, t. b #nire-ecb. dc-%t2 
jsr tile 
jimp dcscx 
ccb docr)ption *** 
ecbdec: move. b NSOO. dem .0 
move. b 9nird-ecb. dv-,, t2 
move. b NSIES201 ra-I 
jsr dec 
jillp dewm 
tell pipelined 
pecb: jsr Ikey 
move. b $200000. d2 
andi. b 4SOU2 
We pecbde 
Ccb clict)-ption 
pecbl: move. b NSOO, dvnI-%t3 
rnove. b gee-IbR. dc-. %t2 
move. 1i (al)+. desch 
move. 1l (al)+. dcsch 
nio%, e. b (al)+. dosch 
move. b (al)+. desch 
rnove. b (al)+. desch 
nio%, c. b (al)+. desch 
move. b (al)+. d,: scli 
move. b (al)+. desch 
sululm #$0001. dO 
jsr Clic 
niove. b #SIYS201 fa5 
movem RSOOOO. dO 
jsr talc 
jillp d. %,. x 
pectl decDption 0*0 
pecbde. - nio%, e. b #SOO. dem - st3 move. b #cd_tllg. dc_%t2 
rnove. b (al)+. dsch 
move. b (al)+. d, -, ch 
move. b (al)+, dc%ch 
move. b (al)+. dosch 
move. b (al)+, dowh 
niove. b (a 1) 4-Aesch 
rnove. b (al)+Asch 
rnove. b (al)+, &%ch 
subq. w NSOOOI, dO 
jsr dec 
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pecbl2: move. b 4SIT. S201f. 15 
move. b 4SITS201fa-I 
nlove. w #SOOOl, dO 
jSr dec 
jillp desex 
Cipher block coding 
cbc: jsr Ikey 
Or d5 
niove. b S200000. d4 
andi. b #S02. d4 
beq cbenx 
movem #SOOOS. d5 
j-P cbcnx I 
cbcnx- move. w #SOOIO, d5 
cbcnxl: move. 1 #S20300O. a3 
move. 1 a3. a2 
clr d4 
nio%, e. b S200003. d4 
mulu NS0018. d-l 
adda. 1 d4, a3 
adda. 1 d4, a2 
adda. 1 NS0010. a2 
adda. 1 0.0 
move. b Nliv. dc st2 
niove. b 03)+. tiesch 
Illove. 1l, (D) 4-. dawh 
niove. h (0)+, desch 
niove. b (a3)+, dc%cli 
move. 1i (a3)+, d,: -ch 
movc. b (a3)+. d,!., cli 
move. b, (a3)+, dc4, ch 
nio%, o. b 
move. b S200000. i. 12 -. %%oi-k- out mhethcr encryption 
or d0cryption is retlis ired 
andi. b hSOSA2 
bile clictice 
cbc ellm-ptioll 
cb,. ttx2: move. b V. dcm %t3 
move. b #cc-Il4. dc_%t2 
move. b, (a I )+. d,: %cil 1-*ill. % lite pille 
move. b (a I )+. d,: %cil 
move. 1i (a 1)+Asch 
niove. b (al)+. d,:., cli 
move. b (al)+, dc%ch, 
move. b (a I )+. d,; %cli 
nio%, c. b (al)+, do%ch 
move. b (al)+. &sclj 
Sub(l. w 9; SOOOI. dO 
jsr clic 
niove. b #StI', S20lth3 . Initialise tile memory location 11or movem #SOOOO. dO -, the last read 
jsr enc 
move. b #rfvdc_st2 
move. b d. %cli. (a2)+ 
move. b dosvll. (-. %2)+ 
movc. b de%elQa2)+ 
move. b d,! kcli. (a2)+ 
movc. b desch. (a2)+ 
niove. b d, -., Lli. (a2)+ 
move. b dscll. (a2)+ 
move. b, dcsch. (a2)+ 
jnip desox 
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cbc deMption 
cbcdec: move. b dMan st3 
move. b gcd-flig. dc-st2 
move. b (al)+, dosch 
move. b (al)+, dosch 
move. b (al)+, dcsch 
move. b (al)+, dc.,; ch 
move. b (al)+, dasch 
move. b (al)+, dosch 
move. b (al)+, dcscli 
move. b (al)+, descli 
subq. w #SOOO I. dO 
jsr dec 
cbcnx3: move. b #Sll". S201 fa5 
move. b #Sil', S201 fA 
move. w 4'S0001, dO 
jsr doe 
movo. b #rl'%,, dc-%t2 
move. b desch. (a2)+ 
move. b de%cli. (a2)+ 
nio%, c. b dscli. (a2)+. 
niove. b dcsch. (a2)+ 
nio%, c. b d. %cli. (a2)+ 
movc. b d. %cli. (a2)+ 
niove. b desch. (a2)+ 
nio%, c. b d, %cli. (a2)+. 
jillp desex 
tollip: Illove. h ý$Oolllcll 
jillp tollip 
dosex: move. 1i hS04.1atvh 
tilovo. b 4SOO. $201 11.14 
movc. b #$00, S201 116 
Illove. b ns00.1atch 
Illovem. 1 (a7) ýAO-JTA-a6 
rtr 
Standard cilM-plitiii routing 
enc: 1110%le. w sr. -(a7) 
movend dl-d7/a2-; i6. -(a7) 
move. 1i $201ra%O 
niove. b 9! SOO. S2011.15 
andi. b NSIY. d5 
bile CIIC12 
end: sub. w #SOOO I. dO nimt be herc for mamagýs 
beq encliS ; smaller than 8 bms 
b1s clicx 
enc16: movc. b den st I. d3 
and. b RS68.0 
bile encliS 
movo. b (aI)+. d.: -. 4. b 
move. 11 (a I )+. d,: scli 
nio%, e. b (il)+, d,:. %cll 
Illove. 1l (aI)+, dscjj 
move. b (al)+, desch 
niove. b (al)+. d,,, cll 
move. b (aI)+. d,:, cIj 
move. b (aI)+. dcscjj 
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niove. b #S00.1atch 
end 1: move. b den-st I. d3 
and. b NSSO, J3 
bne uterr 
encl2: move. b den st I. d3 
and. b NS20. d3 
beq cticI2 
cnc13: move. b d, %cli. (aO)+ 
move. b dcsch. (aO)+ 
niove. b dscli, (aO)+ 
move. b dscli. (aO)+ 
move. b d,; sclL(aO)+ 
move. b dcscli. (aO)+ 
move. b dcscii. (aO)+ 
move. b dcsLh. (aO)+ 
jillp cild 
encx: move. b #nop. dc-%t2 
movend (a7)+. dl-d7/a2-aG 
rtr 
Standard decDption routine 
dec: movem sr. -(a7) 
movend dl-d7/. t2-; i6. -(a7) 
nio%, c. b $2011115.0 
niove. b USOO. S20 I r. 15 
andi. b 9SIKA5 
bile dcc12 
decl: illove. b den --tI. d3 
and. b #S(TH. d3 
bile ded 
nio%-c. b (al)+. doch 
movc. b (. 11)4. dcscIl 
tll(lvc. b (aI)+. d,: %vh 
nio%-c. b (al)-i-Ae. wh 
move. b (aI)+. dcsch 
move. 1i (al)*. d. %ch 
nio%-c. b (aI)+. (Icsch 
move. 11 (al)fAcwh 
niove. b #sOolitch 
decil: niove. b den-stIA3 
and. b NSSO, d3 
bile uterr 
dcc12: niove. b doi stIA3 
and. b #SiO. d3 
b, --q dM2 
dcc]3: move. b dosch. (A)+ 
niove. b do. -. %ch. (ao)+ 
move. b dscli, (aO)+ 
niove. b dc. %cli, (aO)+ 
move. b dmli. (aO)+ 
move. b 
move. b dscIL(ao)+ 
niove. b dcsch. (ao)+ 
SAW #SOOO I. dO ; t, -, t num tv 1wra for memages 
bne dod - smaller than 8 b)l%; s 
dccl4: niove. b $200000. dO 
and. b NSOI, dO 
beq dea 
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move. b $201 r., k4. dO 
andi. b MSOI. dO 
beq dccx 
clr dO 
move. b -(aO). dO 
sub. w dO, S200004 
decx: move. b Niiop. dc_st2 
movem. 1 (a7)+. d I -d7/a2-a6 
rtr 
Ilis routine loah; the dus key into the 
chip 
Ikey: move. w sr, -(a7) 
movem. 1 dO-d7/. iO-a6. -(a7) 
Or dl 
move. 1 4S203000.4 
nio%, c. b $200003. dl 
mulu #SOOIX. di 
adda. 1 d LaO 
movc. b #Ickl. dc-. NI2 
move. b (aO)+. d, -s-. ih 
nio%, e. b (aO)+. dc-ch 
niove. b (A)+. dosch 
movo. b (-, %O)+. d,: %cli 
niovc. b (A)+-, doch 
nio%, c. b (,, tO)+. d,:. wlt 
niove. b (aO)+. dc%cli 
movo. b 
movc. b -%t2 
tiio%-c. b ftsdo. latch 
krec: illove. 11 #SaO. d4 
kel: move. 11 doll %13. d3 
awid. b 9S40.0 
bile kox 
subq. b NSOIA4 
bile kel 
kcx: movoin. 1 (a7)1-. dO-d7/. iO-a6 
rtr 
RSA ad dress commands 
abort eclu Sa02OOc 
plend c(lu Sa02OO4 
intim equ Sa02OO6 
intdi cqu Sa02OOc 
start equ Sa02008 
plore equ Sa02OOO 
RSA program commands 
.............. * ...... 
endr equ Soo 
bihniod equ SIO 
IdouO equ $20 
Idoul equ S21 
ldou5 equ $25 
Idou6 equ $26 
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ldin7 equ S37 
Idin5 equ $35 
1din6 equ $36 
Mint) equ $30 
multplo equ $60 
muItpI6 equ $66 
square equ sco 
shrigh equ $90 
shleft equ S90 
expon equ S70 
preset equ SID 
rsa: move. w -r, -(a7) 
movem. 1 dO-d7/. tO-a6. -(a7) 
cn: move. b S200000. dO 
andi. b #S20, dO 
bne keyin 
jillp, rdata 
Tum modulus into 2's compleinciu. 
keyin: andi. b NSdI'. S2OOOOO 
move. w S200004. dO 
move. 1 4S200006, aO load kev 
rip: move. b rinire. (ao)+ 
subq. w 4SOOOI'do 
bne rip 
move. 1 #S202134. aO store the inodUllIN, 
move. 1 ttS200006. al 
niovc. b S200002. do 
rlpl: niove. b (al)+. (ao)4- 
sul)(I. b M IAO 
bile rlpl 
cir dO 
move. 1 #S200006, ao 
lllove. b S200002. dO 
illove. tv dO. d I 
Iniod: tori. b 4'Sfl*. (; 10)+ 
sub(I. I) PSOU0 
bile Iniod 
linod 1: addi. b #SO I. -(aO) 
lice erprog 
subq. b #SOI. d1 
bile 11110di 
nio%, e. %v 9SOOOI. dO 
bsr error 
jillp rox 
erprog: move. b #S08.1atch 
move. b 9SOO. latch 
move. b #SOO'hitell 
move. b #SOO. plorc 
rep: movc. b regro, dO 
movc. b 40S30,1itch 
and. b 4'S02, d0 
beq rep 
move. b #SOO. IltcIl 
move. ] #SaOOOOO. aO 
move. b $200000, dO 
andi. b #S40. d0 
bile 111tild 
*** Load ModulLIS *** 
niove. b #$1'4. (aO)+ ; presel 4 
addq. ] *SO Lao 
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move. b PSIT), (aO)+; preset 0 
add(j. 1 #SOI. aO 
move. b 4Sfc. (aO)+ . proset c 
addq. 1 fisol, no 
move. b #1din7, (a0)+ loadin7 
addq. 1 4$01, ao 
move. b #slirigli, (aO)+ 
add(I. 1 #$OI. aO 
move. b #shrig1i. (a0)+ 
addq. 1 #SOI. aO 
move. b S20OOOl, d4 
cinp. b NSOO, d4 
beq 11111 
IM: niove. b #slIlc11. (, 1O)+ 
addq. 1 #SO I'aO 
addq. b NSOIA4 
cnip. b #$Og, d4 
bne III) 
Im 1: move. b Cnitmod, (aO)+ initmod 
addq. 1 #SOI, aO 
load memage *** 
move. b #SI'4. (aO)+ 
addti. 1 #SOLIO 
move. b #S11O, (aO)+ 
addq. 1 #SOI, aO 
niove. b #Sl'c. (. 10)+ 
addti. 1 #SO LaO 
nio%, e. b N1dinO. (aO)+ 
add+1 PSOI,. IO 
niove. b S20000 1.0 
cnip. b #SOO, dS 
betl We 
cnIp. b #S07. d5 
beq cpl2 
nio%, e. b AS07.0 
sub. b S20000 I. d5 
cpl: move. 11 M-11101. (. 10)* 
add(I. 1 PSO Lao 
sul)(JAI PSO 1.0 
We VIA 
jmp cpl2 
olle: move. b 
addil. 1 NSO Lao 
cpl2: move. b k1d(1I1O. (10)+ 
addti. 1 9SO Lao 
move. b #1di1%O. (aO)+ 
addq. 1 tfso 1,10 
calculation *** 
clr dO 
move. b $200002. do 
niove. b S20000 I, d2 
cnip. b #SO0, d2 
bne 111hit 
mulu #$0008. dO 
jnip 1IxcpI 
mbit: sub. b #SO 1, dO 
mulu #SOOO8. d0 
cir d2 
niove. b S20OOOI. d2 
add. w d2, dO 
rLxcpl: addq #S02. dO 
movem dO. d I 
movem dO. d2 
ror. w NSOR, dO set the presets 
ori. b #proset, dO 
move. b dO. (. tO)+ 
addq. l NSOI. ao 
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ror. w #S04, dl 
ori. b #pr.,. -,: t. dl 
move. b d 1, (aO)+ 
addtl. l Nsol, ao 
ori. b #presot. d2 
nio%, e. b d2. (aO)+ 
addill 4so Lao 
cir dO 
nlo%, e. b S20OOO2. dO 
add. 1 #S200006. dO 
move. 1 dO, a I 
move. b $200003A 
move. b (al)+, dl 
move. b dIA2 
nioveq. b #$O8. d3 bit counter 
nioveq. b #S04, d4 I st nibblc counter 
and. b MOA2 check to see if I in first 
bne lepr nibblo 
subq. b 9S04, d3 
lcpr: subq. b #SO l, d3 
btst d3. d I 
bne lepr2 
subil. b ASO I. d-l 
bile lepr it'no I in rir%t nibblo 
niovc. %v 4SO0O2. dO then %ipal error 
bsr error 
jmp rex 
lcpr2: subq. b kSO U-1 decrement I im-t nibblo counter beq lcpr5 
lepr3: subcl. b kSO l, d3 
b t.. % t d3. d I 
line lcpr4 
movc. b #mju; krc. (a0)+ 
addL1.1 9SO Lao 
svbq. h #SO U4 
tvq lepl-5 
jillp lcpi-3 
lepr4: Illove. 11 t4; quarc. (aO)+ 
addq. 1 ý'O Lao 
addLIA hSO LaO 
. %ubq. 1) ; PSOI. d4 beq lcpr5 
jillp lcpr3 
1, -pr5: cmp. b #SOO. d3 %tall using expoll bno kpr7 command jillp lcprg 
lcpr6: movol) (; il)+. dl 
nio%, c. b dIA2 
ror. b #S04, d2 
andi. b #SOI'. d2 
ori. b #cxpon, d2 
nio%, c. b d2, (iO)+ 
addtl. I #SOI, lO 
lepr7: andi. b NSOUI slore low niblih: 
ori. b #cxpon. d I 
move. b dl. (aO)+ 
addill #SO LaO 
lcpr8: sub(I NSO UO 
bile lepi-6 
cIr dO 
nio%*C. b #Sr4, (-. iO)+ 
addtl. l 4SOLao 
nio%, c. b IýSll. (aO)+ 
addq. 1 #SO I. aO 
nio%, c. b #SITJ. (aO)+ 
addq. 1 iVSO LaO 
move. b #SOS, d5 
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move. b S200001, d0 
add. b #SOI. dO 
sub. b dO. d5 
beq lepre 
righ: move. b #shrigh. (aO)+ 
addq. 1 NSO LaO 
subq. b #SO I. d5 
bile righ 
Icprc: move. b #Idoul, (aO)+ 
adi1q. 1 #SOI, aO 
movel #ciidr, (aO)+ 
addq. 1 #$OI, a0 
jo: movel *SOO, plend. end key memory access 
move. b S200002. dI store modulus ror further 
move. 1 *$200006. aO use 
move. 1 #$202328. al 
move. 1 #SaOlcOO. a2 data-mcm7 oil mach 
Icpr9: move. b (aO), (al)+ 
niovc. b (aO)+. (a2)+ 
addq. 1 4SO1. a2 
subq. b 00 I. d I 
bile lepr9 
movc. b #S82. dI 
sub. b S200002. dI 
Icpra: move. b #SOO. (a2)+ 
add(I. 1 9SO I, a2 
SUNJ. b NSO Ld I 
bile lepra 
jillp rex 
Mu ltiply cryptec h program 
Load Nicidtflus * ** 
muld: andi. b #SI)CS200000 
mull 
move. b 
addtl. l 
nio%-,!. b 
addill 
move. 1i 
addti. 1 
niove. b 
addtl. l 
nio%, c. b 
addtl. l 
1110%. c. b 
addti. 1 
move. b 
cnip. b 
bcq 
nio%, e. b 
addti. 1 
addti. b 
cnip. b 
bne 
mul2: nio%-c. b 
addq I 
load mult A *** 
movc. b 
addtl. l 
nio%, e. t) 
addq. 1 
move. b 
addq. ] 
move. b 
addq. ] 
preset 4 
proset 0 
4 so I. ao 
hSf'c. (; %O) f, 
. 
PSOLIO 
PIdin7. (ao)+ 
h so I., 10 
Nshrigh. (A)+ 
4$0 LaO 
gshrigh. (ao) 4- 
hSOl. aO 
$20000 I, d4 
#SOO. d4 
mul2 
At%lilcll. (aO)+ 
NS01, aO 
NSOJA4 
#S08. d4 
Illul I 
#initmod. (aO)+ 
#SO Lao 
ttSf4. (aO)+ 
4$01, ao 
N$fO. (. 10)+ 
#SO I.. ko 
#SOI,. 10 
#IdiiiO, (aO)+ 
#SO I, ao 
loadin7 
initmod 
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niove. b 
cnip. b 
beq 
cmp. b 
beq 
move. b 
sub. b 
mul3: move. b 
addq. 1 
subq. b 
bne 
jinp 
mone: move. b 
addq. 1 
mul4: move. b 
addq. 1 
load mult B *** 
move. b 
add(I. 1 
movel 
addq. 1 
nio%, c. b 
addtl. l 
move. b 
addcl. 1 
$20000 l, d5 
#SOO, d5 
mone 
#S07, d5 
mul4 
#S07, d5 
S2OOOOl, d5 
#sl)lcll. (aO)+ 
Atsol'ao 
#SOI. d5 
mul3 
IM114 
gslirigli. (aO)+ 
4SO LaO 
#Idt)tiO. (aO)+ 
#SO LaO 
NSf4. (aO)+ 
MIA 
NSID. (10)+ 
ksol'. 10 
4$1'e. (aO)+ 
kso I, ao 
kldi116. (aO)+ 
NSOI,., IO 
nio%, c. b S20000 IX 
cmp. b #SOO. d5 
beq 111010 
cIllp. b NS07,0 
beq nm16 
nio%, e. b 0$07.0 
sub. b S20000 I. d5 
nIU15: Illove. 1l #shIcII. (aO)+ 
addq. 1 #S01,30 
subti. b PSO I. d5 
bile 1111115 
jIllp intaI6 
niono2: Illovol) Vshrigh. (A)+ 
add(J. 1 P so I. aO 
niuI6: Illove. 11 llfdouiS. (A) t- 
addtl. l ý' SO LaO 
Illove. b #Idin6. (a0) 
addil. 1 4SO Lao 
calculation *** 
mulb: 
wonul: 
cir 
lnovc. b 
nio%-c. b 
cliip, b 
bne 
mulu 
jillp 
sub. b 
nlultj 
cir 
nio%, c. b 
add. w 
addq 
MOVC. W 
movem 
ror. w 
ori. b 
niove. b 
addq. 1 
ror. %v 
ori. b 
nio%, e. b 
addti. 1 
ori. b 
move. b 
addq. 1 
dO 
S200002A 
S200001. d2 
9$00. d2 
mull) 
#$0008, dO 
Imilul 
NSOI. dO 
NSOOORAO 
d2 
S20000 IA2 
d2. dO 
il$02, dO 
dO. d I 
dO, d2 
NS08. dO set the pros-ots 
gpr%.. wt, dO 
dO. (aO)+ 
fosol. 10 
PS04. dl 
#prosel, d] 
dl. (aO)+ 
#S01. -nO 
#Prcsct. d2 
d2, (. %O)+ 
NSO Lao 
291 
Appendix B 
move. b #111tlltplo, (aO)+ 
addq. 1 #SO Lao 
Loadout the result *** 
Or dO 
move. b #$f4. (aO)+ 
add(l. 1 #SOI, ao 
move. b #Sfl. (ao)+ 
addq. 1 #Sol. ao 
move. b #SITJ. (aO)+ 
addcl. 1 4SOI. ao 
move. b #SO8, d5 
move. b S200001. do 
add. b kSOI, dO 
sub. b dO. d5 
beq mulo 
iTnul: move. b #shrigh, (aO)+ 
add(I. 1 #S01,10 
subq. b A(SOI, d5 
bile rinul 
mulo: move. 1) #Idoul. (aO)+- 
addL1.1 #SOI.. Io 
nio%, c. b #ciidr. (aO)+ 
addq. I #S01.10 
jillp jo 
En crypt dala *00 
rdata: rnove. b S20000O. dO 
and. b 4'SIO. dO 
bile 111111111 
jillp rec 
mulpl: clr dO 
movem S200004. dO 
illove. 1 #$200006. aO 
nilp: move. b ramrc. (aO)+ 
subtl. w 4soool. do 
bile lillp 
tilove. 1 USA I 800A 
move. 1 #S200006. aO 
rnove. b S200002. do 
mlpr: Illove-11 (aO)+. (a2)+ 
addq. 1 #SOI, a2 
sub(l. b NSOIAO 
bile m1pr 
lllo%, c. %V ;; S20o. do 
sub. b S200002AO 
mlpr2: niove. b #SOO. (. 12)+ 
addq. 1 4SOIA 
subq. %v #SOl. dO 
bile mlpr2 
nlove. 1 #S200006. al 
move. b $200002. dO 
mlp2: niow. b $200002. di modulus longth counter 
bsr med 
andi. b #Scl'. $200000 
Or dI 
move. b S200002, dl 
Ii IMICAV dl. $200004 
jillp M 
rec: Or dO 
inovem S200004, do 
move. 1 #S200006, ao 
Ill: movel ranire, (ao)+ 
subq. w #SOOOI, do 
bile lp 
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move. ] 4S200006. aO 
move. 1 #S200006, al 
11110WAV S200004AO 
rdIp2: move. b S200002. dI 1110dHILIN 1011gth COLIolor 
bsr rsied 
Or d4 
move. b S200002, d4 
subm d4. dO 
bhi rdIp2 
jillp rex 
rex: movem. 1 (a7)+. dO-d7/aO-a6 
nr 
RSA ENCRYPTIONMECRYPTION 
aO - read counter address 
aI= wito counter address 
dO - momage length remaining 
rsaed: movem sr. -(a7) 
move. 1 NS; iOOOOO. a2 
rsa2: nio%-c. b (. iO)+. (a2)+ 
addtl. l tiSOI. a2 
sul)(1.1) #S0I. dl 
bile rsa2 
cir d2 
momb #S82. d2 
sub. b S200002. d2 
rsa9. rnovo. b USOO. (a2)+ 
addq. 1 #SO I. a2 
sub(j. b #SO 1. (12 
bile r%a9 
illove. 11 ftsoo. swrt 
PS60.1atch 
rsa3: lilovo. b r,: gr,:. d2 
and. b #S02. d2 
beq ". 3 
rnovo. b S200002. dl 
move. 1 9Sa004OO. a2 
rnove. b S20000 l. d2 
cnip. b #SOO. d2 
beq e. \Ira 
move. b #SOO. S202580 
move. 1 $$S202581.0 
jillp rsa4 
eAra: Illove. 1 #S202580.0 
rsa4: nlovo. b (a2)+. (a3)+ 
addq. 1 #SO La2 
subq. b #SOl. dl 
bge i -,, a 4 
cir dl 
clr d3 
move. b $200002, d2 
move. 1 #S20258O, a3 iiiost sig b)1c or result 
move. 1 ftS202134A most sis ime orniodUlU. X 
movo. b (a3)+. dl 
and. b NSOI, dl Test cxtra result Imc 
bile large jump to routine %\ iiich deals will, 
a greater result than modulus 
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rsa5: move. b (a4)+. d I 
move. b (a3)+, d3 
cinp. b d 1.0 
bili large 
cnip. b d l, d3 
bne less 
subq. b #SOI, d2 
bne rsa5 
jnip large 
less: move. ] NS202581.0 
movc. b S200002, dl 
lelpl: move. b (a3)+, (al)+ 
subq. b #SOI, dl 
bne ICIPI 
jmp rsax 
large: move. 1 NS202581AI 
cir 0 
move. b S200002.0 
add. 1 d3. d I 
move. 1 #S202328. d2 
add. 1 d3. d2 
move. 1 d I. a2 
move. 1 d2. a3 
moveb S200002. dl 
Or d2 
move. 1 a La4 
Or d6 
move. b S200002A 
add. 1 d6. a4 
add. 1 d6. a I 
IaIP2: add. b -(a3). d2 
add. b -(a2), d2 
bes 1; 111) 
movc. b d2, -(; k4) 
clr d2 
jmp 1.11111 
]alp: 1110%. C. 1) d2. -(a4) 
move. 1) MIA 
lalpl: subtl h t; SOI. dl 
bne lall)2 
rsax: rtr 
error: MoveAv %r. -(a7) 
movem. 1 (a7)+. dl-d7/aO-a6 
move. b PSOCS200001 
movem 9SO000O. S200000 
1110WAV do. S200004 
1110%. C111.1 (a7)+. dl-d7'aO-a6 
nr 
end 
routino for result loLs than 
modulus 
routine for result greater 
than modLlltl% 
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********** ** 
Name: JosephMorrissey 
File: Crypt. h 
Language: C 
Ilis beader file defines the functions used for direct access to 
the ENCDEC board. 
*************************a *****t*$ ** *S**$ $******** 
Affidef CRYPT-11 
#define CRYPT-11 
/* Include Files */ 
Anclude <sys1t), pes. h> 
Anclude <stdio. h> 
#include <fcnt1. h> 
/* Function */ 
#define C RSA OX80 
#define CDES Ox-10 
#define CKEYLD Ox2O 
#define C DECRYPT OX08 
#define C MULTLOAD Ox4O 
#define C MULT OXIO 
#define C TEST OXIO 
#define CPOWER OxO4 
#define C BEGIN OxO2 
#define C-END 0.0 1 
/* Utilities */ 
4define C PECI3 OXIO 
#define C ECII OXOR 
fidefine C CBC OxO4 
#define C OFB OxO2 
#define C_CrB OXO I 
#define C BLANK OXOU 
#define Ch IXX 4000 
#define C-1 I EAD 6 
/* Definit ion afthe generic I'll-packet 
týpcdefst ruct I 
u char function., 
u char crl-. 
u char ;; r2. 
U char cr3. 
u-shon message-I'migth. 
u-char Illessageic-MAXI.. 
)BOARD_DATtV, 
P Print I'Ll-packet to specified filc */ 
void cr)-pt_prinI(BOARF)_D., Vl*A *lid. FILE *out); 
P Read and %%TitC I'll-packet to board */ 
void send - 
to 
- 
board(BOARD_DATA *lid. IFILE $board fd)-, 
void read_f'i-oiii_l)ti. irki(flOAltl)_I), NTA *lid. ru. E *Ixm_rd_fJ); 
/* segment i string for storage within the nic-, %age 
segment of the PB-packet */ 
int mm-%vritc(BO. ARD_DAI*A *bd, u char *ptr. u-illt Icligill. u-ilit off,., s int me,, %-rcad(BOARD_D, %TA *bd. u-char *ptr. u_int hmigth, u_int 
#endif 
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Name: Joseph Nlorri%sey 
File: luarded. 1i 
Language: C 
'Mis file contains all the dechrations for the manipUbtiOn of files 
and data for DES or RSA calculations using the ENCDEC board. 
s. *t*$*$*****$*$t*$s********. s$s$*$ ** *****t* **** 
4iffidef H HARDED 
#def ine H-HARDED 
/* Include f ties */ 
4include <stdio. li> 
#include <sys/types. 1i> 
#include "Iongh" 
fiinclude "crypLh" 
/* Definitions */ 
4define P TEST 10 
#define [iLTF_LENGTII 8000 
/* CRYPTJLAG */ 
#define H ENCRYPT I 
#define H_DECRYPT 0 
/* MODE FLAG*/ 
#define If SINGLE CRYP I 
#define H_DOUBLE-CRYP 0 
/*PROFI LE FLAG$/ 
Mefine If PROFILEI OxO4 
#define 11 PROFILE2 Me 
Mefine 11 PROFILL3 0XIC 
#define If-PROFILE4 We 
/* FRAM EI [EADER DEFAI ILT SIZE 
#define 11 PI 2 
#define 11 P2 3 
#define 11 P3 7 
#define I I-P4 II 
#define II BEGIN I 
#define 11 END 2 
Hefine 11 MIDDLE 3 
#define If-SINGLE 4 
/* Fl [EADER CONTENTS 
#define IIF INJ`0 orr 
_ _ 
0. %20 
#define IIF INF0 U, \IN 
- 
(JxIo 
#define IIFINI'O Tl, \IE OX08 
#define IIF INFO LENGTII 
- 
W4 
#define 11FINFO STATUS 
- 
OX02 
#define 11FINFO COUNTE 
_ - 
R OX0 I 
#define IlF DEF OX00 
/0 INFO&STATIJS FLAG $1 
#define IIST BEGOxIO 
_ bdefine HSTý ENDOxM 
- Mefine flSt SIN 000 
#define H_ERROR 0 
#define H-COMPLETE I 
Mefine li-CONTINUE 2 
/* BOOLEAN VALUES 
#define 11 TRUE I 
#define H-FALSE 0 
1* ERRO RS */ 
#def ine HE OTHER 
#dcf ine HE7LENGTl-l -2 
hVefine HE7NIBBLE 4 
odefing HE7FILE-oPEN .6 
/*Numbor ortests for primility*1 
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#derine HE-PARAM . 15 
4define HE BOARD . 16 
#define HE-FRAME . 17 
/* DES modes */ 
#define HE_ ECB ON01 
#define HE_ CBC OxO2 
#define HE_ OFB 0\04 
#define IIE 
-CFB 
oxog 
#define HD 
_ECB 
OXI I 
Mefine tID 
-CBC 
Ox 12 
#define HD 
-OFB 
OA4 
#define HD 
_CFB 
OX18 
#define BOARD_Nk\IE "/dcv/cncdccO" 
/* RSA key structure 
typedef struct I 
LONG TYPE exp-, 
LONCTYPE mod; 
)H_RSA_KEY; 
/* DES key structure 0/ 
typedef struct I 
LONG TYPE ke)... 
LONG TYPE iv-. 
)11-DES-KEY-. 
/* Data type structure 
typedef struct( 
char *ptd-. 
U-int dIV. 
)11_DATA_TYIIE. 
/* Frame header structure 
t)pedcf struct I 
u-char F_Iicadcr[21-. 
u char F- ilillo - opt.. u char F_inl'o_tjmnj 4 1-. 
u char F_info_timcj4j-. 
u char F_info-length; 
u char F-info statils.. 
u-char F_inflo-counter 
I lF_l IEAD. 
Key Generation Rout inc% 
int ED_pz_%-erifN-(t. ON(. i TYPE 01. u_int ninble-s-t). 
int ED_pz , *1. u int imilitcst. char nibble); _&cn(LON(j_fNTr - int ED_pz_pair TYP[ TYPE 
int ED _gcn(I. 
ON(; 
_ -. 
*prl. I. ON(j_ 
I 
-' *pr2. ujiit length. charch - 111, 
W) 
_pz_kcy__%tcp(LON(. i- 
TY111' . *k 1. LOW-TYPE Ok 2. LON(; _*I*Y 
PE *nnili 1. 
LON(-i_TN*1'1-' . *nm112. char expon)-, 
int ED kcy_load(LONG-TYPE Oexp. LONG-TYPE Omod). 
int ED-multiplyJoad(LONO-1 . YPE 01); 
int ED multiply(LONG TYPE *a. U)NG-TYPE *b. U)NO-TYPE *mml. LA)NO-TYIIC Ores); 
int. ED-GCD(LONO-T-YPE *x. LA)NO_I'YI'E ly, LONG-TYPE Ous); 
Key Storage Routines 
int ED 
- 
kc)filc 
- 
trafo(char*filcnamc. II_RSA KEY $key)-. 
int ED k-eparuct_trarb(char *filetiamc, I I_R! i; %_KEY *key, char ovcr%%Tit,: ); 
EncryptiotiTeen-ption Routines 
int ED_filc_cr), pt(char ci)jit (lap KE *I": I _, char mode-flag. char stuff 
fia& I I-RSA- Yy 
ll_RSA 
- 
KEN' *kcy2. char profilel. char prolil,: 2. char Odatrile-iii, 
char *dallila_out. char overwrile); 
int ED_data_crypt(char crypt_11ag. char modejag. char stuff Ila& 
11 
- 
RSA KEN' *kcy 1,1 I_RSA_KEY *key2. char prof ile 1, char proril,: 2, 
li-Dt%f, %-TYPE*dati_iti. ll_DATA_TYPE*dita out); 
int, ED_filc_dccr)-pt(rILE *data_in. rlJ, E *dala_oul, I I_RSA_KEf Okty. 
char profile), 
int, ED-data_&M. pt(I I-DATA-TYPE *data-in. I I_DATA TYPE *data out. II RSA KEY *key, 
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char prof iie)-. 
int ED_ftle_encr)p1(FILE *dataJi. FILE *data_out. I I_RSA_KEY *kcy. 
char profile): 
int ED_data_cncr)-pt(I J_DATA_TYPE *dmajn. I I-DATA-TYPE *data_OUt. I I_RSA_KEY *key, 
char profile)-. 
Framing Routines 
int ED_unpccljramctN*pc2(char *framc, cluar *data_buf. uJit franic-leligill. 
ti-int *datajenglh. clur firstjranw)-, 
int ED_unpcel_framct)p%: I(char *frame. char *da1a_bL1f ujnt frame-length. 
u-int OdataJength); 
int ED_f coii.,., truct-fraiiiet)-pe2(FILE *datajn. char $frame - 
nag. char *frame. 
u-int rramajength. chir licad. char firs-t-frame). 
int ED_d_construct_framct)pc2(I I_D. -%Ttk_TYI'E *data_in. I I_D. -%TA_TYPE *data-ouL 
u-int frame-length. char licad); 
int ED_f constnict-frametype I (FILE OdataJi. char $framc-fla& char $franic. 
u-int firanic-length. char head); 
int ED_d_construct_framctypcI(I I_DATA-1 . YPE *data_iii, II-DATA_TYPE *data-oUt, 
u int franic-length. char licad)-. 
int ED_unpecl_rramc(char ý'framc. char *dMajiur ujnt *data-length. 
u_int framejength, I IFj IEAD *Ili)-. 
int ED_f Frcatc_framc(FILE *dat-in. char *11ramejag. char *framo. 
u-int rramejength. IIF_IIEAD $11i. uJit p,, ize)-. 
int ED_d_creatc_fraiiic(11_1)ýkTA_TYI'E *data-in. II-DATA_TYPL *data_out. ujnt firame-cOunter. 
u_int data-counur. u_int framejength. IIF_IIEAD *Ili. 
u- int psin. char *11-anw_11ag. u_int 
int *Ih. char *1'ramc. clur *dmajiur. uJit Odmajength. 
u-int firamejength): 
DES runctions 
int ED des key wito to filc(l *dcs. char *11kname. int 
int ED dus kcyjcad_from-lalc(l I-DES-KEY *dc%. char 9iloname)-, 
int ED-dcs-s,: ndkc)'(l 1_1)1: S_KEN' *dcs. char position). 
int ED key(I I -'s _gcncrato_dc. %_ -DE -KEY 
*dcs). 
int ED-dusjilc(int ayptjnock. int %tull* flag. I Od, %. char *datl ih: _in, char *datalliv_out. int overwitc); 
#endif If-ENCDEC 
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/sssssssss**sss*sssssssss**S$$*********** . ssss. s. *s. ** 
Name: Joseph Morrissey 
File: longh 
language: C 
This file contains the function definition% II)r long intoger 
manipulation. 
#ifndef LONG 
-H #define LA)NG If 
/* Include Files */ 
#'include <stdio. h> 
#include <sys/types. h- 
/* Long type structure definition 0/ 
typedef struct I 
u int bill; 
u char negative-. 
u-char "'lluni. 
)LONG-TYPE; 
1* LONG-TYPE manageinent 
void default LT(LONG TYPE "llp): 
void copy_CT(LONG_fYPE flip]. LONGJYPE $I(p2). 
void free LT - inem(LONG-TYPE 
*lip)-. 
void pritýt_LT(LONGJYPE Nip. FILE Optr)-. 
/* T)pe conversion function. % */ 
void -tringto_LT(L0N(s-TYPr *hp, ti-char *ptr. u_int bitlen. ti-char I'wk); 
void LT - 
to-5tring(LONGJYM flip. u_char *string, u-int str-length. char IM)-. 
void uint - 
to 
- 
LT(LOW-TYM flip. u_int i)-. 
void int to - 
LT(LONG_TYPI. *lip. ini i)-, 
void uciýmrjq_LT(L0NG_TYPL flip. u_ehar c)-. 
void ciiir_to_LT(I-()\*(, _*[*N*1'1-', 
"Ilp. char c)-. 
/* Basic mathematical 11mclions */ 
int add - 
l: I'(L0NG_TN' IIE Oltpl. LONG_TYPE, *Itp2. LONG TYPE "res). 
int subtract_L1'(L0NC9_TN'PI1 *IlpI. l. ()N(vjN'PEOllp2. *ros)-. 
int multiply-I. T(LOW-TY111'. flipl. LONG-TY111'. *I1p2. LOW-TYPE. "res): 
int divide LT(LON(jjYm'ý siipi. L0N(1_'I'YPl' *Itp2. LONG-TY111. *r, %). 
int moduFus_LT(L0NG_'I'N'PE *Itpl. LOW-TYPI.. *11p2. LONG-TYM Ore. %), int inc 
- 
LT(LONC i-TNTE. *1111). 
void *itp, u-int it, ). 
/* Bit manipulation */ 
int not - 
LT(LONG_TYPE flip. L0NG-TN*PI-'*rcs)-. 
int or LT(U)NG_1*YPE *Itpl. l-0N(; _TN'IIr 
"Itp2. LONG-ITlIr Or'. q. 
int aQ LT(LONG_TYPE "Ilp 1. LONE e_TYPI: *IIP2. LON(j-TYPE Ores). 
int r%liiTI - 
LT(LONC-TYPE flip. int 1.1. ()N(o_I'YI'E *rus)-. 
int I-%hift_LT(L0NG-TYPI1 *lip. int 1. LONG-TYM "'res). 
/* Logical tests */ 
U-int greater - 
than_LT(LONG-TYPE *Itpi. LONO-TYPE fltp2)ý 
u- int Im_than_LT(IA)NG_TYPE *Itpl. IA)NU_TYPr *Itp2). 
u_int equal_LT(LONG-TYPE *lip I. LONG-TYPE Oltp2), 
u-int not-eqmI_LT(L0NO-1 . YPE $Itpl. LONG-TYPE *Itp2)-. 
/* Advanced mathematical runctions */ 
int rnod_. power_LT(U)NG-TYPE *lip, LONG-TYPE *I, LONG_TYPE Imod, LONG Or 
int GCD(LONG TYPE Ox, LONG_TYPE *y. L0NG_1 YPE "res). 
int INVERSE(ILNG-TYPE *x, LOW 
-I. 
YVE *it. LONG 
T 
TYPE Ores); 
void updi1e(LONG-TYPE ly. LONG-TYPE "a. LONO-TYPE *b)-. 
/* String manipul ition */ 
u-int in b)1cs(u_int bill); 
U-ilit fiýid bitlcn(u_ch. kr *p1r. u_int length)-. 
u-char striiTd(u_char *., Ir. u_int pos)-. 
#endif 
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** ******$ **$**S$* **** ******$ 
II 
Name: JOSCIIII MOITiSSCY 
File: organism. h 
Language: C++ 
H This header file contains daclarations for 
the clim organism that describe% a genetic 
problem solver. 
#ifn&f H-ORGANIS&I 
#define H_ORGANISM 
// Include Files 
#include rstreanth 
#include -c: \tc\gcn_cpp\Lhr. h" 
typedef unsigned int u- int.. 
typedef unsigned char u-char. 
class ORGANISM 
public: 
CHROMOSOME *gellotype.. 
U-int no-of-chromo%om%%-. 
CONSTRUCTORS 
itiling ORGVNISNI(void). 
01MANISM(ORGANISM &o)-. 
ORG, VNIS, M(CIIRO\IOSo. %Ir 
DESTRUCTOR 
-ORC; ANIS. \I(vt)id)*. 
GET FUNCTIONS 
inline U-int 
infing u-illt 
inline double 
inline double 
inline double 
inline BINARY 
H SET FLNCTIONS 
inline void 
infill'! void 
inline void 
inline void 
void 
PRINT FUNCTION 
chr. 11-illt gen)-. 
chr. u-illt 
chr. LI-iiii 
Chr. LI_illt ßC11), 
Set I'mulat ion(u_ int dir. u_int gon. double pm): 
Set 11crossovolu_int chr. u_int gen. dotahlo 11c). 
chr. ujnt gen. double lit). 
SoGenc(tijnt chr. u_int gen. BINARY 
Set Random( 
void prinl(o%tream& out - COLit)*. 
OPERATOR 
ORGAMSM& operator=(ORGANISM &, o)-, 
FRIEND FL TNCTION 
friend ostrcani& operator - (ostrcam& o. 01MANISM& org)-, 
friend istream& olicrator (istrcam& i. 0WANISM& or&); 
#endif 
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H Name: Joseph Morrissey # Files: chromosome 
fl Language: C++ 
# 11is Imider file contains dcclar. itions 
a genetic orgmisim chromo-111- 
#ifndef H_CIIR 
#define H_CIIR 
// Include Files 
Anclude "61c\gen_cpp\binary. h" 
typedef unsigned int U-int. 
typedef unsigned char u-char 
class CHROMOSOME I 
BINARY *gone. 
u int no-or 9cim';.. 
double *V111LItatiow. 
double Opmw%ovm. 
double III tII csq 
public: 
CONSTRUCTORS 
inline CI IROMOSOXIE(void),. 
Cl IROMOSOXIE(Cl IROMOSOME &C)*. 
Cl lROMOSOME(BINARY *b. u_int ng. doublo *pm. double *pc. double *11t)-. 
DESTRUCTOR 
-C1 IROMOSOX117(void)-. 
GET FUNCTIONS 
inline u int UctNoOll icncs(void). 
infine double (killmut. 11ioll(II-int 
inlino double Octi'vrossover(u_int gen)-. 
inline double 6&1-1161"ý, (ujilt gen)*. 
inline BINARY (letGene(ti-int gm). 
SET FUNCTIONS 
inline void Set Pintitat ion(uji it gen. double lim)-. 
inline void Set Perossover(tij nt gen. double pe). 
inline void setritncý,, (L, -im gen. 
dtitime iit).. 
inline void SaGene(uJit gen. IIINARY&bin). 
inline void Set gn). 
fl PRINT Fl TNCTION 
void print(oslream& out = cout): 
OPERATOR 
CHROMOSOME& olier. it4)r=(CIIIZoXIOSOXII-'&c). 
H GENETIC FUNCTIONS 
U-int AlleleMulation(void). 
FRIEND FUNCTION 
friend oNtrcam& operator - (o%treani& o. Cl IROMOSOMM c). 
friend 6trcam& olicrator- (i%trc; iiii&i. CilltO. \IOSo, \IE&c)-, 
#endif 
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H Name: Joseph Morrissey 
fl File: binary. h 
H Unguage: C++ 
fl 
H 'Mis File contains the declarations for a class 
of long binary bitstrings. 
H 
#ifndef 11 BINARY 
#def ine H_BINARY 
#include estdio. lf> 
#include <iostream. h'- 
typedef unsigned char u- char 
typedef unsigned int U-inl. 
class BINARY I 
public: 
u char *bit.,; -. 
u int 
H Constructors 
inline BINARY(void); 
BINARY(IIINARY &bit)*. 
BINARY(u-char *hit. U-int 110-bits). 
H Destructors 
inline -IIINARY(void). 
H Bit Manipulation Functions 
void SkAllit(U-ilitSet. U-ill, hit-, W)'. 
u int Clefflit(u-int Ilit-no).. 
V-0ýid Random(icnerator(u-int 1n)'. 
H Operator 0%, crloa&-; 
BINARY& operator=(IIINARY& b)-. 
H Other Functions 
void priw(ostreani& out -vx)ut)-. 
//Friendly Functions 
friend imream& operator - (imrcam& i. BINARY& b). 
friend ostrcam& operator - (ostream& o. BINARY& b); 
H Inline Functions 
inline int GaNoBils(void). 
U-int GetAliViiiietilCoit. %taiit(ti_iiiI hiflmgth)ý 
#endif 
// 
Name: JOW1111 XIOITi, -SCý' 
File: randonfli 
Unguage: C++ 
'Mis header file contains the declarations 
for the random number gencration function. 
Niffidef H RANDOM 
#define III RANDOM 
#define RANMAN20000 
void init-rind(void); 
double random_doubl,. jvoid)-. 
unsigned int flip(double probability). 
unsigned int md(unsigncd int Ik)%%cr. unsignod int upper); 
#cndif 
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S.,. 
// 
fl Name: Joseph Xlorrisscy 
# File: scalo. 11 
/I Language: C++ 
fl 
# This header file contaim the doclaratiom; 
# necmary for scaling functions 
#ifndef 11 SCALE 
- #define H SCALE 
H Include files 
#include "c: \W&en_cpp1, or&. h" 
// Scaling constants 
const double CNIULT=2.0; 
const double FACTORI-1.0; 
const double FACTOR2=0.0. 
struct fitness stat I 
double max-fitnos. min-11wem;. m-g-fianss. %umfitnes';. 
// Scaling fulictiolis 
void Linew &I*stat. doublo &-ractorl. double &I'a4; tor2)-. 
double LincarScalc(dotihhý I'actor I. douhh: fiwtor2. doub1c l`itnc,; )-. 
fitness-sut *tlrg_ptr. unsigied int lu)pulation. 
unsignod int unsigned int &cnc_ntI)-. 
void Fill FitimmStat(O RC UNISM *org_ptr. unsigned hit Vopuhttion. 
mr. -igncd int chr-no. unsigncd int gole-1141.6111cm-A-maM f%t. 1t). 
#ctidir 
II 
Name: Joseph Mon. i. "ey 
File: titility. 11 
Unguage: C++ 
This hador rile contains mi%collanomm 
declarations for useful flunctions 
#ifiidcf 11 MILITY 
#define 11-IMLITY 
H Include riles 
#include <Stdio. 11 
Ninclude - fiaream. 11 
// Typedef declarations 
typedef un,; igned int to - 
illt; 
typedef unsigned char u-char. 
Functions 
u int ill-II)iCS(II-int 
U-int find hill on(u_char *ptr. u_int longth); 
u- char strijTd(u-char mr, u_int ptx-; )-. 
int upchar(char &ptr)-, 
void to-upper(char *. %tr_ptr). 
void print-binar)1ofstream &oulfila. unsigned int num1wr)-. 
kodif 
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I/ Name: Joseph Morrissey 
File: 11001 
Unguage: C++ 
Ilis headcr file contain.,; the declaration% 
for net. cpp. Which contains; the functions 
for using the nodc class to Sencrate IWUral 
H networks 
Wridef H NET 
#define H_NET 
Ninclude <iostreanflf, 
Criclude "c: \tc\jieu_cpjýjiode. h" 
typedef unsigned int ti - 
int.. 
typedef unsigned char u-char; 
class net 
private: 
nodc 0110de li. %t-. 
u int no nols. 
u int no stimulators; 
u int no thinkers-. 
U-int nojcslionders; 
public: 
//Coti%lructors 
inlinc nct(void)-. 
net(net &, n). 
net(nodc *li%t, u-int no. u-int no-m. u-int no-th. u_int no-us); 
//Ekstructor 
-net(void); 
/Alseful creation runctions 
void &i)-. 
void ConnectionList(int nodc%131. int *$Ii%t. int *no-ip); 
net &olicralor=(nct &n)-. 
flPrint Funoions 
void Prinl(ostrcanl& out = cout). 
//Neural Functions 
inline 11 int 
infine u int GaNo'Minkcrs(void): 
infine u int 
void Set Randoin(void). 
void I Ilidatel'all Comwet ion. q void). 
void Calcu lateNclOutimt(void); 
void SdStimulus(douhle *stim). 
void (velOwlitit(doublo *reslumsc). 
virtual void learn(doublo *expectod-oullitit), 
//Odi-. -r Functions 
friend osircam& operator (owcam& %. net& n)-. 
friend istream& operator (i. %tream& i. net&, n)-. 
#cndif 
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fl Name: Joseph hlorri. tKey 
fl File: node. h 
H Language: C++ 
fl 
fl This header file contains the &clarations 
fl for node. cpp. Which make tip the nodo 
H functional ity for neural networks. 
Mndef H NODE 
Hefine H_NODE 
H Include files 
#include "6tc\neu_cWpa1h. h" 
typedef unsigned int U-int; 
typedef unsigned char u-char. 
class node 
public: 
U int node id. 
double threshold: 
double oulpill. 
path *i11pUt. 
unsigned int 110-111puls'. 
//CONSTRUCTORS 
inline node(void). 
node(node &, it). 
node(u_int id. doublo 1. path *i. u-int 
MESTRUCTOR 
-tiodc(%-oid)-. 
//PRINT wNcTIONS 
void print(ostreanM mit = cout). 
POPERATOR 1-IINCTIONS 
node &, operator=(node &it)-. 
UNEURAL FUNCTIONS 
void SciThro,, hold(doublo value 0.0, u_int xet-o)- 
void Updalchiptils(nodc 
double StI111111puts(void): 
void NotleOtnpul(void). 
virtual dOUNC JIL1111); 
#include -iostrcam. 1i 
ostrearn& operator- -- (ostreani& s. node& it). 
istrearn& opcrator - -(istrcam& i. nodo& it). 
kndif 
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fl 
H Name: Joxcph Xlorriswy 
# File: path. h 
H Language: C++ 
H 
H Wis header file contains declarations for 
# path. cpp. Which provides the inrormation 
fl for connecting nodes. 
Affidef H PATI I 
#define I-f-PATI I 
//Include files 
#include <filreatiflf- 
#include "c: \tc\nau_cpp\node. h" 
typedef unsigned int u-int; 
typedef unsigned char ti-char. 
class path 
public: 
u int node-U. 
double *ip-. 
double wCight.. 
double %, arl-. 
XONSTRUCTORS 
itiline path(void)-. 
inline Path(Path &, p)-. 
infine palh(tijiit iik)d,: _id. 
double 
YDESTR UCTORS 
-path(void)-. 
//PRINT FUNCTIONS 
void priul(ostream& out ý COUQ'. 
//GET FUNCTIONS 
inline U-illt 
//OPERATORS 
path& operator-( 
/INEURAL FUNCTIONS 
void 
infille void 
inline 
getjoot(void) I reltim (tiodc_id)-. 
path &1))-. 
SaWeight(doublo %. afLl,: =O. O. uJill sct-o); 
Connectilath(double* ptr); 
double IlathOmpul(void)-. 
#include - iostreanfli - 
os-treanA operator -- (o, tream& s. path& p)-. 
istreann& operator - ýistrcam& L patIM p). 
#endif 
310 
Appendix C 
Software RSA Functions 
311 
Appendix C 
/J*******8$8*$s********t$************$******* 
II 
# Name: . 10%01111 X101'rilQ), 
File: enedoc. 11 
Language: C 
fl This header file contains the declarations 
# for encdec. c. which contains the runctions. 
9 that provide the sime functionality as the 
9 encdec board provides 
#ifndef H ENCDEC 
#define H-ENCDEC 
#include <stdio. li> 
hinclude "long. ])" 
#define EC P TEST 10 
#define ECJEJF-LENGTlI 8000 
/*CRYPT FLAG*/ 
#define EC ENCRYPT I 
#define ECDECRYPT 0 
MIODE FLAG*/ 
#define EC SINGLE CRYP I 
- #define 
_CRYPO 
EC7D0UBLE 
/*rROFILE FLAW/ 
#define cc PROFILEI OxO4 
#define EC PR0I-*ILE2 OxOC 
Mdefine EC PROFILD OxIc 
#define EC-PROHLE-1 Ox3c 
1$FPAWE I [EADER DEFAULT SIZI. 01 
#define EC PI 2 
#define EC P2 3 
#define EC 113 7 
- #define EC P4 11 
#define EC BEGIN I 
#define ECEND 2 
Ndefine EC MIDDLE 3 
#define ECSINGLE 4 
/*FIIEADERCON, rEN'I*S*, ' 
#define ECF INFO OPT O. x2O 
#define ECI . 
_lNrO_I',, 
\IN OxIo 
#define ECF INI`0 TIME OXON 
- #define LENGTII OxO4 ECCINI70 
- #define ECCINFO STXI'IIS ON02 
#define ECF_INFO_COUNTER OX01 
/*INFO&STATIIS FLAW/ 
#define ECST_BEO OXIO 
#define ECST_END Ox2O 
#define ECST_SIN OX30 
Ndefine EC ERROR 0 
#define EC7CO, \IPLLI'E I 
#define EC-CONTINUE 2 
PBOOLEAN VALITES*/ 
Ndefine EC TRUE 
#define EC7FALSE 
/*EP, RORS*/ 
#dcrtne ECE o, rilER 
l*Numlicr ort. %ts for primality*/ 
Hefine ECE LENGTH -2 
#define ECE7NIBBLE -4 
Mefine ECE7FILE OPEN -6 
Ndefine ECE PARiM -15 
#define ECE7FRAME -16 
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typedef struct I 
LONG 
- 
TYPE exp. 
LONG-TYPE Illod. 
)EC-RSA-KEY; 
typedefstruct( 
char *ptd. 
U-int dlg,. 
)EC-DATA_TYPE; 
typedef struct ( 
u- char F-headerl2l. 
u-char F- info - opt. u- char F info_umnj4j-. 
u-char Finro-time141-. 
U-char F-inro-length. 
u- char F- inro-stalus. 
ti-rhar Fjnro_counter. 
)ECF_HEAD, 
int EC_pz_%, erir)-(LONG-TYI'E $1. u-int ninlitst). 
int EC_pz_gen(LONG-1 . YPE $1. u-int ninhim. char nibb1c)-. 
int EC_pz_pair_gcn(LON(s_TYPE *pd. LON(t_'I'N*I'E *pr2. uJit longth. char d1_n1txj)-. 
int EC_pý_kevstep(LONG rN*IIE *kI. LONG TYPE *k2. LONG TNTE *nnilil. 
L6NG 
- 
TYPE *nmb2. -dmr expon). 
int EC 
- 
keyfile 
- 
trarti(char *111crianw. EC_RS. X_KEY *key)-. 
int EC keystruct 
- 
trallo(charfliloiamo. LC_IZSA_KEN" Okey. char twom rite). 
int EC7filo_cryp1(clwr cryp(jag. char modcjlag. char stulfjbg. EC-IZSA-Kl'-. Y *kcyl. 
E. C 
- 
RSA KEX *kov2. char profilol. char profiW. char *datfile-in, 
char *d. itFilo-out. d; ar overwitc)-. 
int EC-dati_MTI(char crypt_Ilag. char modoJag. Oiar stull* ILI& 
1-'C-IZS; %-KI: N' *kcvl. I: C-lt. %A-Kl'. Y *kcv2. char profilcl. Char proill,: 2. 
*dMaji. . YIT. 
int EC_fi1o_dccDp1(FIl. E, *dauji. FILE Odata_out. EC_RSA_KEW *key. 
char profile). 
int EC daIa_dempt(rC_DXI*A . IWITOdata in. EIC DATA TYPI"data out. I. C RSA -Y* kuy. -KE char proll1c). 
int *dala-in. FILE *data_titit. *key. 
char profilc)-. 
int EC-d. tta_ciiM. pt(EC_I).. X'I", X-1*N'1'1-', *dati-in. I: C_DA1'A-, rN, m-, sdaia-otit. *kay, 
char profile): 
int *Ihmw. char *Jaw bur. u- int thimo-length. 
gth. char ýir% u int *(lata-len .I 
int EC-u upce1ji-anict ype I C.. liar *firamo. diar *Jata-hull ti-int firamc-lengtli. 
u_int *dalajength). 
int EC-f! Coii. %Inict-f'raiiiciý, pc2(1: 11.1. *dma-itL char Ofiramc-lla& char Orrame. 
- 
g1h. ch. u-int firame len ar head. char first franic); 
int EC_d_cotisti-tiý. i_f*i-; iiiiet%pc2(1'. C_I).. k*l', k_*I'N'I'E *datajn. EC. 
-DATA-TYPIL 
Odata-cotit. 
uJit rr. micJoigth. char licad). 
int EC_f commict-firatmetyPe I (FI LE *d. tta_in, char $11ramejas, char *framc. 
tijnt firamc_length. char head); 
int EC_d_constnicI_1'ramcI)pe I (I-. C_I).. %TA_TYI'I-*. *data_in. 1,. c-r). XTA_TN*I'E odata_oUt. 
uJit firamcJoigth. char head)-. 
int EC-Unpocljramo(char *rramc. char Odata-hur. u-int *data-loigillý 
u_int frame 
- 
1-mg1h. ECr_I IEAD *Ili)-. 
int EC-f creatc_11rame(FILE1 *dal-im char *rrimoJag. char *firamo. 
uJit frame length. ECF I MAD $Ih. u_inI psizc); 
int EC_d_creatc_fr; iiiie(EC_I), VI'A_fN'1'1-. *datajii. EC_I)ATA-'I*N'Ilr sdata-out. u-int franw-counw. 
u_int data_COLMIer. u_int firailic-length. l7CF_1 ICAD 011). 
uJit psize. char *rran%o_lIa& uJit 
int EC remove framelicader(ECr I IE. AD Mi. char *rramo. char *data buf uitdt. ----. - 11 
0a 3-loicill, 
u-int framejength): 
int EC-fIl_franic(ECF_I IEAD *Ih. char Ofirame. char Odam_bul. uJill rramejengt1j); 
#cndif H_ENCDEC 
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I 
# Name: Joseph Morrissey 
H File: encdec. li 
# Languige: C++ 
I/ 'Mi s header file contains the declarations 
I/ for enedec. cpp. %%hich contains the I'mictions 
H that provide Ilic samc functionality as the 
H encdoc board provides 
#ifndef H ENCDEC 
#define H-ENCDEC 
Minclude <fstreani. h: - 
#include "Long. h" 
typedef unsigned int u- int. 
typedef umsigiod char ti-char 
Hefine P TEST 10 hNumbor of wstx for primality 
#define CUF_LENGTll 8000 
//CRYPT FLAG 
#define ENCRYPT I 
#dcfint DECRYPT 0 
MOODE FLAG 
#derjne SINGLE CRY11 
#ddinc DOUBLE-CRYP 0 
//PROFILE FIAG 
#dcrine PRO171LEI OxO4 
#dcrint PROFILE2 ONOC 
#dernic PROFILE3 ONIC 
#define PROFILE4 ox3c 
//FRANIE I IEADER F)rl-*, \I! Ll* SIZE 
#derme I'l 2 
#dcfjtie 112 3 
#deline P3 7 
#dcrine P4 II 
#derine BEGIN I 
#cIefine END 2 
#derine MIDDLE 3 
#define SINGLE 4 
/IFIIEADERCONTEN-rs 
#define F INFO OPT 
- 
0. \20 
#define F7lNrO 11, \IN OXIO 
#define F INFO TIME 
- 
MR 
#define CINFO LENGTI I 
- - 
OxO4 
#dcrkne ý INM STAIII. S OxO2 
#define F_INFO_COLT\'l*Elt oxo I 
//INFO&STAIIIS FLAG 
#define ST BEG OxIO 
#define Sf-END O. x2O 
#define Sf-SIN 000 
#define ERROR 
#define COMPLETE 
#define CONTINUE 
//BOOLEAN VALUES 
#derme TRUE I 
Nderine FALSE 0 
//ERRORS 
#define E OTHER .1 
#define E LENGTI 1 .2 
Ndefine CNIBBLE 4 
#define E7FILE OPEN -6 
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#define E PARMI -15 
#derine E: FRk, \IE -16 
stnict RSA KEY I 
LOKIG 
- 
TYPE cxp-. 
LONG-TYPE Illod; 
struct DATA - 
TYPEJ 
char *ptd. 
U-int dlg-, 
stnict F HEAD I - u char F_Iieadcr[21-. 
u-char F- illro opt. 
u char F 
u char F7iiit*o tisiicl4l-. 
u_char F-info - 
longth-, 
u- char F_hillb %tatu%*, 
u char F-hirki-countor. 
# Key Generation Routines 
int EC_pýý_vcriýNýLONG_l I Yllr &I. to-int 1111111to"t).. 
int EC_pz_geti(LONG 
- 
TYPE &I, u_int nnibtest. char nibble): 
int EC_pz mod _piir-r, cn(LONG - 
TYPE &, prl. LONG-l NIT &, pr2. ti-int length. charch- 
_pz_k-cy_slop(I, 
ONG_I'N*VE &, ki. LONG-TNTE&U. 1, ()N(t-*I'YI'E MullIll. ifit EC I, 
LON(j-T%Tr &mul)2. char expon); 
// Key Storage Routines 
int EC keyfile trall)(char *111, mamo. IZSA_K]-N' &tcy)-. 
int EC7kcystm-ct_traro(char Ofilomnic. IZS.. %_Kr. Y &key. char overwitc). 
H Encryption/Docr)-ption Routim-, 
int EC-filo-crYpt(char cryp1jag. char modejag. char stuff 11.1g. RSA_KEY K-keyl. 
RSA KEN' &kc)-2. char profitc 1. char prolil.: 2. char *dattalc-im 
char-; datflIc_out. charown%ritc); 
int EC-data_crvpt(charct)-pt flag. charmodo flagcharstull' flag, 
RSA KEY&-kcyl. RSA Kl-'Y&, k%: %. 2. char profild. char profilc2. 
DATA-111'r &d. ita-in. DXlA-TYVI-*. &d. kta_ouI)-. 
int EC_fiIc_dccr)l)t(f. sIrcam &data-in. Immun &data-out. RSA-KE. y &, key. 
char profilo): 
int EC-data_dcci-ý-pi(I)ATA_*I'N'1'1-*. &Jala. 
-in. 
DATA-TNTE. &, dala-oulL RSA_KEY &key. 
char profile)-. 
itit EC-filo-encrypt(Istream &LImajo. Istream &d. ita-mit. RSA-KEY Ucy. 
char proI114. 
int EC-dala_ciicrýPI(I)XI'A_'I*N'1'1-' . &daIa_in. D. VI*A-, ryi, E, &ttata-otit. IZSA_KrY &key. 
char profile)-. 
// Framing Routines 
int *11rime. char Nata_btif. ujiit 1ramoJaigtIL 
u int *data length. char 1`ir%t_I*ram,: )-. 
int EC unpecl_Frametypel- bul. u intrialm: length. . 
(char *firamc. char *data_ 
ii-int *data-Icng1h)-. 
int EC-coti. %lni4. t-fraiii%: týPc2(1'-., trcaiii &data_in. char Orrame-flag, char Ofirallic. 
u-int frame-length. char licad); 
int EC-coii%tnict-l'ratticiý. pc2(1)i%TA_1 . YPE &datajii. DATA-TYPE, &J, da-mit, 
u-int firamejength. char hend)-, 
int EC-Coii%tnict-fraiiicl)pi: l(rsircaiii &, datajn. char *rramc_Ila& char $11rame. 
u-int frame-kngth. char head)-. 
int EC-coii,; truct-fraiiietý*P, i(t)xrA-TYI'E &dmajit. DATA-TYPE &data-out. 
u-int framoJength. char licad); 
int EC-Unpeel-firame(char *framc. char Odala_bur. uJit IdataJoistli. 
uJit firamejength, F_l [EAD Mh). 
int EC-create-frainelfistream &dat-in. char *rrinw-fla& char *franw. 
u int rrame-length, char head. uJit psize); 
int EC_cre,. kto f&nc(DATA TYPE &data_in. DATA TYPE &data out, u int rrame 
-poulit'; uJit data_counter. u-int framejength. F_l I EAD Mi, 
u_int psizc. char *rramoJag. u_int 
int EC_rcmovc_rramchcad,: r(F I lEAD Mb. char *rrimc. char *data bur u int $, Lita III 
-U 
JUI]k. 
U- int framejongth)-. 
int EC-fill-frame(F-1 MAO MIL char *frame. char *dala_bur U-int rranw-kngth)-. 
#cndif II-ENCDEC 
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Name: JOWPI) MOITiSSCY 
File: long. 11 
Language: C++ 
71is header rile contains the declarations 
for long. cpp. Which contains the functions 
for long integer calculations using the 
LONG-TYPE 
#ifndef LONG_H 
#define WNG-11 
#include <iostream. h`- 
qpedef unsigned int 11 - 
int. 
typedef unsigned char u-char. 
clam LA)NG_TYPE 
public: 
u int b1n., 
u char negative.. 
u char *11uni.. 
/[Default constructor 
LONG-I 
H lock -I prevents elimination ol'uro. bellirc NISig I 
LONG_TN'PE(u_clmr *ptr. u_ijil loigth. ti_char lock = oy 
//Clone - copy constnictor 
LONG-1 . YPE(const LONL; 
_TN'I'17. 
t- It). 
fiDestructor 
-LONG-TYPE(void). 
//Conversion Constnictor 
LONOJITF(ti-char c)-. 
LONG-1 . YPE(II-int i)-. 
LONG-TYPE(char c)-. 
LONC; 
_I*YI'E(iiit 
i), 
//Operators 
LONG-TYPE &-opcrator=(IONG_*I*YP17& I)-. 
u char opcratorjj(u_int i)-. LF)NG TYPE operalor-(void)-, 
LONG 
- 
TYPE opcrator+(I. ONG_'I*YPF& 1); 
LONG 
- 
TYPE operator-(LONU - 
TYPE& I)-. 
LONG TYPE opcrator*(LON(', _l 
.y 1). 
LONG TYPE operator, '(I. ONG_TYP17& I)-. 
LONG TYPE 
- operatorO. 
(LONke I)-. 
LONG TYIT operator: (LONG TN-m-, & 1). 
LONG 
- 
TYPE operaloM(IM15 I. NTE& 1). 
LONG 
- 
TN. pc operator (LONd Tyrr& 1). LONG 
- 
TYPE operator (IA)N(. o - 
TYPE& 1).. 
LONG-TYPE &op,: r; %tor++(int). 
LONG_TYPE &opcrator! -0. OW -I. 
NIT& D.. 
LONG-TYPE &operalor$-(LONG 
- 
TYPEA I); 
LONG 
- 
TYPE &opcrato0, -(I. ON0 TYPEA I)-. 
Lk)N0-TYPE &opcrator&=(LON6_TYPr& I)-. 
I/Logical Operators 
u- int operator-(LONG 
- 
TYPE& 1). 
u- int opcrator! -(LON(-s_l'YPE& I)-. 
u- int opcrator: ýLONG 
- 
TYPE& 1))-. 
U-int o1wrator: (LONG_ .I. YPIA b)-. 
void Io-string(ujimr *. %tring. u_int mr-longth. char fill-0); LONG-TYPE modjxi%ver(IONO_TYIT M. Lo, \(I_I*YI'E &mood). 
void print(ostream &out - coul)-. 
void gCl)_l0llgjlUmbcr(u_int 1n); 
//Get Characterislic 
hillne U-int gcl_lcngth(void), 
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infine u-char* getjiumber(void). 
flSet, Chuacterisfic 
infille u- char get - sign(void); infille void set-longth(LI-int III)-. 
LONG TYPE GCD(ION(; TYrr &, x. LONG -IIYPE&, Y)*. LON07TYPE INVCRSF(L(-)Nc,. 
--rym7 
&-a. LONG-l . YPE &ti)-. 
//Misc Functions 
void updatc(LONG-TYPE &),. LONG-TYPI. &a. LONG_-rN-PE &b)-. 
u- int in b)Ies(u_int b1n); 
u-int fu7d_bitlcn(u_char *ptr. u_int Icnglh). 
u-char strind(u_char g1r, u_int pos)-, 
#endif 
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Sofihvare DES Functions 
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*****. $**$*. s*** ******** 
// 
H Name: Joseph hlorri%sey 
H File: ds. h 
H Language: C 
H 
fl This header file contai ns the doclarations 
H for long. cpp. Which cowain% the imictiom 
for DES calculatiom. 
#ifndef DES-11 
#define DES-11 
#define SD ECB OX01 
#define Sl)ýCBC 
- 
OxO2 
#define Sb OFB OxO4 
#define SE) CFB oxog 
#define SDES ENC ON01 
#define SDES-DEC ONOO 
#dcrine SDES OTIIE. lk .1 
9define SDES_FlLE-Ol, FN -2 
t)pcdcf struct I 
unsigned chir 
Unsigned chir 
SDES_KEY. 
t)pedef struct I 
unsigned char 
unsigned int Ing. 
SDES_D. -%TA; 
int EC_data-d,:. wr)-p, (sm. sj)xrA *daw-OU1. Sl)l: ', S_I)A-rA *data-in. SDLS_KEY Od, %Lvy. 
unsigned char ci). pt_mt%k. unsigned char cryptjlagý. 
int EC_clcctrt)iiic-ctldk: llt)ok(Sl)l-. S-I)wvrA *dala-out. SDES-DATA *data-im SDE S_KEY *dNk-,; y. 
unsigood char cryptjlagý. 
int EC-ciplier-blilck_cli; tiiiiiig(SI)FS-1).. VI'A *JaIa-Out. SDES-DATA *dataJit. SDES_KEY Odokcy. 
imsigned char 
int *tfita_out. SI)ES_[).. %I*A Odatajm SDES_KEY OdAcy. 
unsigncd char cD. pt_Ilag)-. 
int EC-ciplier_f*eetlli: ick(SI)r. S_I).. %*I't% *data_out. si)is_i).. %-r, % SI)I-S_KLY -&, Uy. 
unsigned char crypI_Ilaf; )-. 
int EC_file(char ciypt-modc. char cryptjag, char stuff flag. Sl)l,. S_KrY *J. %Lcy, 
char Odatfilc-in. char *datfialo_otat. char 0%". 'M%TitA: )*. 
int EC-f cl,: ctronio_codclxxil, (l`ILE *data-mit. rILE *data-iii. SOES-KILY *&Acy, 
ullsigned Char Cl) pt-ilas). 
int Ec-r *Jau_out. HIS, *daujit. Sl)l-'S_KEY *J, %Lt; y. 
unsigncd char crypt_11ig)'. 
int EC_f *J. 'aa_out. I'll. r SI)LS_Kr. N' Od. Acy. 
um, igned char crýptjlag). 
int EC-f ciphor_11cedback(FILE *data_out. FILL *data_in. DSES_KEY 
unsigned char crypI_Ilag)-. 
void EC error(char ctror). 
int EC 
ýIt EC KcyWritc(SDES KEY *de%koy. char flilename. int overw4c). 
int EC7Kc)-Rcad(SDES_KrY Odcskcy. vhar Ofilenamc); 
int EC-des(timigned char *d. %t3_0LIt. unsignod char *dat3_iti. ti-igned char ki 1611481); 
int EC-ckd1junsigned char out1321. unsigned char R1321, unsiped char L1481); 
int EC expandjata(unsigned char *arrayl. umigned char *array2. int no 
int ECroduce-data(unsigned char *arrayl. tiompod char *array2. im 
int EC-key_. nhcdulc(tmsign%: d char LI 1611491. unsigncd char kc)-1641. int enc); 
#endif 
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The Four Basic Arithmetic Algorithms k5 
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Addition 
This algorithm is used for tile addition of nonnegative integers of radix b and with n-places. 
Given two nonnegative integers (A,, A21 A, ..... 
A. ),, and (131, B2, B, ...... 
Bn)b we wish to form 
their radix b surn, (So, Si, S2 ....... 
SII)b- 
keeps track of tile digit position, k keeps track of the carry. I 
1. j=n, k=O 
2. Sj (Aj + Bj + k) niod b 
3. k (Aj + Bj + k) /b 
k may only equal I or 0 
4. j=j-1 
5. Ifj >0 goto 2 
6. So =k 
7. End 
Subtraction 
This algorithm is used for the subtraction of two nonnegative integers of radix b and with n- 
places. Given two nonnegative integers (A,, A2, A, ...... 
A,, ),, and (131. B2, B3* ..... B, 
)b, with 
the relationship (A,, A2, A. i ...... 
A,, )I, ý: (131, B2, B3* ..... 
Bn)h, we wish to form their 
nonnegative radix-b difYcrence, (DI, D2, D., ...... D,, 
),,. 
keeps track of digit position, k keeps track of borrow. 
1. j=n, k=0 
2. Dj = (Aj - Bj + k) mod b 
3. k=(Aj-Bj+li)/b 
k may only take tile ValUe 0 or -I - 
j =j - 
5. If j>0 goto 2 
6. If k= -I then the input to the algorithm did not conform to tile assumptions made. 
7. End 
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Multiplication 
This algorithm is used for the multiplication of two nonnegative integers of radix b, one 
with n-places, the other with m-places. Given two nonnegative integers (Al, A2, A39---. -Ao)b 
and (BI, B2, B3, ..... 
B )b, we wish to form their radix-b product (PI, P2, P3, ..... 
Pm+n)b- 
I- (P 1. P2, P3 ...... 
Pn)b = (0,0,0 ...... 
O)bs i=M 
2, If Bj =0 set Pj =0 and goto 10 
3. i=n, k=0 
4. t= Ai x Bj + Pj+j +k 
5. Pi. j =t niod b 
6. kt/b 
7. ii-1 
8. If i>0 goto 4 
9. Pj =k 
lo. j =j -1 
I I. If j>0 goto 2 
12. End 
Division 
This algorithrn is used for tile division of a nonnegative, integer by another nonnegativc 
integer. Given A= (A,, A2, A.,, ..... 
A,, 4,, ),, and B (B 1,132,133, ..... 
B,, ),, where B, <> 0 and n 
> 1, we wish to form tile radix-b quotient A/B (Q,,, Q1, Q2, ..... 
Q. ),, and the remainder A 
mod b= (111, R2, R3 ...... 
R,, ),,. 
1. d=b/ (131 + 1), (Ao, A,, A2 ...... = 
(A 1, A2, A3 
...... Am+n)b, 
(131, B2, B.,, ..... B,, 
)I, = (B 1, B2, B. i ...... B,, 
),, xd 
2. j=0 
3. If Aj =B1, set q= b- I ELSE set q= (Ajb+Aj+ 1) /B1 
4. If B2q > (Ajb+Aj+ I -qB I)b + Aj. 2 then q=q-I and goto 4 
5. (Al, AN Ai ...... 
Aj+, j)jj = (Al, A2, Ail.,.... Aj+,, ),, - q(BI, B2, B3, ..... Ba)b 
6. Q. =q 
7. If the result of step 5 was positive goto 9 
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8. Q= Qj - 1, (A 1, A2, A3 ) ...... An),, = 
(A I, A2, A. 4 ...... + (0, B 1, 
B29 
..... 
Bn)b 
9. j=j+ I 
10. If j :5 ill goto 3 
II -(QOt Q1, 
Q2 
....... 
Qnjb is the desired quotient, the remainder = 
(Ani+l 
...... 
6, 
nl+n)b 
/d 
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Applications of keystroke analysis for improved login security and 
continuous user authentication 
S. M. Furriell, J. P. Morrissey, P. W. Sanders and C. T. Stockel 
Network Research Group, Faculty of Technolog , 
University of Plymouth, Plymouth, Oy 
United Kingdom. E-mail : stevef(Di soc. plym. ac. uk 
Abstract 
Ais paper examines the use of keystroke analysis as a means of improving authentication 
in modem information systems, hased tpon the bionietric measurement of user typing 
characteristics. The discussion identifies that the concept may he implemented ill Avo 
ways, providing the basisfor hoih an enhanced authenticationfront-end (ill combination 
with the entry of a standardpav. sword) as wel/ asfor conlinuous, transparent sipervision 
throughout the se. s. vion. 
Two practical %ysfen? s have been implemented and evaltiated, based tpon static and 
dynamic very1cation fechniques. The static verifier modide uses a neural neAvork 
approach, whilst the dgianfic very'ler involves slalistical analysis methods. 
The effectiveness (? f each modide is examined usitig experimental test subject groups (15 
typists in the static syslem and 30 in the dynamic swc4). Me results observed allow both 
the authentication and cmalysis strategies to be contrasted, along with a gencral 
assessment of the proleclioli ihca the combimilion qf led7niques would afford 
The paper also discusses how Me techniques could he integrated uIlhilt a more 
comprehensive intrusion delecliolifi-alnework Mal would he capable of identýfying variolls 
other classes qfsyslem ahuse. 
Keyivoi-ds Computer Security, Keystroke Analysis, Intrusion Detection, Authentication, 
Biornetrics, Passwords, Neural Networks. 
1. Introduction 
The issues of user identification and ay 
' 
thentication are of paramount irnportancc in the 
provision of secure information, systems. If a user is 
' 
not identified, it is impossible to grant 
any specific access rights or, ensure-, i, ndividual accountability for -activities. Without 
authentication, user identities could be used by unauthorised parties for illegitimate 
purposes. Whilst obtaining a (clainned) identity is extremely straightforward, the subscqucnt 
verification is problematic and various possible approaches exist. The potential foundations for authentication are commonly categorised as follows (Wood 1977) 
something the user biows (e. g. a password); 
something tile user hcys (e. g. a token such as a card or key); 
something the user is (e. g. a biometric such as fingerprint or voice pattern). 
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The first of these methods is currently the most widely used, with passwords having the 
advantages of both conceptual simplicity and easy implementation. However, it has been 
identified that passwords provide an unreliable basis for user authentication (Jobusch and 
Oldehoeft 1989) and that stronger methods are necessary, using techniques that are more 
difficult, if not impossible, to forge. In general, the use of a biometric appears to be the 
strongest option, as it may not be easily guessed, stolen or transferred to other people in the 
same way as secret knowledge or a token. However, the cost of the technology required to 
successfully implement most biometric methods largely precludes its uptake in many cases. 
What is, therefore, required is a bioi-netric measurement that can be obtained without 
requiring any form of additional hardware. Fortunately, such a characteristic can potentially 
be identified in the form of users typing style (or keyboard rhythm). 
The basic premise of the approach is that typing characteristics will be reasonably unique to 
each user, revealing an individual "signature". Tile concept of using keystrokes to assess 
identity was originally proposed by Spillane (1975) and can be claimed to provide a 
"behavioural" biometric measurement, in that the act of typing represents how a user does 
something as opposed to being a physiological characteristic. 00 
2. An overview of kevstroke analvsis concepts 
Before considering a monitoring strategy, it was necessary to identify suitable typing 0. 
characteristics that could be used as a basis for analysis (and hence authentication). Several 
factors were considered, as listed below : 
inter-keystroke tinles-, 
keystroke dUration times, 
typing error frequency-, 
force of keystrokes, 
keystrokes / words per minute. 
Of these, tile inter-keystroke thne was considered likely to be the most characteristic and 
was, therefore, adopted as tile basis for tile practical investigations to be described later. 
Users are likely to differ dramatically in terms of typing styles and abilities, depending upon 
factors such as their familiarity with tile keyboard, experience and any formal tuition. 
Indeed, previous research (Card et al. 1980) has determined six general skill classifications 
based upon the average inter-keystroke time of the subject. In theory it should be relatively 
easy to differentiate between users frorn different categories, whereas discrimination within 
a category may be more problematic. 
The typing characteristics of each user must be assessed to create an approp t pr f ria e () Ile 
that may then be used for subsequent authentication. "Any signiricant departures ftom the 
profile will cause impostor alerts. I- 
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Keystroke analysis may be incorporated into an authentication system in two ways - 
referred to as static and d), nalnic verification strategies. 0 
Static vefification 
In this scenario authentication is based upon the entry of a static text string. 
There are two points at which such analysis could be used; in the initial 
authentication of a user (i. e. at login) and whenever a volatile command is 
entered. 
Logilt 
There are usually two points during the login process that are ideal for 
static keystroke analysis, at the entry of useriiante and passivord. 
Passwords are currently the most widely used form of authentication, but 
are often compromised by users failing to follow simple procedures, 
recognised in a variety of previous studies (such as, avoiding dictiotiary 
words, or incorporating munher. v into tile password sequence). Using 
keystroke analysis, tile usernanie and password would be entered as usual, 
but rattler than just authenticating tile user from this alone the system 
would also analyse the way in which it was typed, providing a further 
level of authentication. 
0 Volatile coiiii; Iciiicl. v 
These are defined as any commands that may delete, modify or copy 
information stored by the systern, such as the 'dellree' or 'xcol)y' 
cornmands in MS-DOS (Microsoft 1994). These could be used by 
malicious intruders to vandalise information, inconveniencing legitimate 
users and potentially causing serious damage. There would, however, be 
a practical limit to the number of commands that could be monitored in 
this way as, for each one to be analysed, a specific prorile would need to 
be obtained frorn tile le-itimate user. C) 
Static verification appears to be tile most common approach, * having been the 
basis for a nUrnber of previous studies (Blelia et al. 1990; Joyce and Gupta 
1990). 
Dyiiandc verýficafiolt 
Using this approach authenticati 
, 
on' is based 'upon any arbitrary text input, 
allowing greater scope for Supervision in real-time during user sessions. 
Monitorin- could occur continuously, providing a transparent (i. e. non-intrusive) 
means of authentication that is not currently possible with most other methods 
(even those based on biometric features). 
In this scenario atithentication is no ý longer reliant on a single judgement but 
becomes continuous throughout the session. One advantage here is that it should 
serve to prevent "logical piggybacking", - whereby an intruder attempts to utilise 
an unattended terminal that is already logged into another account. 
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As with other biometric systems, the effectiveness of keystroke analysis may be judged on 
the basis of two factors : the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and tile False Rejection Rate 
(FRR). The FAR relates to errors where impostors are falsely believed to be legitimate 
users. Conversely, the FRR refers to errors where the system falsely identifies the 
legitimate user as an impostor. These rates share a mutually exclusive relationship, such 
that configuring tile tolerances of a systern to give good results for one will generally cause 
a degradation of the other (and, as such, it is not possible to attain optimum levels for both 
measures). An "equal error" scenario is not really an appropriate compromise and a 
decision must, therefore, be made as to which rate should receive priority. 
In actual fact, the priorities will vary depending upon whether a static or dynamic 
authentication system is used. In the static scenario, minimisation of the FAR is considered 
to be the priority, as any successful impostor could potentially go unchecked for a whole 
session. However, in tile dynarnic scenario, with continuous assessment, a greater window 
for impostor detection is available and so minimising the FRR becomes the most important 
consideration (as rejections din-hig a session Could irritate and disrupt a legitimate user 
more significantly than occasional false login failures). A further important consideration in 
the dynamic scenario is tile speed with which the identity assessment can be provided by the 
system (i. e. how many keystrokes could an impostor enter before being noticed 7). 
3. PRACTICAL STUDIES OF KEYSTROKE ANALYSIS 
The research tearn has conducted two practical studies to help evaluate the efrectivcness of 
the keystroke analysis concept. Both of these investigations utilised PC-based experimental 
systems and related to the static and dynarnic verification approaches respectively. 
The systerns share coninion core functionality, using PC hardware interrupts to detect 
keyboard actions and collect inter-keystroke timings (with one millisecond accuracy), but 
differ significantly in terms of tile analysis strategies employed. In the static analyser, 
authentication is based Lipoil neUral network techniques, whilst the dynamic system uses 
statistical methods. 
In both cases, analysis was restricted to character pairs (or digralA. Y) involving alphabetic 
and "space" keystrokes, as these were considered the most likely to reveal any characteristic 
rhythm and were also found to produce the best results in a previous study which conducted 
a comprehensive investigation of this aspect (Leggett and Williams 1988), Both systems 
also attempted to ensure that tile typing profiles 
, 
were representative of users normal styles by ignoring erroneous inputs. Tile profiler for t- he static analyser achieved this by totally 
disregarding all inaccurate samples, whereasýthe version for- the dynamic system (where 
samples were longer and, hence, abandonment Would have been impractical) filtered out and ignored any deleted keystrokes., 
A significant number of test Subjects were involved in both studies, with abilities ranging from experienced typists to comparative novices. 
Specific details of tile two systems' and the results obtained are described in the sections the follow. 
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4. STATIC KEYSTROKE ANALYSIS 
The static keystroke analyser was implemented using a neural network for pattern 
recognition, based upon a MUlti-layer perceptron network. The perceptron is one of the 
best studied single layer neural networks (McClelland and Rumelhart 1986) and is made up 
of several simple biological neUron models. The simple model is constructed from input 
lines, a thresholding unit and an output line. If tile inputs to the thresholding unit are 
greater than a threshold value the perceptron "fires", as shown in figure 1. 
Input Sum 
& Threshold 
output 
Input 
In p 
output 
Input 
Input, Hidden output 
Layer Layer(s) Layer 
Fig. 1: and multi-layer I)ei'cel)tl'()Ils 
However, the single layer perceptron is, only able to classify linearly separable problems and 
the variability of user typing, styles suggests that keystroke 'analysis does not fit into this 
category. As a result, a multi-layer perceptron was used, which is capable of solving non- 
linear problerns. These networks are made up of several neuron models, with at least one 
layer which is not directly connected to tile input or- output of the network. The version 
used in the experiment employed tile back-proPagation learning algorithm (McClelland and 
Rumelhart 1986), which attempts to mininlise tile-error of the network by comparing the 
actual output to a target Output for specific input vectors and adjusting the weights of input 
lines accordingly. 
The static verification systern is actually the more recent of the two implementations and, as 
such, the test subject base to date has been rather small. A sanilder program was used to 
collect samples from 15 experimental test subjects. Each subject typed four rercrence 
phrases 35 times each. The four phrases were as follows: 
REF 1: "PRINT"; 
REF 2: " TRA NSFERENCE, 
REF3: "REDSKYATNIGHT"; 
REF4: "MIGBY PLA YE RS ODDSHAPE, D BALLS". 
(+ 
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These phrases were chosen to allow sufficient overall representation of left-hand, right-hand 
and crossover digraphs, and differing phrase lenaths were used to allow an examination of 
the effect that this had on attempts to classify tile user's samples. 
The inter-keystroke times obtained from sampling the test subjects typing were saved to a 
file for later use by the pattern recognition module. 
Set phrases were used to make the classification as difficult as possible, giving a worst case 
scenario where all users have the same password, but with a real life scenario for the volatile 
commands. The use of individually distinct phrases such as usernames will be investigated in 
future experiments but, because everyone is familiar with typing their own names, it is 
reasonable to assume that individual typing techniques will be more prominent and, 
therefore, more easily identifiable. Genetic algorithms will also be used in later experiments 
to identify the specific digraphs that the neural network uses to identify users. 0 
In the experiment every user had their own multi-layer perceptron for each phrase, to 
identify the specific user from tile others sampled. Twenty-five samples of the user to be 
identified were placed into tile training set of the multi-layer perceptron, along with twenty- 
five samples froin each of the other users to provide false samples. The remaining 10 
samples from each user were used to evaluate the success that each network attained in 
identifying the legitimate user and rejecting impostors. This gave a total of 150 legitimate 
user attempts and 2 100 impostor attempts as tile basis for evaluation. 
Each neural network was presented with 4000 inter-keystroke samples for supervised 
training. The samples were chosen at randoill from the training set. The resulting neural 
network was then evaluated, with tile output being a value between 0 and I (with I 
indicating a positive identification of tile User). In actual fact, three decision boundaries (i. e. 
the points at which tile neural networks Output would be taken as a positive identification) 
were evaluated, namely 0.7.0.8 and 0.9. 
Table I presents the results of tile initial experiment. In this case tile neural network was 
trained on a ratio of one true sanli)le to one false samnle- numin thn -irti, ni 
chosen randomly. 
0.7 0.8 0.9 
REF 1 12 8 4 
REF 2 4 4 3 
REF 3 5 4 2 
REF 4 3 2 2 
Average 6 5 3_ 
FAR given as %,, ý 
0.7- 0.8 0.9 
_REF 
1 30 42 58 
_REF 
2 22 25 34 
. 
REF 3 24 27 34 
REF 4 53 38 43 
Average 32 33 42 
ERR given as 
Table 1: Effectivenos ivith 1: 1t raining ratio 0% 
It was found that the neural network provided a lower FRR if the training was biased 
towards using more samples of the use 
,r 
to be identified. A ratio of four true samples to one false sample gave better results, as shown in table 2. 
---- 
-' --a. . &I " 'h'- vv. $ c 
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0.7 0.8 0.9 
REF 1 24 21 15 
REF 2 8 6 5 
REF 3 8 6 5 
REF 4 4 3 2 
Average 11 9 6 
0.7 0.8 0.9 
REF 1 10 15 26 
REF 2 15 19 25 
REF 3 21 23 27 
REF 4 28 32 40 
Averag 
,. e 
19 22 3 
FAR given as % ERR given as 
Table 2: Effectiveness with 4: 1 trainim, ratio N 
However, given that the static analysis at login could be based upon the entry of two 
phrases (i. e. usernarne and password), it was decided to evaluate the effectiveness in this 
context. This was achieved using a combination of tile REF 2 and REF 3 phrases, giving 
the results in table . 3. Tile success of the authentication was 
determined using three 
confidence classifications: 
rejected (R), where a sample pair is rejected by both neural nets; 
low (L), where a sample pair is rejected by one neural net; 
high (H), where a sample pair is accepted by both neural nets. 
R L H 
0.7 87 13 1 
0,8 89 11 0 
0.9 92 18 0- 
R L H 
0.7 4 38 58 
0.8 5 10 55 
. 
0.9 7 50 
, 
43 
Impostor allempl-V r1u) User allempts 
Table 3: Results for two phrase combination 
It is important to reduce tile FRR so that users are not overly inconvenienced through 
multiple authentication reqUeStS. However, ', in a static verification system it is more 
important (especially where tile mechanism may be used at the login point of a session) for 
the FAR to be rninimised, to prevent ill'alicious attackers'gaining initial entry to the system. 
If the reference phrases used are short, then a relatively high FRR of around 10% may be 
acceptable. 
The background and findings of this study are described in more detail in Morrissey (1995). 0 
5. DYNAMIC KEYSTROKE ANALYSIS 
The other experimental StUdy concerned the evaluation of a d), "'anlic verification approach. 
As previously mentioned, this system was actually the earlier of the two implementations 
and analysis in this case was based upon statistical methods rather than neural networks, 
with the profiles storing mean and standard deviation values for each digraph. 
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A total of 30 test subjects were involved in this study, with each being required to submit a 
profile sample and two additional test samples. The profiling procedure required users to 
enter two samples of a 2200 character i-efei-ence text. A more significant length was 
necessary in this scenario to ensure that each users "natural" typing style emerged and that 
sufficient samples of each digraph were obtained to enable appropriate mean and standard 
deviation values to be established. The two further text samples (of 574 and 389 
characters) were used to represent impostor attempts by comparing them against all profiles 
not belonging to the sarne user. As such. the results in this phase were derived from more 
than 1700 impostor attempts. 
The monitoring system compared the inter-keystroke times from the test samples against 
user profiles, with incompatible times being judged invalid. These judgements were then 
analysed in two ways to detect impostors : 
monitoring tile percentage of invalid keystrokes during the 100 most recently typed, 
2. monitoring the number of consecutive invalid keystrokes. 
However, it was recognised that even legitimate users would generate some degree of 
invalid keystrokes and, as a consequence, each prorile held associated authenficalion 
thresholds for these factors, with intrusion alerts being generated if either was exceeded 
during monitoring. 
Given that the dynamic analyser would be used for continuous monitoring, tile minimisation 
of false rejections was viewed as a priority. It was considered that if the FRR could be 
totally eliminated, then what would then be observed would cffectively be a "worst-case! ' 
FAR. To this end, the authentication thresholds in the profiles were determined for each 
subject on an individual basis (by observing the peak- values frorn the comparison of the two 
additional typing samples against their profile). This ensured that thresholds were set such .P that the legitimate user would always pass. The aims of the study were, therefore, to 
determine the FAR and tile speed Of SLICCCSSfUl impostor detection. 
In terms of overall impostor detection effiectiveness, the experimental system exhibited an 
overall FAR of 15% (based upon 13% for the first sample and 18% for the second). This 
figure would be of less significance when considered along with the initial authentication 
provided by the static analyser and the combination of the two methods would almost 
certainly defeat most impostors. 
In the cases where detection was achieved, the other important consideration was how 
many keystrokes the impostor was able to enter before being detected. The cxpcrimcntal 
findings here are presented in figure 2, which shows the percentage of impostors detected 
within five distinct keystroke ranges (with cumulative values also indicated). 
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Fig. 2: Keystrokes before impostor detection 
These results indicate that the vast majority of impostors would be detected within 160 
keystrokes (tile equivalent of two standard lines of text), with detection in under 40 
keystrokes in 26% of cases. Whilst this may not combat the most destructive scenarios 
(e. g. the immediate entry of "delete *. *" would very likely be unchallenged, unless 
specifically trionitorcd as a vohifile commmid by tile static analyser), it should be sufficient 
to identify the i-nore common types of intruder who generally require sustained access in 
order to effect a serious breach. It should be noted that detection is likely to be quicker in 
cases where an impostor takes the place of a legitininte uscr. as a certain percentage of 
invalid keystrokes would already have been registered (by the legitimate user), causing tile 
rejection threshold to be reached more easily. 
A more detailed discussion of the dynamic analyser in ternis of both the system 
implementation and the results observed is presented in Furnell (1995). 
6. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PRACTICAL STUDIES 
An overall comparison of the experimental results is presented in table 4. 
, Static Dynamic 
Atinlyser Analyser 
No. test subjects 15 30 
FAR (%) 8: 15 
so FRR (0/,, ) 70 
- bascd upon two plimse combination 
0. acliic%, cd vil italicaticafion Ilircsitolds 
Table 4: Comparison of experimental study rc%ult., 4 
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At this stage it has only been possible to evaluate the two systems independently (as only a 
small number of test Subjects were common to both studies), with tile consequence that an 
overall FAR for tile combined strategies Could not be obtained. However, it is certainly true 
to say that in some cases where a fialse acceptance would occur within one analyser, the 
other systern could compensate by successfully trapping the impostor. 
With regard to the performance of the individual systems, it can be observed that the neural 
network techniques used by the static verifier do not appear to yield such a significant 
improvement over the statistical approach as one might expect. However, it is expected 
that the performance could be improved further with the incorporation of a genetic 
algorithm to determine the most characteristic user digraphs within each phrase. It is also 
recognised that as the analysers operate in different contexts, such a comparison is not 
exactly comparing like with like. 
The single phrase results for the static analyser were rather disappointing in terms of the 
levels of false rejection observed. Whilst it is considered that these would not pose a 
significant problem in the login context (and could be largely overcome by adopting the two 
phrase analysis), the issue would be more problematic if monitoring volatile commands 
(which would normally be single phrases). The results indicate that this could lead to 
repeated false rejections within a session (tile factor that the dynamic analyser strives to 
avoid), making Supervision somewhat less than transparent. For this reason the static 
system is not considered Suitable for tile second purpose unless it can be strengthened. In 
addition, tile increased FRR with longer text strings is worthy of further examination, 
although observation during tile study revealed that test subjects generally made more 
mistakes with tile longer samples, necessitating repeated re-entry. which potentially led to 
uncharacteristic typing. 
With regard to the dynamic analyser, the main point that must be rccogniscd is that the FRR 
of 0% was obtained artificially. However, it is still envisaged that false rejections would not 
be frequent enough to significantly worry legitimate users in practice if authentication 
thresholds were set correctly. 
Having established the effectiveness of the two techniques, it is also interesting to consider 
how they could be integrated within a more comprehensive monitoring framework. This 
issue is discussed in tile next section which presents tile conceptual design of a system called 
IMS (for Intrusion Monitoring System). 
7. A wider intrusion detection framework 
It must be recognised that the use or keystroke analysis alone does not provide a 
comprehensive basis for intrusion detection, as the technique is only suitable as a user 
authentication mechanism. It is actually possible to identiry several distinct classes of 
computer system abuser (Anderson 1980) : 
9 external penetrators (i. e. unauthorised users of the system); 
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" masqueraders (i. e. authorised users who operate under the identity of another 
user); 
" clandestine users (i. e. users who evade access controls and auditing). 
" misfeasors (i. e. legitimate users who abuse their privileges). 
It should be evident that keystroke analysis would only be suitable for detecting the first and 
second of these classes and would be ineffective against tile other two (given that these are 
legitimate users operating under their own identities). In addition, no defence would be 
provided against malicious processes (i. e. viruses, worms and Trojan Horse programs). 
Therefore, in order to provide more comprehensive intrusion detection it becomes necessary 
to monitor other aspects of user behaviour, along with general events that may be indicative 
of intrusions. 
With regard to enhancing behaviour profiles, suggested strategies include the monitoring of .; P 
time and location of system access-, 
operating system command usage, 
application usage; 
data access. 
Such characteristics. in combination with the existing information on user typing stylcs, 
would allow significantly more comprehensive profiles to be constructed. 
In addition to profiles, the system could specifically monitor for a variety of events that 
might form part of a known intrusion scenario. The occurrence orsuch events would be 
regarded as Suspicious. especially in aggregation, and would be used to increase the Art 
status for the affected user or process. Some illustrative examples of such events are given 
below, along with the type of intruder that the occurrence of each would indicate : 
out of hours access Q)eiten-trim- or nfisfeit. voi-), 
use ofdormant 'accotilits(exfei*liiill)ciietitilot, ortyi(i. v(litci*ctder)-, 
excessive use of system "help" facilities (exlel-iw1pewfivior); 
modification ofcxecutable file (nutficiousp-oce. vs). 
The use of profiles and ruics in this way is based upon a similar premise to the approach 
used by the IDES intrusion monitor (Lunt 1990) and various other detection systems 
(Mukherjee et al. 1994). 
At a high level, tile proposed INIS architecture is based upon the concept of a ccntraliscd 
Host handling the monitoring and supervision of one or more Clientv running on local 
workstations. Tile purpose of the Clients is to collect relevant data on user and process 
activity a' nd respond to any suspected intrusions detected by the Host. All behaviour 
profiles, generic rules and such like would be maintained securely at the Host, which also 
handles all of the analysis and the main bulk of other processing associated with the 
supervision. By contrast, tile Client involves no local data storage and acts almost 
exclusively as an agent of the flost. 
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At a lower level, the system would be comprised of a number of functional modules, as 
shown in figure 3 and outlined below. 
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Fig. 3: MIS Architccture 
Anoinaly Detector 
The purpose of the Anomaly Detector will be to analyse user and process activity ror signs 
of suspected intrusion, comparing it against the behaviour profiles that apply to the current 
users (claimedy identity as well as against the generic intrusion rules. It is envisaged that 
this will be comprised of a number of further sub-modules, each handling a specific aspect 
of anomaly detection (e. g. keystroke analysis). 
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Profile Refiner 
The IMS would also utilise activity data as the basis for'updating behaviour profiles. This 
recognises the possibility that user behaviour may legitimately change over time and the 
Profile Refuier would provide an automatic means for profiles to be updated to reflect this. 
It would be most appropriate for tile I"i-ofile Refutei- to be based upon the neural network 
approach, given that tile inherent ability to analyse and recognise patterns could allow 
behavioural characteristics to be identified that might not be apparent to a human observer. 
In this way, the effectiveness of tile system would have the potential to improve over time, 
in that it could gradually learn more patterns of legitimate activity for each user and 
determine which of the profiled characteristics provide the most reliable discriminators. 
It would be undesirable for the Pi-ofile Refluer to utilise data that is later found to be 
anomalous and refinement would only take place after the termination of user sessions 
(provided, of course, that no intrusions were proven during this time). 
Recorder 
The Recoi-dei- handles tile short-term storage of systern activity data during the period of a 
user session. Upon termination tile information will be picked up and used by the Ptoji'le 
Refuier, provided that tile session was not considered anomalous. 
Archiver 
The Amhivei- will collect data relating to all security relevant events (including login 
failures, intrusion alerts, authentication challenges. suspended sessions and the like) and 
store it in a long-term archive (in the sarne manner as a traditional audit trail), providing a 
more permanent record of activities and suspected anomalies. 
Collector 
The Colleclor represents the interface betwccn the INIS and the underlying applications, 
with the responsibility for obtaining information on all relevant uscr and systcm activitics. 
These would be monitored with two objectives: 
to collect data on those events which pertain to monitorcd behaviour 
characteristics; 
to identify those events which 11lay IfTect tile security of the system (for 
comparison against generic intnision indicators). 
The resolution of data collection would be determined, at the Host by the System 
Administrator. 
Respon(ler 
This module resides in the Client and handles the task or responding to anomalies detected by the Host. ' The operation' of the Re. yolider would ccntre around the continuous 
monitoring of the alert status transmitted by the Host, with increases in the level triggering 
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appropriate actions. The nature of response might include issue of a user authentication 
challenge, suspension of a session or cancellation of a process. 
Communicator 
The Coninnitticafor provides the communications interface between the Host and the local 
Client systems and, as such, the functionality of this module is duplicated on both sides of 
the link. The principal functions would include transmitting user and process information to 
the Host and then subsequently keeping the Client(s) informed of the current alert status. If 
implemented in a heterogeneous environment, tile Client side would be responsible for 
resolving any operating system differences that exist within the monitoring domain so that 
information could be presented to the Host in a consistent, standardised format. 
Controller 
This module allows the System Administrator to configure the operation of the IMS system, 
On the Host side, this would apply to the Anonictly Defecloi- (e. g. behaviour characteristics 
to consider / prioritise, generic rules in operation), the Ilt(file Refiller (e. g. frequency of 
refinement) and the Ai-chivei- (e. g. level of detail required). On the Client side, 
configuration would affect the operation of the (7611ecloi- (e. g. the level of data collection) 
and the Resj)ondei- (e. g. the level of response at each alert level). These settings would be 
controlled and recorded through the Host system, with any Client settings being established 
at the time of session initiation. 
The operation of these modules would combine to provide a system architecture offiering 
improved security, whilst at the same time retaining the advantages of end-user convenience 
and financial viability. 
8. Conclusions 
The overall results from the experimental studies are considered to be encouraging and, 
although both systems exhibited some degree of error. it must be remembered that tile 
approaches are intended to supplement or strengthen security as opposed to providing a 
total solution. 
Both techniques have considerable potential for easy integration into existing systems, with 
the static analyser enhancing existing password mechanisms and the dynamic system i providing the basis for continuous supervision at subsequent times. This has already been 
achieved in the context of a demonstrator system developed since the experimental study, 
which allows transparent monitoring of user activity (in real-time) on a clicnt workstation. 
Planned future development of the systems include the enhancement of the static analyser to incorporate a geneti 
'c 
algorithm, along with subsequent modification of the dynamic system 
to utilise these techniques if tile results are suitably encouraging. 
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The incorporation of keystroke analysis into an overall IMS-type framework is Viewed as 
advantageous to provide more comprehensive supervision. Whilst the concept is not 
envisaged as a replacement for conventional authentication and access control methods, it 
will provide a way to strengthen existing systems and complement any security already 
provided. 
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security system capabIc of bcing addcd to cxistitig 
computer sývstciiis to bring their ctirrciit IcN, cl of 
scatrity tip to a lc%, cl icccpt. ible by their owticts. 
2. Comprehensive Integrated 
Security System 
The CISS archileclure was developed to protect a 
computer system within an open distributed 
environment against the threats detailed in Table 
1. Abstract 
This paper presents a model for increasing 
security within a secnriýv domain thrmýgh the use 
of localised securi(v services and continuous 
monitoring. The model divides securit *v SeIIII 
. ces 
between three loýizical structures Local Scria-it ,v Units, Local Securi(v Servers and Domain 
Management Centres. The localisation (? /' 
securi(v allows the finclional divisions within 
organt. vations to implement ino(4fied vecuriýv 
dependent upon their indivithial needs. 
.. 
Monitoring. Ke)4vords : Compulcr Sccuril%. 
Locil Sccurity, CISS. 
1. Inti-oduction 
As networks and the conscquential connection of 
computers with their stored data becomes 
increasingly common. the security or that data 
becomes cx, cr more important. Current 
techniques in security liavc proved themselves to 
be iiicffcc(i%, c when confronted by credible 
hackers 111,12 1,1) 1. As more and more 
people gainacccss to tictworks and the computers 
connected to them. as current poliqy %vidtin tlic 
EC and USA indicates they will. there will be 
more people tempted to pursue illegal activities. 
Many im), wish to instigate malicious dainage 
while others may only inadvertently causc 
damage. Whatever the reason. the action is 
illegal and security upon the computer kystcnis 
must be cipablc of dealing with Ilicscaticnipts. 
To combat the increased security risks that 
placing Sensitive inrornintion upon open 
computer rictAvorks with ever increasing numbers 
of users introduces, new methods for sccuritN 
must be found. This paper - uses CISý 
(Comprehensive Integratcd Security Systcni)14 I 
as its basic security provider. The International 
Standards Orginisation (ISO) have been selling 
swidards for opcii interconnection or systcnis. 
The CISS model ittcnipts to provide the required 
security as indicatcd by the ISO within relevant 
publications 15 1,16 1 and it also attempts to 
proNide the security necessary for open 
distributed environnicilts. CISS is an adaptable 
1"breat Description 
Masqueraders When a legal entity ( user/prograin 
impersonates another. 
Illegal Associations Where an illegal entity fornis an 
association with a legal entity that 
violates the authentication and 
authorisation policies in place. 
Non-authorised accc. " Where an intruder/user gains access to 
resources that violates the access control 
Policy. 
Denial ol'Service \\'here a legal entity is denied access to 
ru-sources that are required for proper 
operation. 
Repudiation Prevent the Calse denial ofa legal entity 
that has provided a rervice or resource. 
Leakago oflnilmnation Ums orconisdentiality. anonymity. and 
inknppropriation. 
Trallic Analysis Deduction of hil'onnation from 
clinrit. teristic% ofdata transfer. 
NIC. "Isage Prevention ofre-submission ofdata 
bevond it% valid liCetime, replay atticks. 
Data Modificalion Malicious or accidental modification of 
dala. 
Doduction ol'bill-4-maiion Colloction ofdata front summaries in a 
distrilitited database 
111csat Modifivation of Malicious or accidental modification of 
Proit-raim I sollware. 
Tablc I Threats 
To combat thcsc threats CISS ninkcs available 
scr%-iccs that can be used to provide the necessary 
sccurity nicasurcs. The security services are 
provided through the correct scquciicing of the 
sccurit), mcchnnisms shown ill Table 2. The 
scn-iccs can be requested by uscrs, or forced upon 
thcIll by the sccurity administrator's 
configuration of CISS according to the sccurity 
Polic-', ill nlacc. 
Security hlechanixin Description 
Lit Enciphernient Application of c-typtograpilic 
n1gorithim for confidentiality. 
DS Digital Signature Use of cryptographic techniques to 
provide proof of origin. 
AC Access Control Controlling the access to resources 
unon a network. 
DI Message A] goriduns to check the integrity of 
Atithenticifion Codes communicitted data. 
All Authentication Techniques by which the identity of an Exchatip entity can be confirtned, 
Tl' Trall'ic Padding Ilrovidt: prt)tcctiotiagaiiisitraftic 
111.11wis 
RC Routij)g Conjrt)l Control the padi along which &-tta is 
communicated. 
NT I Nolari%ation Provigion of proofs. 
Table 2 Security Mechanisms 
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X indicates a mechanism is prescm and 0 
indicates its absence. 
Service En DS I AC DI AE, 'I'l, RC Nt 
Peer Entity x x1 0 0 x 0 0 0 
Authentication 
Data origin x IN 
Authentication 
Access Control 0 N 
Service 
Data x 0 
Conridentiality 
_ Now 0 x o x o 0 0 x 
repudiation 
I 1 
Origin 
Non- 0 x X 
repudiation 
I delivery 
Table 3 Sample Services 
Because a security kystcm is a complex and 
potentially large soffivare constniction problem. 
CISS has been divided into ten functional 
demerits known as agents. Thc agents are 
responsible for the co-ordination. supply and 
control of security sen-iccs to users/entitics. 
The 10 CISS agents are: 
1. User Agent (UA) L, This is the interrace of CISS through 
which the uscrs can access its security 
mechanisms and services directly via a 
request. Dependent upon the security 
policy some security services Nvill be 
provided irrespective of the user's 
Nvislics. 
2. Security Administration Agent (SAA) 
This is the second interface to CISS 
and is solely used by the security 
administrator. 'I'lie division of 
functionality between the UA and the 
SAA has come about due to the 
necessity of making the UA a multi- 
user agent producing complex code, 
tile sepiration produces simpler code 
for tile SAA. 
3. Operational Environment Agent (OPENA) 
This is the third and final interface 
through which CISS communicatcs 
with the outside world. Its main 
function is interfacing the operating 
system (OS), applications ctc, to tile 
SSA for the provision of security 
scn-iccs. The OPENA is ninde up in 
part by (lie application programming 
interface (API). The interface allows 
applications to access CISS services 
giving CISS greater flexibility for 
i ilipicillciltat ion within existing 
systems. The OPENA interacts with 
the AA and IDCA for communication 
with entities external to the local 
security domain. 
4. Security Services Agent (SSA) 
The SSA is the central agent through 
Which aII services are requested. The 
SSA has contact with 111 other agents. 
The SSA selects the security 
illechanisins that n requested security 
smice is mide tip front and with 
, assistance front tile security 
niccliallisill agent implements the 
service. 
. 5. Security Mechanisms Agent (SMA) 
The SMA interfaces the security 
111ccliallislils to the SSA for the 
provision of security services. 
6. Security Management Information Base 
Agent (SMIBA) A 
The SMIBA is responsible for 
interfacing tile SMIB to the other 
agents within CISS. it is tile only 
, agent with directaccess to the SMIB. 
4ý S-ýý A-. - 
:" 
1. ý I. -* 
Fi4gure 1 10 A-,,, ctit Interaction 
The Security Management Information Base 
The security managenicnt information base 
(SMIB) is the CISS knowicdge store. It contains 
inforniation on the configuration of CISS through 
the selection of nicchanisms, scrviccs. protocols 
and the subscquent limitations upon the variables 
in their use as specified by a sccurity policy. The 
SMIB contains information on authoriscd uscrs. 
autlicntication data, uscr entity capabilitics and 
privileges. 
342 
Appendix D 
7. Association Ajuent (AA) 
The AA is rcsponsible for the 
associations bct%vccn agcnts within the 
local sccurity domain. 
8. Inter Domain Communication Agent 
(IDCA) 
The IDCA is rcsponsible for 
communication with cmitics external 
to the local sccurity domain. It must 
ncgotiatcs the rcquircd parameters for 
a sccurc connection with any cxtcrnal 
entity. The IDCA interacts with the 
AA and the OPENA for the provision 
of sccu re inter domain 
communications. 
9. Monitorin-A-CiA(MA) 
The monitoring agcnt monitors the 
activity of CISS, primarily the actions 
of the SSA, and logs the cvcnts within 
the SMIB. The historical events that 
arc storcd within the SMIB arc only 
acccssiblc by the sccurity administrator 
for the preparation oraudit logs. 
10. RecoN-ci%%- Agent (RA) 
The rcco%, cr)* agcnt is rcsponsiblc for 
the rcco%, cr), of CISS N%-Iicii faults cillicr 
at componctil lc%-cl or procedural lc%-cl 
occur. 
3. Local Security 
The 3-L architcclure is comprised of a domain 
management cciitrc ( DMC ), multiple local 
security sen-crs ( LSSs ) and a local security unit 
( LSU ) at cach uscr tuminal. Nfulliple LSýs are 
hostcd upon a single LSS. the number of LSSs 
, within in organisation would be dependent upon 
its size and its intunal policy for computcr assct 
organisation. The three levels would interact 
within the boundaries or aic sccurity domain to 
enible the requircinmits or aic organisation's 
security policy to be nict both within the sccurio, 
domain and in communication with the external 
domain crivironnicnt. 
Each higher lc%-cl within the 3-L architecture is 
aware of the capabilities of lower level units that 
-ire connected to it, information concerning the 
liosted sccurity modules would be kept within the 
SMIBs of the LSSs and DMCs. This allows the 
tipper lc%, cls to determine whether services 
requested by lo%%, cr lcvcI units meet with the 
required security laid down by the domain 
scctirity policy and therefore whether the 
opcration can go ahead, or if the operation 
requires more security than is available the 
operation is prevented by the higher level entity 
and the reason is logged with the requesting unit. 
The objective of the three level architecture ( 3-L 
architecture ) is to provide manigement of 
security scr%, iccs within the bounclarics of a 
sccurity domain in a distributed environment by 
sclective c1ploymcnt of the CISS agents. Some 
of the security scn, iccs that must be co-ordinatcd 
over the cntirc domain are described below. 
Logging and Auditing Scctirity Relcvaiit 
Evcnts: 
Audit inrormation must be analysed 
for powntial privilcge abuse and 
intrusion detection. 
Inter-domain Communications: 
Mimi a uscr wishes to pcrrorin some 
function manipulating in entity within 
a differcia security domain the 
matiagcnicnt stnicture of each domain 
must ncgotiate what services are 
rcquircd for secure communication 
ox, cr the public unsecured nct%vork. 
Gmicration. Storage and Distribution of 
Cryptographic Kcys: 
To maintain conriftntiality within the 
domain it is necessary to generate keys 
to a set policy and tlicn use secure 
protocols for their storage and 
distribution. 
Domain Notary Service 
The security ninnigmicrit must 
provide trusted third party CITP) 
services for users. This means that the 
TTP[7 I functions of registration, 
notarisition, certification and public 
key N-crification along with public-kcy 
distribution must be provided. 
Trustcd cntry point 
Fircivalls 18 1, are used for access 
control to local area networks through 
the internet. This inctliod of access 
control should be iniplcmcntcd in 
CISS vin a single point of entry and 
exit to the security domain, allowing 
f 
L DMC 
LSS LSS 
Lsu A LSU RLSU J& LSU 
IiI 
It # user User Usor Soe', jdtvDomain 
Figure 2 Three LcN-cl Architecture 
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the implementation for cilicient 
security logging and access control. 
Domain Communications: 
If a user wishes to perform a rcinotc 
operation upon a ninclihic that is 
within the same security domain, the 
security management stnicturc must 
make sure that all security 
requirements are met according to the 
policy laid out within tlic domain. 
Access Control 
Through the use of the sccurit% 
domains SMIB the access rights aiiý 
privileges of individuals may be 
determined so that unauthoriscd 
manipulation or domain entities can be 
secured against. 
Authentication 
Every person that wishes to use CISS 
functionality must first be 
authenticated through information 
stored within the security domains 
SMIB. 
The CISS agents uscd %% ithi n cach lc%-cl are listed 
in the table below. 
X-Prcsciit 
O-Abscnt 
I)XIC I. SS IMI 
UA N 
SAA N N N 
SSA _ N N N 
SMA N N N 
_ SXIIBA N N 
OPENA N N N 
AA N N 
IDCA N 
NIA N N N0 
RA N N 
ADDITIONAL N N N 
Table 4 Agents Used within 3-L 
Some of the co-ordination dutics are common 
amongst the three levels and some are spccific to 
a certain level. the table below suins up the 
diNision of labour for the 3-L architecture. 
X-ProNidcd 
O-Not Provided 
Secufitv Service Inte I-%% Ist I 
Logging and Auditing Security Relevant 
Events 
N x 
Generation. Storage and Di%tribution of 
Cryptographic Kevs 
N x IN 
Domain Notarv Service 
Inter-Domain Comnitinicitiom N 
Trugted Entrv Point N 
Domain Commu ni cat ion. - X 
Access Control N 
Authentication 0 N N 
Table 5 3-L Division Of Labour 
The 3-L irchitccturc rclics heavily upon the use 
of public-kc)-J9 I and sccret-key 
cr)-ptos)-stciiis[IO 1; the public-key ci), ptographic 
techniques are used for the 
amlictitication/integrity and confidentiality 
requircnicnts while the sccrct-key cryptosysIcnis 
are uscd to accomplish very fast bulk encryption 
solcly for the purpose of confidentiality. Every 
user. LSU. LSS and DMC will have their own 
public cryptographic key pair used for 
authentication and certified by an LSS, DMC or 
cxtcriial TTP. The use of the LSU, LSS and 
DMC key pairs are for security service 
management only, while the user's public-key 
pair is used to attain personal liability and 
accountability. 
Donwin Alanagenient Centre 
The domain 111,111agnicnt cciitre is the highest 
authority within the tlirce liycr architecture and 
is comprised or most agents within the basic 
CISS model. see table 4. For all iiitciits and 
purposes it acts as a central entry point to entities 
requesting associations on the opposite side of a 
security boundary. The DMC is the only level 
entity within a security domain that has the direct 
use of the IDCA. Within the DMC's SMIB each 
LSS is listed along with its inter domain 
communication propertics. The property list may 
simply contain in attributc that refers the DMC 
to the LSS of interest for instnictions, or it may 
be a dctailcd list or cxtcriial entities that may 
forin an association with in entity inside the 
sccurity domain. 
For example, n business wishes to plncc the 
machincs it uses for accounting upon a LAN so 
that its accountants may access them from rcinote 
sitcs across the domain. However, the 
administration is worricd thit the placement of 
the machincs upon the LAN will put thcm at risk 
from attackcrs outside of the organisations 
sccurity donmin. Tlicrcforc. a rule is ciitcrcd into 
the DMC SMIB that no cxtcrnal associations are 
allowcd with the accounting machincs, thus 
sccuring thcm from potential external liackcrs 
just as an Intmict firewall scrccns aucinpted 
associitions. 
The DMC is rcsponsible for the inip1mcritation 
of the sccurity policy laid out for a domain. To 
accomplish this the DMC is capable of modifying 
the SAA or rather the SMIB cntrics that 
deterininc the sccurity mcchanism uscd by the 
various protocols within the 3-L architecture by 
cach of the levcls, such as digital signature 
systems or cryptosystcnis used for conridcntiality. 
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The co-ordination and synchronisation of 
management keys within the security domain is 
the primary responsibility of the DMC. The 
DMC ensures synchronisation by rcgular 
distribution of a list of LSS public-kcy ccrtificatcs 
to all LSSs. The ccrtificatc list is distributed in 
off-peak liours so that systcni performance is not 
adversely affected. The DMC may dciiiand the 
generation or new keys from its hosted LSSs 
according to the security policy of the domain. 
The time for which keys may be valid will be 
convenient intcrvals dependent Oil the 
organisation. For example, weckly distributions 
of the certificate list may be accomplislicd oil 
Sunday nights. which in all likelihood is the 
quietest night in most organimfions. 
Local Security Server 
The local security scn-cr providcs the framework 
for secure communications across the LAN wid 
has a pirt in all of the LSU'sactivitics. The LSS 
can be thought of as a file scn-cr and any 
references to filcs will be c. xaniiiicd bv the LSý. 
It enforces the protocols to be uscd as indicated 
by the DMC and subscqucii1l). ciitcrcd into the 
LSS's SMIB. The DNIC provides the LSS with 
notary scr%-iccs and misted kc). certificates. It is 
envisaged that the DMC should be a physicall) 
secured machine to %Ahich acccss land the 
obtaining of systcm privilegcs is restricted to 
mininial pcrsonncl. The DMC should be solely 
controlled by the sccurity scetion of the 
organisation. 
The LSS provides secure sen-ices such as secure 
file transfa. notary scn-iccs. c1c. to the LSUs that 
it hosts. 
confidentiality of data between it and the LSS, 
and the authentication of users. If dumb 
terminals are used in networks then due to their 
lack of processing power and therefore their 
inability to maintain conflidcntial 
conimmucations between themselves and their 
host, they provide a small security risk. In the 
case of dumb terminals it must be assumed that 
the physical links between the terminal and the 
host is secured, either through cryptode-vices 
IIII at either end of the connection, or physical 
impediments, for example concrete criciscrnmit 
of the line. 
umomead 
oclemce conmochon 
DLOW lolrn4uA 
b'WASU IN 4t 
Figuire 4 Secure Dumb Terminal 
In the event of dumb terminals being used within 
the 31, architecture the LSU Nvill reside on the 
host and the sccurity iiictliods for confidentiality 
mentioned above must be rclicd upon for secrecy. 
However. with the downward spiral in the cost of 
processing power, and the movement towards 
distributcd processing it can be assumed that 
most user (crininals within LANs recently sct-up 
will not be dumb terminals, with the most 
common approach bcing tite use or Pcs. i4ow 
much processing power tlicsc tcriiiinals have is 
extremely variable and dcpcndcnt upon such 
things as the coniptitcr purchase policy of the 
company. therdorc the architecture of a security 
system niust be IIcxiblc cnough to cope with 
di[Terciit levels in computing technology. 
AL 
Proof Of 
Subn"on v'"Moge pfoof k4&WK" 
Of Dehvery 
kcx)(af O, klirl 
f PeclApt Proof O 
Figapre 3 Non-reptitliation Routes 
For secure communication outside of (lie security 
domain the LSU contacts Ilic LSS which thell 
contacts the DMC on the LSU*s belialf. 
Local Security Unit 
The local security unit is sittlatcd at the user 
terminal and is concerned primarily with the 
The local security unit provides the processing 
power for most of the work in the provision of 
security under CISS. Within the 3-1, architecture 
there are many LSUs %vithin a domain, this 
division of proccsshig power is a more cfricicnt 
way of incohig the needs of users than through 
the use of a large central processing clement. 
Therefore. it is important that the LSU works as 
quickly and as cfficicntlY as possible. 
The bulk of processing done by the LSU will be 
taken tip through the cryptosystenis used within 
the security protocols. Public-kcy and Secret key 
systems can be very processor intensive and 
should tlicrcfore be provided by dedicated 
hardware %%-Iicrc%, cr possible, Fast RSA hardwire 
and cryptographic boards have been designed by 
the Network Mearch Group[12 1, [13 1 for this 
very purpose. 
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The LSU is aware or its LSS's and DNIC's 
public-kcy as it will have caclied a copy of tile 
DMC's signed certificate attesting to the validity 
of the LSSs public-kcy. 
4. Expansion of the Nlonitoring 
Agent 
Almost all security features placed on computcr 
systems are prewntative. Wlictlicr flicy are smart 
cards, passwords or bionictric identification 
systems, they are barriers placed in the way of an 
attacker attwipting to gain unauthorised access 
to a computer system. As useful as these 
tecliniqucs ire for access control once an attacker 
his by-passed dicin, it bcconics rMundant. As a 
conscqucncc conventional computer sccuritý 
s), stcius have reputcdly failcd to deal with three 
major security probicnis 1] 4 1.115 1.116 1: 
I. illcgal use of a system b) , . 111 
tinatithorised user once 11ccess 
controls have bccit compromised: 
2. abuse of pri%-ilcgcs by an authoriscd 
user. User abuse is potentially the 
most dangerous security breach as 
rcgular uscrs will have a good idea or 
wlicre to direct attacks for the most 
damagc. or wlicre the most valuable 
itil'briiiation is kept upon a systcm-. 
3. anomalous behaviour of system 
resources. through prcmice of logic 
bombs, bugs, viruses and Trojan 
horscs. 
The traditional method for detecting cascs onc 
and two ibovc is through the use of audit logs. 
Many existing opcrating systems such as VMS 
117 1 offer limited auditing facilities that can be 
used to detect masqueraders. HoN%-c%-cr. the 
amount of auditing information that can be 
gcncrated is vast. Therdorc. the inrorniation 
cannot be processed by a single sccurity 
administrator, and even d it was. discover)- or a 
masquerader would have been made too late to 
prcvcnt a masquerader from causing any damage. 
I. It is possible to learn the normal actiNity of a 
system, its resources and the users upon it, so 
that its behaviour can be predicted. 
2. A masquerader, privilege abuser, or virus, 
exhibit anomalous activity that can be 
detected as not being part of the normal 
systcm behaviour and the correct counter 
nicasurcs can be implcilicntcd to pment/limit 
damage. 
The reasoning bchind the two premises is as 
follows. 
The bdiaviour of a system cannot be 
unprcdictabIc for any length of time as that 
would provide no platform for any productive 
work to be done on it. Thcrefore, it is 
possible to predict a systcnis bchiviour 
User behaviour can be catcgoriscd due to two 
prevalent factors: humans form habits that are 
pectiliar to them. for instance there are 
multiple ways to open a file and once a user 
uses one way they rarely change even though 
it may not be the most efficient way; job 
specialisation, for example a secretary on the 
system will probably use difficrent system 
resources than a programmer. 
Anomalous behaviour is any that falls outside 
of the norm for I specific entity. III tile case 
of I niasqucrader the control bcliaviotir 
pattern would be that of the uscr whose 
account is bcing uscd. It can be assumcd that 
-I inasqucradcr will not pcrform the usual 
tasks that the uscr would be expected to since 
the masqucradcr is not thcre to perform as the 
legal uscr but instcad tlicrc for exploration, or 
malicious daniage. Programs should behave 
in I prcdictabic niamicr. If tlicy do not, for 
instance Nflicti hirectcd by a sicilth vinis, tlicy 
may c. \hibit rile modifications or writes to 
mcniory Iliat are uncliarictcristic. A powntill 
1)ri%, ilcgc abuscr may show indicative signs by 
c. xccssiN, c browsing, the aucniptcd/actual, 
attainment of supcr uscr status, or the ability 
to assunic another uscr's id. 
Computer vinises are the most wclI known of all 
malicious soffivare and have bccoilic much more 
complex as tlicir writcrs have ciiiplo). cd more 
sophisticated tccliniques in the creation of 
malicious soflwarc. 
A monitoring scheme has tlirce stagcs. 
161 Moniltor 
Andysis 
Response 
Pcrhaps the best method of dealing with the Fig-urc 5 Stages of Intrusion Detection security problems described abo 
, 
vc is through the 
continual surveillance of system activity. If the Monitor: 
following two ' premises are tnic then the system variables that are capable of being development of a system to deal %vith the security used to indicate anomalous behaviour problems discimcd is possible. 
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must be monitored and storcd for 
historical analysis. 
Analysis: 
using the nicasurcinciits of the system 
variables monitored tile monitoring 
scheme must be capable of rccognising 
anomalous bchaviour upoii Ilic computcr 
system. 
Response: 
depending oil the conclusions rcachcd by 
the analysis of hidicators a rcsponsc must 
be formed and inipIcnicnted, limiting the 
damage to dita upon the computer systcm 
and the protection of scn-iccs to users. 
The extended monitoring agcnt allows the 
gcncration of a single sccurity log that can be 
compriscd of gcncric CISS cvcnIs and specific 
events for the computing platform upon which 
CISS exists, i. e. the Opcrating Sysicin. 
Through the use of security log ciarics a history 
of user activity can be buill up. From this 
information a prqfilc can be gcncratccl that 
describes the tiscr/mitity's normal activity upon 
the s), stein. This prorilc can then be used in the 
detection or anomalous behaviour during an) 
future tiscr/ciitit)l activity. 
The basic CISS security log %Nill be made up of 
two entries the havic 1qq entry and the activity 
entty. The basic log entry is made up of fields 
that identify the uscr/cntity that caused an event, 
the time -it which the cvcnt took place, the system 
rcsourcc actcd upon. etc. An activity entry is a 
list of basic log entries linked to a single 
uscr/cntity action such as use of mail tools, text 
editors etc. 
The two sccurity log mitrics are used by the 
monitoring system to create prorilcs- activity 
profiles and behavioural profiles. Activity 
profiles describe a tiscr's/cntity's norinal activity 
entries. Bchavioural profiles related activities 
such as session *start-up' which may be the first 
activitics a user does it the start of each session-, 
login. reading mail, reading subscribed 
ncwsgroups. 
FA-4-1 -EMtr-y A,. A-t Audd Ent(V b 
"". IV Rome 2 
I Bt. ou, c 
Fig-ure 7 Prorile Monitoring 
Profiling can be divided into thrcc sections. 
1. Data filtcring: 
through the correct data selection the most 
indicative incasurcs are used while the rest 
are discarded to reduce processing. This 
is also a function or the analysis scclion of 
the monitoringagut. 
2. Profile crcation: 
froin the filtered nicasurcs a control 
profile is created that inclicatcs the 
boundaries of normal behaviour. 
3. Profile Rclincinciit: 
the profile is continuously rcrincd so that 
it is tip to date. 
lyd- 
-Xý 
X , 
xx 
Bccausc profiles are nicant to be representative of 
lite tiscrs normal activity it is important to keep 
them tip to datc. This can be done through the 
acquisition of sampic activity during nornial 
scssions. Automatic updating in this form can be 
accomplished daily or N%-cckly, depending on the 
activity of the tiscr. Updating a profile would 
only like place at the Icrinination of a successful 
scssion. This rcdtices the chince of 
contamination of a profile by possible 
niasqueradcr activity. The logical section within 
the monitoring agent that is responsible for 
profile rclincinciii is the profile rcrincr. 
The surreptitious updating or profiles can lead to 
the problem of slow change. If privilege abusers 
know that profiling is being used with automatic 
updaics they may attempt to slowly modify their 
bchaviour over time, consequently altering tlicir 
profiles. Thus they may not exhibit anomalous 
bchaviour even AN-licn abusing the system. For 
example. a privilcge abuscr can gradually 
introduce file browsing into his normal list of 
aclivitics and thcn slowly incrca se his browsing 
activities. 
The second way to update a profile is for the 
sccurity administrator to force an update by 
rmn"f;,, ý -# #1--h 41- CA A rt. *- IL_ 1-11-LA346 At L11AVUE, 11 LIIF. Ot%f%. I Illb WVUIU UU 
Figure 6 Profiler rcqt; ircd at initial sct-up of the system, at the 
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addition of a new user, or at the addition of new 
soffivarc. 
Software profiles will bc limited to activities. B) 
attributing a piece of software with an activit), 
profile it should be possible to detect in), 
anomalous writes or reads. that could be 
indications of a Trojan liorse or vinis. Such 
activity when detected by the monitoring 
scheme's analyser may demand the initiation of a 
virus scanner specifically targeting the suspect 
piece of soffivare. If no vinis is found the 
responder may tag the piece of software for (lie 
security administrators attention. The sccurilN 
administrator can then tisc the activity audit 
entries to examine exactly N%hat the piece of 
software is doing. 
sacwth, 
Log Eýon 
Nohm 
Qllllý`Ill 
Sects, tv Loo 
Figuire H Analysi% Within CISS 
Anomalous activity docclion of software using 
profiling will only work if the knoN%ledge base 
holds profiles prior to infection, Any infected 
sollware introduced into Ilic svsicni for the first 
time will not be detected as c4iibiting anomalous 
behaviour NN-licii the stealth vinis delivers its 
payload. Since most organisations use a limited 
number of soffivare packages it is possible that 
standard applications can be profiled and their 
profile introduced into the knowledge base prior 
to installation of the software upon the system. 
These standard profiles can be gcncratcd cillicr 
by the application suppliers or the CISS 
suppliers. 
Computcr terminals can be given behaviour 
profiles so that their actions upon a network can 
be monitored for anomalous -activity. Activities 
that a terminal may be audited for. and for which 
a behaviour profilc may be gencrated. include 
network connections. remote logills. trafflic 
intensity, ctc. This sort of profiling can help in 
the prucntion of machines being used for 
activities such as hacking. 
Profiles take tinic to be generated so the most 
vuhicrable tinic for a systcm is %%hcn a ncxv cntily 
is placed upon it ( uicr/sonwarc ). Thcrdorc. 
until enough inrorniation has been gathered for 
an initial profile standard sccurity mechanisms 
must suffice. 
Within the monitoring agent there should be 
r- -tinic -line a- cal anahsis and ofr , nalysis. The real 
finic analysis will be made tip of the three 
specificd analyscrs. 
1. The task of the cxpert system will be to detect 
'1110111,11ous behaviour by applying the 
c. xpcriciicc that security experts liavc imbucd 
into it through the rules that they have 
generated for its hircmice engine. The expert 
s%-stciii will tise the essential rules as dictated ýy the sanic experts monitoring in real-time. 
2.7iic task of the statistical inalyscr is to detect 
ationialous behaviour of entities through 
activitics outside or their norm as dictated by 
their prorilcs. This is more specific than that 
or oic expert system. although the rcil-tinic 
c. xpcrt system will use the results of statistical 
analyscr in its own analysis. 
3. The neural network should be used in very 
spCcific cases whcrc the samples that are 
nccdcd for its training can be collected and 
Ilic problem is %, cr), specific. 
As Nvell as the awmaly detection through activity 
prorilcs there should be other real time 
supen, isory mechanisms requiring analysis, such 
as keystroke timings. network traffic analysis, 
Cie. Tlicrc is also an off-line security log 
anal)-ser, that is an expert system with a full rule 
base, that can conduct thorough analysis of the 
security log. Anomalies detected through these 
mcchanisms are reported to the evaluation block 
of Figure S. 
The evaluation block can be cither n simple sum 
Onshold sclicnic with logic for furtlicr 
rcrincinent of profiling nnd snrnpling, or it ain be 
nn expert systcni programmed to perform a 
decision on the currciit scairity of CISS through 
the daw provided by the monitoring agents rcnl- 
time winlNurs. 
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The evaluation segment of the moniloring agent 
will have all awareness rating so that the greater 
the aNvarcness the more sensitive the analyser 
becomes. For instance, numerous suspicious 
activity may occur in isolation without 
necessarily tipping the monitoring agent that a 
masquerader is present. The frequency of 
suspicious activity contributes to the awareness 
value so that continued suspicious activity will 
eventual cause a response from the sývstciu. 
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found in the detection of anomalous behaviour 
upon a system. The incrusing frcqucncy of 
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Abstract 
This paper gives an introduction into computer 
system user identification and presents the 
results of an investigation into the application of 
a multi-layer perceptron and a genetic algorilhin 
to user identification. The nuilti-layer 
perceptron was trained to recoýiznise the 
keystroke thnings of 4 static text stilitizs fi-oin 15 
users. The genelic alýorilhjn was al)plied to 
optimising the data used to train the intilli-IQWr 
perceptron and identification of the user. 77te 
security inechanisin investýqated can be easily 
added to any computer ývslein to increase 
'password'securitY. 
Keywords : Perceptron. Genclic Algorithm. 
Kcystrokc Analysis. Atitlicntication. 
Untroduction 
Secured computer systcnis aim to protcct the claw 
processing scn-ices they provide and the daw 
they store within memory. The first unc or 
defence thit any computer systcm has against 
malicious attacks is to deny access to potential 
attackers. The only way that this can be done is 
to identify the person that is attempting to log 
onto the system, and tlicrcby determine whctlicr 
tlicy have a legitimate right to scn, iccs. 
2. User Authentication 
An individual possesses three qualitics that ma) 
be used to identify thcm I11: 
" what the individual knows: 
" %%, Iiattliciiidividti,. ilo%%-iispli). sic. ill)- 
" what the individual is. 
Any or all of these qualities can be used in a tiscr 
authentication mcclianism, with the strongest 
authentication nicclianisnis using more than one 
of these qualitics. 
What They Know 
Authentication S3'StcIIIs C. Nploiting this quality 
generally require the individual to know a sccret 
password which inust be presented when 
challenged. Other systems may use a ditabase 
that contains dctailcý personal knowledge about 
its users, whenever someone jUmpts to login 
the), are asked random questions, such as. 
birthdates of offspring, nanics of relatives, 
favourite itcm of music, and the answer given is 
compared to those in the database. 
The password is the most common authentication 
mcclianisin in use at prcsciit. When a user logs 
into a computcr system lie is usually challenged 
for a password, this password is kept in a 
database indcxcd by the user's login name. If 
uscrs choosc tlicir passwords according to 
common sccurity policy 12 1, then the password 
ilieclianisin is vcry secure, especially when 
augnientcd Nvith a limitcd aniount of unsuccessful 
logon attciiipts (i. e. a "three tries and you are 
out" policy). 
HoNN-c%-cr. it has bccii shown in various studies 
1") 1. that no nialtcr how theoretically secure a 
password mcchnnism is, its overall security is 
compromised vcry casily by: 
uscrs picking easily gucssable words such as, 
"Password. - -drowssap, " or using words 
dcrix, cd from tlicir login namcs, or found in 
dictionaries. Dictionary words are 
particularly dangcrous bccausc progranis exist 
to crack uscr accounts 14 1. by simply using 
an cxhaustivc scarch tccliniquc to obtain 
passwords; 
bccausc some uscrs communicate tlicir 
passwords to other users, or write thcm down 
near their tcrininals, for cxample the BT 
CIISC. 
Even with its faults. the password mechanism is 
still in Nvide use as the sole form of user 
authentication on many computcr systems. The 
low cost of inipIcnicniing a password mcchanisin 
and the familiarity users have with the 
mcchanisin makes ccrtain that for the foreseeable 
future it will continue to be the most popular 
form of nufficntication. 
What They Own 
In this situation the legitimate user will have a 
token that must be presented wlicii challenged. 
The token is usually in the form of a magnetic 
stripe card or increasingly a sinnrt card 16 1. The 
difTermicc between the two cards is a matter of 
intelligence, the smart card, as its name implies, 
has some intelligence in the form of on-board 
processing capabilities. The present smart card 
technology is split into two main areas: active 
cards and second generation cards. Active cards 
are meant to be used in a stand alone mode where 
power and processing is done on-board, where as 
the second generation cards are passive and 
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require a card reader. HoN%-c%, cr, most cards in 
use fall into the arca bowccii the two. 
The use of tokciis has increased in c%-ci)diy life. 
%%ith almost everybody carrying one ( e. g. 
Automatic Teller Machincs, A. T. M. cards). 
Tokens used in an autlictitication mechanism 
require the purchasc or specialiscd cquipmcnt. 
For example in the case of magnctic stripe cards, 
not only must a mignctic stripe card rcader be 
purchased for all physical locations whcrc user 
authentication is dcciucd necessary, but so must 
cards for all users on the system. This initial 
outlay of capital on spccialiscd equipiucia can 
make a tokcii sclicnic prohibitive in most 
environments c. xccpt those that require high 
security, such as gowninicnt installations. banks. 
etc. 
With the continuing reduction of processor size, 
smart cards arc being used in 'see through' 
authentication mcchanisms 17 1. that do not 
necessarily rcquirc a sincialised reader but 
require the purchasing or smart cards for all 
users. 
Tokciis used in an authentication mechanism can 
provide good scairity. but users arc fallible and 
may lose or forget cards. The token may also be 
stolen, scriously compromising security. 
What Thev Are 
Wlicn i biological charactcristic can be used to 
idciitify in individual it is callcd a biometric. 
Bionictrics can be furthcr di%-idcd into two 
groups, active ind passive. A passive bionictric 
is a physical charactcristic that may be scanned 
with no cffort by the subject othcr than the 
cxhibition of said charactcristic. e. g. finger- 
prints, or ficial features. An active bionictric 
could be hand writing IS 1. or voice pattans 19 1. 
In a bionictric autlicntic-ation systcin ; in attackcr 
call only hopc to imitite the characteristic thit 
the mcclianisin uscs to Wntify lcgilinizitc uscrs. 
Some of the bionictrics that hnvc becu rcsurched 
are human faces. specch, fingcr prints, bod) 
odour and iris patterns. Duc to Ilic Icchnologics 
cmploycd in bionictric nicasurcment the ficid is 
mainly experinictital and lins not found many 
applications in C. xisting '111111cliticatioll 
nicclianisnis. I 
Hovvevcr, bionictrics offer potentially the best 
forin of user -111thmitication since thcY mcasure 
actual chiractcristics of what a user is. As with 
any authentication mcchanism flicy are not fool 
body to identify Ilicnisch-cs. It is of course 
possible for an attacker to obtain the necessary 
body part. However, the cffort and will on the 
part of the attacker must be far greater than that 
necessary, for example to steal a slip of paper 
with a user's pass%-%-ord on it. It is also possible 
fo r two people to have similar active 
characteristics and tlicrcfore fool an active 
bionictric authentication mechanism, but, if an 
attacker happens to have a dissimilar active 
bionictric they must make an extreme cffort to 
mimic the user. 
Bionictrics used in in authentication mcclianisin 
ofTer several advantages: 
" requires very little training for users to use; 
" there is no risk of losing, or having a token 
stolen as there is in a token mechanism, 
" no risk of having in item of knowledge 
(password) becoming known. 
However. bionictrics also have several 
disadvantages: 
III passh-C systems require processing 
equipmcnt either audio, visual or chemical 
that can be N-cry expensive; 
the processing of bionictric data can be very 
proccsscr intensive; 
thc information to deceive: a system may be 
acquired from the user through sampling; 
the), are never perfect, recognition of a subject 
is generally given as a degree of confidence. 
Bionictric authentication systciijs litilisc t1le 0111y 
nicasurcincnt that actually tests the identity of a 
person. It cin be argued thit the first two 
qualitics incrcly idciitify the knowledge of a 
password and the token itself, not the person 
flicilisch-cs. 
This paper invatigatcs and discusses a clicip 
solution for an active bionictric security 
mechanism. that can cisily be introduced into 
most existing systcnis using the most common 
autlictitication mccil-Inisin - the pissword. 
3. Keystroke Analysis 
In 1975 Spillane I 10 1, proposed that just like 
handwriting, typing styles were -an 2ct'vc 
bionictric measurement. When analysing typing, 
various factors can be measured, for example: 
intcr-kcystroke timing (the timing 
bchvccn consecutive key 
depressions); 
depression time (the length of time a 
key is depressed); 
pressure of key depression. 
proof. In passi%, e bionictric autlicnticatioll 
mcclianisms the user'niust present a p: art' of the 
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Furthcr rcscarch 1111,112 1.113 1 into the arca 
of typing analysis has confirmcd Spillane's 
proposal. An advantagc of typing analysis ox-cr 
otlicr bionictric systcnis is that it minimiscs sonic 
of the gencral disadvantagcs prcscnt in them: 
1. it potentially rcquircs no c. xtra 
Cquipincilt, 
2. most of the clata proccssing can bc 
done in an initial learning pliasc. 
T)I)ing analysis can work in onc of two ways. 
Static analysis is conducted upon text strings that 
do not change. There are two points at which 
such analysis could significantly augment the 
security of a computer system. in the initial 
authentication of a uscr (i. c. at login) and 
whenever a volatilc command is used. At 1(ýgin 
there are usually IN%, o points that are ideal for 
static typing analysis. at the entry of usei- nalne 
and the corresponding pasmvortL A volatile 
command is onc which when used can be 
potentially harniffil. Tlic), are commands that 
generally delete or iiiodiýv data storcd within 
computcr memory, such as the 'deltrec' or 'del' 
commands in MS-DOS 114 1. 
typing characteristics for static analysis. The 
sampling program was written in C, utilising the 
DOS kcyboard intumpts to time the intcn, als 
bctween kc), depressions. 
Every subjcct that took pirt in the experiment 
entered four set rcfcrciice text strings. The four 
strhigs NN, cre as follows: 
REM : -PRINT'; 
REF2: "TRANSFERENCE'; 
REF3 : "RED SKY AT MIGHT', 
REF4 : **RUG7BY PLAYERS ODD 
SHAPED BALLS', 
At the end of each text entry the subjects had to 
depress the return key. 
The text strings %%-crc choscit to make good use of 
the kc)-board. such as cross digraphs that use 
both imivcs or the keyboard, REM was clioscn 
for familiarity to the test subjects, as it is one of 
the most common words that a cornputcr literate 
pcrson will 1), pc. all four reference texts use the 
thrce main ro%N, s of kcys on a Q%%, crty kc)board 
and REF4 is unusual in the combination of words 
and digraphs. 
Dynamic anilysis is conducted upon previously 
unknown text strings that are entered by a user. 
The entry characteristics can be stored and 
analysed Inter or they may be analysed in rcal- 
time, allowing continuous supen-ision of a 
session. 
The cffccti%-cncss of a uscr authentication 
mechanism can be measured using two figurcs. 
the false rejection rate (FRR) and the false 
acceptance rate (FAR). The FRR represents the 
pumitagc of Icgitimatc uscrs actimlly classified 
by the uscr aullicntication mechanism as 
attackers. The FAR is the pumitagc orattackus 
classified by the mechanism as legifiniale uscrs. 
The investigation conducted into typing analysis 
can be split into 3 phases: 
1. sampling-, 
2. classification of typing samples; 
3. data optimimfion. 
4. Sampling 
The typing sampics collccted for the im-cstigation 
Ni-cre takcn using an IBM PC with a 386-33MHz 
DX proccssor using a standard UK configuration 
Qwcrty kc)-board. Through cmunination of other 
rescarch in the area of typing analysis 1111,1121, 
The subjects N%, crc forced to tisc static text strings 
to make classification of Ilicir samples as difficult 
as possible-, coninion sense dictates that typing 
st)-Ics are exaggerated wlicii uscrs type in familiar 
text strings such as tlicir names. The choice of 
set strings of text rcprcsctits a worst case sccnario 
for typing analysis of passwords ( wlicre all users 
have the sanic password ) and the mil sittiation 
of volatile commands that arc set by the 
opcrating system bcing tiscd and common to all 
uscrs. The four text strings were also graduatcd 
in Icngth to cvaluatc what cfrcct it had on 
classirication of samples. 
Before the test subjccts began typing they were 
told: 
1. speed Nvas a fictor; 
2. any mistakes made during entry would cause 
the entry to be invalid and tlicy Nvould have to 
enter the whole text string again. 
FiRcen subjects took part in the experiment, who 
were all reasonably familiarwith typing, coming 
from n computing background. Every subject 
entered cach text string 35 times, making all 
entries at one 10-15 minute sitting. The inter- 
kc), stroke times were recorded by the sampling 
program and stored within files. 
1131,115 1, [16 1, it was decided that the intcr- 5.0assirication keystroke timing was the best discriminator or The reason for choosing the multi-layer people's t3ping styles, and one of the few useful 
perccptron for pattcrn recognition lies in the fact 
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ftt it is one of the few classification techniques 
that can solve problems involving non-lincar 
separability, and the potentially hTmitc varicty of 
individual typing styles suggests that typing 
analysis is a non lincar problem. 
In 1943 McCulloch and Pitts proposcd a modd of 
a biological ncuron. It was not till 1962 that 
simple collections of the basic neuron model 
became known as Perceptrons 117 1. A multi- 
layer perccptron has an input laycr. an output. 
and at least one hiddcn la)-cr which is not dircctly 
connected to the outside world. The topology of 
a multi-laycr perccptron can be sccii in Figure 1. 
The neural net %%-as trained with 4000 
prcsciitatioiis of training samples. The training 
vector used for cach cycle %%-, is chosen randomly 
from the training set. The networks were 
cvahiatcd Nvith the final 10 t)l)ing samples of 
cach subject, giving for test purposes 150 
lcgiiiiiiate attempts and 2100 attempts of 
illcgitiniate access. 
0.7 1 0.8 1 0.9 
REF 11 24 21 15 
RLF 2 8 6 
REF 3 8 6 5 
1 
REF 4 4 3 2 
Average 1 1 9 6 6 
FAR gi%, cii as 
0.7 1 0.8 1 0.9 
Figurc I NfUlti-Layer Perceptron Model 
The learning algorithin employed for thc inulti- 
layer pcrccptroii uscd in the experiment was thc 
'back-propagntion' algorithm 118 1. The back 
propagation algorithin trics to ininimisc the error 
of each tiodc's output. The algoritlini starts 
calculating errors from thc output laycr and thcn 
propagates the error back to the liiddcii layer till 
the errors for all nodes is known. 
A multi-layer perccptroit iict%%ork wn creatcd for 
each REF text for ever), test subject. Ench test 
subject's networks were taught to distinguish 
tlicir keystroke timings from the other test 
subjects. The neural nct, if %%orking perfect]). 
would give an output of I if the specific user's 
timings were llic input vector. and a0 if the input 
vector Nvas onc of the other 14 test subjects. 
However, multi-laycr pcrccptroiis rarely givc 
perfect outputs so a threshold scheme had to be 
. of 
set. It %vas decided to cvalualc the efficacy 
three threshold values 0.7,0.8. and 0.9, any value 
output by the nctwork above these thresholds was 
taken as recognition or a specific test subject. 
The basic topology of tile multi-laycr puceptron 
NVIS: 
hiput nodes cqual to the numbu of 
digraphs in dic REF tcxt- 
one hidden li%lcr, with a number of 
nodcs cqual to livice the input nodcs-. 
a single output nodc. 
REF 1 10 15 1 26 
REF2 15 19 25 
it 1: F3 21 23 27 
REI: 4 29 32 40 
Average 19 22 30 
Tablc I Results 
FRR givcn as 
The low FAR makes the network -, ippcar more 
suitable for login security, as the FRR is still a 
little high for use in a volatile command security 
Inechanisill. 
Since the neural network analysis seemed more 
suited to a login security mechanism it was 
decided to investigate the use of two reference 
texts. thus emulating the login process wherc a 
uscrninic and password arc used. This is a worse 
case scenario wlicrc all users have the same name 
and password. 
Two neural licts wcrc employed in this two 
reference strategy, one for the login name and the 
other for the password. Every attempt of 
authentication to (lie system is placed into one of 
threc categories depending on the combined 
result of (lie neural ncts. 
(R)cjcctcd - both Samples were rejected by 
their respective ricuril networks. 
(L)ow - onc of the two sampics was rejected. 
(H)igh - Both samples were accepted 
REF I and REF 2 
It IT 11 
LO. 7 72 26 2 
O. X 76 22 2 
0.9 
, 
82 
1 
17 
,I 
hilpostor attciiipts (o/. ) 
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--T-L 11 iz L L7 68 
.8 
0.9 
0.8 63 
0q 9 52 
0.7 3 29 68 
0.8 4 33 63 
0.9 9 39 52 
User Attempts (%) 
Table 2 Two Reference Results (REFI and 
REF2) 
REF 2 and REF 3 
.90 
t7 
.8 
0 0.9 
0.80 
Impostor Attciiipts N 
L 11 
L7 59 
.8 
0 0.9 
0.8 55 
.9 43 
Uscr Alicnipts 
Table 3 Two Reference Results (REF2. md 
REF3) 
As can be seen. it is possible to incrcasc the 
security significantly. using a threshold valtic of 
0.9 and a requirement of at least an L category 
result, the FRR can be brought down to 7% and 
the FAR to 8%. 
6. Data Optimisation 
The ncxt part of Ilic inx-cstigation was an allempt 
to improvc flic rcstills of the basic multi-layer 
pcrccptroii through optimisation of Ilic input 
N, cctors. Starting from an initial conjecturc that: 
"cach individual has specific digraphs 
that are particularly characteristic of their Iyping 
Style. " 
the possibility of idcntiýving characteristic 
dign, plis wis rescarclicd. 
As with the pcrccptroti the genetic algorithm 
(GA), came about through research intoan aspect 
of the real world. evolution, and more specifically 
the mechanism bchind it. that 1)ro%-ides the 
necessary small increments in performance for 
natural selection to work, gctictics. E%-olution is 
a natural sorting mechanism that seeks to 
optimisc performance of living entities. it relics 
upon the fact that the more successful incliN-iduals 
of any group will pass on their genctic 
information to tlicir childrcii. In the process of 
breeding there is a chance that the genetic 
material passed onto the next generation will be 
mutated, introducing a characteristic that was not 
previously presciit in the groups genetic pool. If 
this inutition is a contributing factor to the 
success of an individual tlicii it is likely to be 
passcd onto the nc. xt gcncration. 
Genetic algoritlinis are slightly diffcrcnt from 
other algorithms thit perform search and 
optimisition proccclurcs in seN, cril, %N-, iys: 
" GAs conduct their scarch from several points 
and not from a single point*. 
" GAs use probabilistic nilcs and not 
dctcrininistic ones-, 
" GAs need only know the objective function 
and no other auxiliary information; 
" GAs need only a coding of the pararnetcr set 
and not the paranictus tlicniscIvcs. 
The expcriiiiciits into the optimisation of digripli 
sclcction was conductcd on four subjccls chosen 
at random. it was necessary to limit the number 
of subjccts bccause of the Icngth of tinic it took to 
calculate the fitness (how AA, cll that nicniber 
performcd i. c. its ability to corrcctly clissify a 
typing S. 1111PIC) for cach incinbcr of a gciicn, tion. 
Although only four subjccts %%, crc optiiiiiscd the 
cntirc training scl was uscd to train the neural 
ncts and to cvaluatc the GA sclcction of digraphs. 
The basic rcstills. using c%, cry digraph and each 
rcfcrciicc with the basic neural net topology and a 
training cycle of 4000 presentations are: 
o. 7 0.8 0.9 
1 14 8 4 
REF2 7 6 5 
REF 3 3 3 2 
It F. F4 3 3 2 
verap 7 5 
FAR givcii as % 
0.7 0.8 1 0.9 
RLF 1 31 42 1 59 
REF2 17 19 25 
REF 3 40 49 55 
REF 4 23 27 38 
Average 28 34 
FRR givcn as 
Table 4 GA Basic Results 
One of the subjects choscii was the most 
inconsistcnt typists froin the tcst subjccts, it was 
dicir inconsistucy thnt providcd the high FAR 
for REF 3. 
In the first expcriiiiciit a population of 12 was 
used and the number of gmicrations that the 
gcnctic algorillim mvit on for was 20. The results 
of the optimisation can be seen below 
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0.7 0.8 0.9 
REF 1 14 9 6 
PLEF 2 7 7 5 
REF 3 8 6 4 
REF 4 2 2 1 
Average 18 6 4 
FAR 
0.7 0.8 0.9 
REF 1 32 44 14 
REF 2 12 15 30 
REF 3 29 32 43 
REF 4 16 20 29 
verage 22 29 
1 39 
FRR 
Tablc 5 GA Exp I Results 
Digraphs uscd MaN Digraillis 
REF 1 4 5 
REF 2 7 12 
REF 3 10 16 
REF 4 16 30 
0.7 0.8 0.9 
REF 1 20 9 5 
REF 2 11 9 7 
REF 3 8 7 4 
IE- F -4 [-3 3 2 
Average 7 
FAR 
0.7 0.9 0.9 
REF 1 31 53 63 
REF 2 19 26 39 
REF 3 29 32 41 
REF 4 23 26 37 
Average 
i 26 1 34 
FRR 
Table 7 GA Exp2 Results 
Digyiplis used I Max Digraphs 
REF 1 2 5 
REF2 6 12 
REF 3 7 16 
REIF 4 12 30 
Table 6 CA Exp I Digraphs P% 
The results show al, mcrall improvement in the 
performance of the ncural tict m-licii using GA 
selected digraphs. Ho%%-c%-cr. in the case of REF I 
tlicrc were not enough digraphs prescm to allow 
a proper sclcction by the genctic algorithm. 
leading to rcsults almost equivalent to that 
attaincd through using all digraphs. The best 
performance by the genctic algorithm was in the 
sclcction of digraphs from REF 4. the FRR was 
rcduccd by 8% on avcragc and the FAR by 1%. 
This improvcnicnt can be c-Nplaincd through the 
large choice of digraphs. allowing the best 
digraphs to be picked that minimiscd both the 
FRR and the FAR. 
In expcrimcnt two a population of 12 Nvas uscd 
and the number of gmicrations that thc gcnclic 
algorithm wcnt on for was 40. Ho%%-c%-cr. this 
tinic the gcnctic algorithins ritiicss was adjustcd 
in rcspcct to how fcw digraphs ix-crc uscd for 
idcritification. 
Table 9 CA E-. 1)2 Digraphs 
7. Conclusion 
The results from using just the neural network 
with no clata optimisation are very encouraging. 
It must be rcnicnibered that this nictliod of user 
authentication is not suggested as a total solution 
but is nicant as a way of increasing the level of 
sccurity on a password mcclianism cliciply and 
rclati%, cly painlessly in tcrins of the complexity of 
adding it to the systcm. The experiment Nvis 
impIcnictitcd in such a way as to make life as 
difficult as possible for the classifier, and from 
the results obtained the multi-laycr pcrccptron 
has copcd very NN-c1l. 
Two conclusions that can be drawn from the 
results givcn by the neural net are: 
I. thit the optimum text length for identification 
purposes involving keystroke analysis is 
greater than 5 and less than 31, optimally 
around 13-20 letters long; 
2. the combination of two tcxts in a login phase 
would provide adequate security for almost 
any login mcchanism. 
As can be seen by the results of the data 
optimisation the application of a genetic 
algorithin can rcducc Ilic numbu of digraphs 
rcquircd to identify a uscr. The results sliowcd a 
general 
-. 
improvement over the straight. 
classirication with no data optimisation. 
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The results from this investigation a rc 
encouraging in that they show considerable 
accuracy without too much refinement forn Nvorst 
case scenario. The algorithin N%-orkcd N-ci)- Nvell 
Ni, hcn multiple refcrencc texts were used. 
Therefore, this autlicntication mcch. mism can be 
used within the login scenario with little more 
refinement. 
However, the second static use proposed ( the 
cntry of a volatile command ) requires more 
thought. If the suggested atillicntication 
mechanism was used the user would have to give 
multiple samples for cach volatile command that 
would use this autlicntication mechanism. No 
user would want to provide the number of 
samples required, so alternative strategies niust 
be thought of, two cxanipics are given below. 
1. The user %%Iicii using a volatilc command 
is challenged for his password. This ina) 
sound is if it would beconic annoying . r. Y However. windows and UNIX alread) 
challenge as to the surety of their 
command, it would takc little adaptation 
to adjust thcsc OSs to rcqucst a password 
instead. 
2. The uscr is allowcd to inifiatc a volatile 
commind as many tinics as it takes for thc 
autliclitication mcchallism to obtain 
cnough sampics ror thc tcaning or its 
ricural nct. Thcrcaftcr thc autimitication 
nicclinnism will cxaminc the keystrokc 
timings or aic volatile command cimy 
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